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How is European integration affecting patterns of capital-labour interaction? 
More specifically, how is the inclusion of interest associations at the European 
level affecting the behavior of domestic interest associations? This dissertation 
contributes to the perennial debate over models of capitalism, focusing on the core 
component of industrial relations in Western Europe. In particular, the dissertation 
attempts to answer three questions: (1) how the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) and BusinessEurope as new political actors have influenced 
domestic interest configurations; (2) how negotiation at the supranational level 
affects the strategies of central actors in domestic industrial relations systems; and 
(3) if and how pressure from the European integration project modifies the 
institutional legacies of domestic IR systems. Using Ireland and Italy as case 
studies, this dissertation examines the impact of two external factors on each 
country’s industrial relations system: interest aggregation and representation at the 
EU level, and the 2002 EU Directive on the Information and Consultation of 
Employees. The findings suggest that the development of the EU and related 
supranational interest confederations generate pressure over time on domestic 
industrial relations systems to decentralize collective bargaining to the company 
level. European integration has shaped the development of a new model of 
capitalism – one which ties market responsiveness to meso-level corporatism – 
while also addressing the more perennial questions of institutional endurance, path-
dependence, and change. 
 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
Background of the Problem 
The development of the European Union as a sui generis supranational 
institution poses many new challenges to country-specific domestic institutions. 
The inclusion of interest associations at the European level has the possibility of 
affecting the behavior of domestic interest associations, as does the advent of 
European level legislation pertaining to modes of labour-management consultation. 
Western Europe is home to a variety of types of industrial relations – ranging from 
the highly formalized ‘neo-corporatist’ to the more competitive ‘pluralist’ – and the 
advent of substantial activity at the EU level relating to organized interests creates 
an additional dynamic for EU member states to account for. In the context of EU 
being the external mover behind policy transfer processes, the study of industrial 
relations under the rubric of EU authority is worth examining for contributions to 
larger discussions of Europeanization. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
Two developments at the European level have the potential to have 
significant effects on domestic systems of industrial relations. The first is the 
advent of European level social partners, which represent peak-level federations of 
workers, industries, businesses and public enterprises all acting together in a 
consultative role for legislative proposals originating from the main three EU 




implementation of the 2002 EU Directive on the Information and Consultation of 
Employees (DICE). This Directive obliged employers to “establish a general 
framework setting out minimum requirements for the right to information and 
consultation of employees in undertakings or establishments within the 
Community.” (EUR-Lex 2002, Article 1) While DICE ensured that the practical 
implementation of the Directive could be done with attention to the pragmatics and 
industrial relations context of each member state, its stipulations still called for a 
legal floor of required employer-employee consultation that was not previously 
present in all EU member states. These two developments hold potential for 
modifying the framework of industrial relations dialogue in member states, either 
by providing a new access point at the supranational level for organized interests to 
lobby or by introducing a new formal requirement for consultation that may not 
have existed prior to DICE. Either form of modification is noteworthy because it 
would indicate that indirect as well as direct forces at the supranational level can 
affect the behavior of institutions within member states. The EU is clearly able to 
bring about significant changes in general member state behavior in areas of 
monetary policy, trade and market preferences, and internal immigration rules; in 
the area of labour-management relations, where country-specific norms and 
nuances are highly embedded and where compliance or non-compliance with a EU 
recommendation is much more difficult to ascertain, the potential ability of the EU 
to re-shape the climate of worker-employee relations is less clear. Added to this is 




Western Europe are ‘sticky’, path-dependent, and very difficult to change.1 Taken 
together, this dissertation examines whether either of the European-level 
developments given above have had any significant impact on domestic systems of 
industrial relations in EU member states, as indications of specific impact would 
reveal the potential authority of the EU to be greater than regulatory. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research was to ascertain what impact the EU, as a sui 
generis supranational organization, has had on industrial relations in its member 
states. The broad purpose speaks to the effects of multilevel governance from a top-
down, European perspective; the specific purpose examines what effects EU 
legislation pertaining to labour issues can have on domestic systems of bargaining 
and negotiation between management and labour. In all cases, this research sought 
to contribute to the idea of institutional ‘path-dependence – to what degree certain 
paths remain cemented even under EU regulations and what conditions might 
contribute to or inhibit path flexibility. The purpose was driven by an interest in the 
















tangible example of the softer, non-fiscal side of Europeanization. Political Science 
literature on the EU has dealt with the concept of Europeanization as an indirect, 
conceptual process that exists in definition but is unavoidably too hazy and 
ambiguous to offer concrete examples of how such indirect influence can be 
measured. This dissertation reflects an attempt to research a linear line of influence 
from the European level to domestic institutions in an area that is suitably 
significant. 
 
Significance of the Problem 
The significance of the problem lies in the overarching power of EU actions 
having substantive effects on domestic institutions, as well as the potential for a 
new ‘hybrid’ form of political economy that deviates from previous European 
models. European integration initially began with a small number of member states 
pooling limited amounts of sovereignty for the purpose of maintaining peace 
through economic interdependence. The growth of the EU since its inception, both 
in breadth and in depth, has posed great advantages and challenges for its member 
states to accommodate. The perennial question within the ‘Europeanization’ area of 
study is whether the EU has the power to fundamentally reshape domestic political 
institutions; whether domestic systems are gradually becoming harmonized towards 
a recognizable European model. Examining the effects of EU-level organized 




opportunity to trace the directionality of influence and to chart to what degree any 
visible effects are intended or unanticipated, subtle or extreme. 
 
Objective of Research and Nature of the Study 
The main aims of the research were to trace the course of directive ICE’s 
implementation in two different member states; to decipher if the implementation 
helped in enacting significant changes in labour-management consultation 
behaviour, and to determine if social dialogue at the European level has had a 
visible impact on influencing the traditional (i.e., long-standing since the post-war 
period) forms of industrial relations’ conduct in EU member states. The 
overarching objective of this research was to contribute to the academic discussion 
of “Europeanization”, in the form of showcasing the relationship between the 
supranational level and the domestic level in one particular issue area.  
 
Research Questions, Hypotheses, and Argument 
 The dissertation attempts to answer three questions: (1) how the European 
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) along with European-level employers’ 
organizations as new political actors have influenced domestic interest 
configurations; (2) how negotiation at the supranational level affects the strategies 
of central actors in domestic industrial relations systems; and (3) if and how 
pressure from the European integration project modifies the institutional legacies 




impact of two external factors on each country’s industrial relations system: interest 
aggregation and representation at the EU level, and the 2002 EU Directive on the 
Information and Consultation of Employees. I hypothesize that the development of 
EU-level, supranational interest confederations generates pressure over time in 
member states toward a form of social dialogue that is increasingly less political 
and binding than previous neo-corporatist models and yet more formal than 
previous voluntary models. I also hypothesize that EU legislation related to worker-
employer relations generates pressure over time on domestic systems of industrial 
relations to decentralize collective bargaining to the individual company level. 
The central argument of the dissertation is that the EU is in fact slowly re-
shaping the industrial relations context of Member States through a newer 
European notion of “social dialogue” that furthers the aims of the single market – 
essentially, productivity and international competitiveness – and underscores the 
priority of employability in any and all social policies. The very limitations of 
supranational EU authority over the domestic social and taxation policies of its 
Member States have necessarily bent the activities of ‘Social Europe’ toward job 
creation and worker preparedness, as opposed to job security and worker 
protections. This has the indirect effect of favouring employer and business 
concerns over traditional trade union demands, and the accompanying effect of 
encouraging unions to adapt their demands to the climate of the EU single market. 
More broadly, the EU’s use of Social Dialogue sets it apart from other 








Political scientists often employ institutional variables to account for 
variation and similarities in the political behavior of EU member states. This 
dissertation follows in this tradition and includes political factors regarding actors, 
interests and choices between competing values to account for variation. 
Possibilities for institutional evolution are linked to external inducements, 
incremental changes, and political re-alignments. The inclusion of organized 
interest representation at the EU level as a prominent political actor has the 
potential to condition national interest configurations to focus on issues separate 
from ideology. The scope of this research contributes to literature on models of 
capitalism and to research on the Europeanization of political economies. The 
suggestion is that European integration has shaped the development of a new model 
of capitalism – one which ties market responsiveness to meso-level corporatism, 
where bargaining and negotiation remains primarily at company level – while also 
addressing continual questions of institutional endurance, path-dependence, and 
change. 
 




The topic was chosen by the researcher when reading through lists of 
directives enacted at the EU level. The form and content of any country’s system of 
industrial relations tends to be one that is heavily conditioned by local context. 
Given the inherently contentious issue of many issues intuitively associated with 
industrial relations – collective wage bargaining, rights of workers, limits of 
employer demands upon workers – the addition of the European level of 
governance to a country’s mode of labour-management dialogue might initially 
seem intrusive for the actors involved. At the same time, given the breadth and 
scope of intra-European integration in the realms of business, finance while trying 
to create a coherent and internationally competitive single market, the need for 
European-level regulation to maintain a floor of standards across the union is 
important in order to avoid “social dumping” of worker rights (i.e., the reduction of 
social protections and provisions to the lowest common denominator, which would 
be the EU Member State with the weakest and thus cheapest regulations). The 
tension that could potentially arise out of these two points imbues DICE with a 
special significance (given the topic area of employee consultation) that could have 
far-reaching implications in certain member states. Specifically, states (such as 
Ireland) that did not have any previously mandated forms of employee consultation 
might find the implementation of this directive to be a very strong challenge to its 
existing voluntarist system of industrial relations. 
The scope of the research project extended from an examination of 




officials. Literature comes from the political science sub-fields to do with neo-
institutionalism, industrial relations (meaning the interaction of labour and 
management as organized interests), and European integration – all primarily in the 
context of comparative politics. Official documents include EU publications and 
reports from European think-tanks and observatories specifically assigned to 
monitor industrial relations in Europe (for more detail, see Chapter 4). Interviews 
included EU officials in the Employment and Social Affairs DG office, experts 
attached to European level social partners, and professionals within the layers of 
social partners in Italy and Ireland, respectively. The European level social partners 
include ETUC, BusinessEurope, UNICE, and CEEP. Within each country the 
social partners included those in government offices to do with employment 
relations, and national federations of trade unions and employer organizations. 
Taken together, these interviews generated the bulk of evidence pertaining to the 
actions at the EU level and the foundations of “social dialogue” that have become 
the new norm in interest negotiation in Europe. Basing evidence on these contacts 
was done with the intention of identifying changes in domestic industrial relations 
systems that are potentially the direct result of European integration. The purpose 
of this research is to compose a dissertation that demonstrates that countries which 
are member states of the EU can experience a convergence of their political 






The central argument, based on evidence found through multiple sources of 
data collection, is that any ‘Europeanization’ of industrial relations systems in EU 
member states is visible in two trends. The first trend is the transfer of negotiation 
away from traditional organizational structures – i.e., national federations of trade 
unions and employee organizations – and toward a general ‘individualist’ approach 
to consultation and coordination increasingly taken on at the company level, when 
a company is large enough to act independently of the sectoral framework. The 
second trend is the notion of social dialogue between relevant social partners 
becoming somewhat standardized and institutionalized across cases at the country 
and sector level. This last trend is the most significant, as it is indicative of a 
general acceptance of a required consultation tool in areas with high degrees of 
formal mechanisms for negotiation and areas with little to no formal mechanisms 
for negotiation. Simply put, this trend institutionalizes the process of ‘social 
dialogue’ in member states that previously had strong state-oriented corporatist 
structures as well as member states that previously had little to no formal roles for 
organized interests in national decision-making. 
Taken together, these two trends illustrate that while effects of 
‘Europeanization’ do exist, they are less visible as a harmonization of national 
systems or as a transfer of sovereignty from domestic levels to the supranational 
level than they are visible at a level of harmonization of sectors and/or company 
practice across the continent and business models in different European countries. 




globalization and multi-national companies and flows of finance. The difference 
between studies on globalization and this research, however, is that there is a 
decidedly European component in the sheer emphasis of the role of employee 
information and consultation systems. Industrial relations are a feature of most 
industrialized democracies; Europe, however, is where the most formal and long-
term systems exist. Europeanization is a concurrent phenomenon with 
globalization, but the explicit priority of strengthening the EU area sets apart a 
more distinct strand of labour-management relations than is prioritized elsewhere in 
literature on multi-national corporations and capital flows across borders. A 
specific example of this is the 2002 EU Directive on the Information and 
Consultation of Employees, which mandates worker consultation in addition to the 
basic information of workers by employers and businesses (see Chapter 5 for more 
detail). The content of this directive is significant because it takes a longer-term 
view of competitiveness; the very idea of mandatory labour-management 
consultation assumes that the productivity of an area (be it a sector, region, or 
country) depends on the employability of the workforce (i.e., the ability of the 
workforce at large to have the resources and capability to quickly adapt to new 
workplace environments and circumstances) rather than the straightforward 
immediate decisions of a company. 
The findings of this research dovetail with an existing strand of research on 
the role of national social pacts to do with collective wage bargaining in various 




emanating from the EU level – entering Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
and adopting the euro as currency, most critically – member states had to enact 
painful reforms in order to bring deficit levels and inflation rates to EMU 
standards. Adopting the method of tripartite concertation (or independent social 
dialogue), where government consulted with trade unions and business 
organizations during the stages of policy/budget formulation, these national social 
pacts served as a device of ‘pre-commitment’ by gaining the support of prominent 
actors ahead of time who might otherwise have been oppositional forces. For many 
authors, the paradox of the run-up to EMU was the fact of the European level (the 
euro) reinforcing the national level (where the social pacts took place) (Crouch 
2000; Pérez 2002; Royo 2002). Numerous other studies (Héritier 2001; Sbragia 
2001) point out the important role of EMU and the EU more generally to member 
states, to such a degree than in certain member states an unlikely majority was  
willing to negotiate tactics together such as painful budget cuts in order to meet the 
criteria for entering the euro-zone. This research complements the aforementioned 
bodies of work by highlighting the occasional perverse effects of European 
integration. Pooling sovereignty at the supranational level can sometimes lead to 
new domestic systems springing up in order to support the framework for the 
European level; the response of domestic social partner organization is one prime 
example of this. The results of this research illustrate that sectoral- and company-




and that sometimes these new systems leave the actors at the national level less 
influential in sculpting industrial relations. 
The central argument of this dissertation also contributes to the “varieties of 
capitalism” literature within the political science sub-disciplines of comparative 
European political economy. But while “varieties of capitalism” concentrates on 
the different ways that industrialized democracies respond to market pressures, in 
the form of institutionalizing various domestic social protections and/or market 
regulators, this dissertation takes a more narrow focus on the sub-genre of 
industrial relations to what could be simplistically termed as ‘varieties of neo-
liberalism’. The EU’s central mandate to provide the free movement of goods, 
people and services across and within member state borders is a direct embodiment 
of using market forces (internally) to enhance relative worldwide economic 
strength, by pooling resources and by breaking down domestic economic 
protections to benefit the larger union. The commitment to free market capitalism is 
inherent in such goals. Scholars and commentators have often referred to the 
overarching process of European integration as a clinically ‘negative’ one, where 
boundaries and traditional domestic protections are removed in order to make way 
for the free flow of persons, goods, capital, and services across the Union (Scharpf 
1998). Yet this negative integration acts as a distinctly protective factor against 
overarching forces of globalization. At the same time, the EU’s attention to issues 
that border or directly cross the line into the ‘social’ realm cloud the purely neo-




measures. At the very least, the recognition that consultation systems between 
workers and employers need to be addressed at the supranational level denotes an 
important qualification to the typical Anglo-American form of neo-liberal 
capitalism. The realm of industrial relations is useful for examining European 
integration because it highlights the tension between negative integration (the 
removal of barriers) and positive integration (the creation of new, shared, or 
harmonized rules and/or systems). The large-scale efforts of the EU now include 
objectives to enhance social policy within the Union and laws to standardize a 
relatively high floor of working rights and conditions. 
 
Definitions of Terms2 
 The term “Europeanization” generally refers to the impact of the EU 
integration process and EU institutions on national politics and policy making 
(Radaelli 2003, 28-29). This process has been conceptualized by scholars as one-
way directionality from the supranational to the national level (Ladrech 1994), or as 
a two-way interaction between the national and supranational levels in which 
member states assimilate the influence of the EU and in turn “project” their 
interests at the EU level (Bulmer and Burch 2000, 2-3). However, the literature on 
Europeanization is not unanimous on the extent to which there is convergence 







 “Industrial Relations” generally speaks to the relationships that exist within 
an industry between the employer and the workers. Related more specifically to the 
field of Political Science, “industrial relations” describes the relationship between 
employees and management which stem directly or indirectly from the union-
employer relationship, and through various other organizational settings designed 
to promote the respective interests of workers and employers. Industrial relations 
also include the interactions between employers and employees with the 
government, and the institutions and associations through which such interactions 
are mediated (Crouch 1977).  
 One process through which such interactions are mediated is that of 
“collective bargaining”, where unions, employers, and government where 
appropriate negotiate to reach an industry-wide collective agreement. Collective 
agreements usually address wages and wage scales, working hours, working 
conditions, grievance mechanisms and rights to participate in workplace or 
company affairs (Ibid). 
 “Social dialogue”, as defined by the International Labour Organization, is: 
all types of negotiation, consultation or simply exchange of information between, 
or among, representatives of governments, employers and workers, on issues of 
common interest relating to economic and social policy. It can exist as a tripartite 
process, with the government as an official party to the dialogue or it may consist 
of bipartite relations only between labour and management (or trade unions and 
employers' organizations), with or without indirect government involvement. 
Social dialogue processes can be informal or institutionalised, and often it is a 
combination of the two. It can take place at the national, regional or at enterprise 
level. It can be inter-professional, sectoral or a combination of these. 
The main goal of social dialogue itself is to promote consensus building and 
democratic involvement among the main stakeholders in the world of work. 
Successful social dialogue structures and processes have the potential to resolve 
important economic and social issues, encourage good governance, advance social 
and industrial peace and stability and boost economic progress (International 





Not included in the above definition is social dialogue taking place at the 
supranational level – definitively the case with the EU. At the European level, 
social dialogue is both bipartite and tripartite, the latter being the case when the 
Commission or other EU public authorities are involved. Tripartite dialogue at the 
EU-level is used less and less as European-level social partners have gained more 
legal autonomy to negotiate agreements amongst themselves (Eurofound 2011a). 
Related to this definition is the term “social partners”, which refer to the chief 
representatives of management and labour; for the purposes of this dissertation, the 
relevant social partners are ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation), BE 
(BusinessEurope), CEEP (Centre européen des enterprises à participation public et 
des enterprises d’intérêt économique général – the European Centre of Enterprises 
with Public Participation), and UEAPME (European Association of Craft, Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises). 
 “Neo-corporatism” refers to a system of state behavior where organized 
interests have clearly defined, formal roles in the realms of social and economic 
policy making that impact worker and employer interests. As contrasted against a 
more “pluralist” system, where interest groups are formed voluntarily, competitive 
for access and resources with each other, and engage in free-form lobbying 




policy proposals with the objective of obtaining a higher degree of consensus in 
parliamentary/committee debate (Crouch 1977).3 
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
The text in this dissertation is arranged in seven chapters: Introduction, 
Literature Review, Methodology, EU-Level Social Dialogue, the 2002 EU 
Directive on the Information and Consultation of Employees, Analysis, and 
Conclusion. Each chapter begins with an introductory paragraph outlining what 
specific material the chapter contains, and concludes with a brief summary. 
Headings and sub-headings within each chapter organize the material into country-
specific findings where appropriate. The empirical chapters (Chapter 4 and Chapter 
5) are organized by variable, rather than by country cases. The format of 
referencing follows the Chicago standard, with in-text citations and footnotes for 
supplementary information. The Bibliography follows Appendix A and Appendix 










CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 
 The bodies of literature addressed in this chapter are those that either speak 
to the influence of European integration on the political economies of EU member 
states, or deal with the context and details of industrial relations in a European 
context, or both.  
 This review is grouped into four themes: Europeanization, Varieties of 
Capitalism, Industrial Relations, and Collective Bargaining. Demoting each theme 




A wealth of literature exists on the definitions, contextualization and 
possibilities of Europeanization: whether it exists, how it is visible, to what extent it 
can explain convergence, and if it is irreversible. Featherstone provides a general 
framework for Europeanization as “a process of structural change, variously 
affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests”, (Featherstone 2003:1). His 
definition considers Europeanization as conceptual rather than a direct causal 
effect, visible in either tangible institutional change or in the gradual adaptation of 
policy and policy processes. He states that evidence for convergence can be found 
at three levels: “the emergence of a European political agenda (the problem of 
process definition shifts to the European agenda); the forms of interest 




modes of representation); and the modes of operation of various actors”, (Ibid: 11, 
italics mine). 
Radaelli corroborates Featherstone’s understanding of Europeanization as 
being neither irreversible nor permanent, by defining the Europeanization process 
as a change in the logic of behavior. The process is not political integration but 
strictly the adaptation of domestic institutions in response to pressure from Europe 
(Radaelli 2003: 30-33). The timing and degree of this process depends on a number 
of intervening variables, such as the discourse, institutional capacity and leadership 
quality present in a member-state during the development of EU public policy 
(Ibid: 47). The strength of Radaelli’s contribution is that it can explain variation in 
domestic adaptation by institution, country or specific policy. 
The term Europeanization was in many ways invented to answer the core 
overarching question of how European integration and policy making affect the 
very states responsible for these very processes. “The term 
‘Europeanization’…responded to the conceptual difficulty of talking about the 
effects of integration on domestic structures…the process by which distinct 
structures of governance at the European level affect domestic structures and 
domestic politics broadly defined,” (Caporaso 2008, 27). Caporaso states that the 
term Europeanization serves a dual definitional function: it highlights the role of 
EU politics and European institutions as an independent variable in domestic 
politics, and it elucidates the process by which domestic structures adapt to 




(2001) have generated a model of Europeanization that addresses the latter part of 
Caporaso’s definition – that of Europeanization and domestic change. The model, 
in both publications, has three phases. The first phase is the process of European 
integration itself, to include treaties, political activity, institutional enlargement, 
and the more specific elements of regulations and court rulings. The second phase 
deals with the immediate ‘fit’ or ‘misfit’ of the first phase on member states 
themselves, assessed by the degree to which each member state needs to change 
circumstances in order to adapt to the process of European integration. The third 
phase identifies the domestic structural conditions that serve as “mediating 
factors”; structures and institutions (such as federalism, interest group structures, 
veto points) that either facilitate or obstruct the member state’s adaptation to 
European integration (Caporaso 2008, 30-34). The utility of this model is that it 
highlights a sequence of events that pinpoint a more linear process of 
Europeanization. Although Caporaso emphasizes that the model must be 
understood as a fundamentally endogenous process, in that the member states under 
study for what effects they exhibit from their ‘fit’ to EU policies are the same 
actors that create the process of integration in the first place, the beginning of the 
first phase with the process of European integration conceptualized as a more or 
less exogenous process is helpful for more detailed analyses of specific acts of 
integration on EU member states. 
Generally problematic to the concept of Europeanization is solid evidence 




difficult to assess the amount of change emanating from Europe, or to draw a line 
between regulations from the European level to domestic political economy 
changes. Literature on Europeanization heavily emphasizes the “soft law” character 
of much of integration policies: “In considering the Lisbon Agenda, we confront an 
interesting duality: while the process is consciously designed to alter domestic 
policy and outcomes, it relies on ‘soft’ mechanisms of implementation; a conscious 
effort to engineer policy change coupled with consciously suggestive means (a 
product of national sensitivities and diversity of fostering progress towards the 
goal,” (Smith 2012, 2). This is particularly relevant when considering things like 
EU-level employment objectives on the political economies of member states. 
Many elements of the Lisbon Agenda are general objectives that require member 
states to demonstrate effort only towards attaining these goals, but do not carry 
with them concrete rewards or penalties for meeting or not meeting these objectives 
by a set deadline. This clouds the possibility of identifying the EU’s transformative 
capacities; however, many studies of Europeanization also demonstrate that soft 
mechanisms of policy making may have subtle but important indirect effects (Vink 
and Graziano 2008, 10). 
To this point, numerous authors examine the potential of the Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC) as a mechanism for Europeanization, but many conclude 









reciprocal learning process where EU member states agree on a set of common 
goals, put them into practice at the national level and then evaluate the outcomes – 
in essence, a direct manifestation of the ‘soft law’ concept. The Lisbon European 
Council of 2000 emphasized the potential of OMC for a number of policy areas 
where the EU has no competences for the definition of minimum standards – social 
policy areas, particularly areas such as inclusion and cohesion related to the context 
of employment, being the most obvious example. The European Employment 
Strategy (EES) is a ‘soft’ law mechanism designed to coordinate the employment 
policies of member states with the overarching objective of increasing employment 
and productivity within the EU as a whole. It is also, to date, the most advanced 
coordination process that utilizes OMC (Eurofound 2008b). The goals and 
objectives of EES are particularly apt for studying industrial relations at the EU 
level and within EU member states for two reasons: first, the content of many EES 
goals – such as those to do with reducing unemployment figures for certain 
populations – often falls within the jurisdiction of the main social partners to help 
develop policy; second, the manner in which social partners are able to generate 
policy prescriptions for EES targets are often (both at the supranational and 
national levels) is often through a framework or non-binding joint agreement, 
which serves as a soft law mirror to the initial objectives. 
Research on the EES considers the emphasis on employment in the Lisbon 







states. For these studies, the topic of employment is the central independent 
variable rather than the institutions of the EU. A key finding of many of these 
studies is that the increase of tripartite central agreements at the national level is 
one key effect of the EES. As the EU’s employment strategy asks member states to 
prepare annual National Action Plans (NAPs), detailing the amount of progress 
towards EU employment targets and the means taken towards achieving these 
targets, national governments are encouraging national social pacts in order to 
coordinate labour market activities at the national level (Goetschy 1999; Léonard 
2001). Cressey and Gold find that the European Employment Strategy (EES) is 
slowly converting social dialogue from a partnership process to a managerialist 
process “by decentralizing [social dialogue] to the national level and co-opting 
social partners into taking responsibility for meeting employment targets over 
which they have had no influence,” (Cressey and Gold 2007, 7). Social dialogue is 
not involved in the co-determination of labour market policies at the EU level; 
instead, national institutions and domestic social partners are left to implement EES 
policies as they see fit. The reliance on the OMC, while upholding the principle of 
subsidiarity and accounting for national discrepancies, also reinforces the shift in 
social dialogue towards goals over means. The danger of this redirection is that it 
renders social dialogue apolitical and empties it of its initial ideology: “redirection 
moves away from the principle of autonomy of bargaining and towards a form of 
managerialism that has been prevalent in the UK, especially in relation to new 




influences member states to centralize their labour market agreements at the 
national level; once monetary policy was delegated to the European Central Bank, 
national governments preferred to coordinate employment issues because it was 
then easier to control for other macroeconomic factors (Pochet 1998). At the same 
time, the emphasis on adaptability and flexibility in the EES encouraged the 
decentralization of bargaining to the company level from the union level because 
businesses needed more room to maneuver policies such as part-time work, 
temporary work, and overtime (Léonard 2001). Ultimately, the EES contributed to 
a concern with employment over other labour market issues, to the point where 
employment levels became a new “social ‘norm’” (Ibid). The main effect of this 
new norm was to encourage the development of centralized agreements targeted 
towards the competitiveness of a country’s labour market; in essence, rather than 
unions and businesses negotiating reciprocal concessions among themselves on 
various labour market issues, negotiation has instead become a series of agreements 
between companies, social partners and governments that focus on the framework 
of employment (Ibid).  
More recently, Heidenreich and Bischoff find with the French example that 
although the execution and implementation of NAPs mainly illustrates the relative 
autonomy of the national field, as well as how officials comfortably re-interpret 
European concepts to fit national processes, the OMC process has legitimate 
influence for national policy-makers in areas (such as employment and social 




social construction of other’ “success stories” can help to overcome previous 
impasses, and help shape riskier reform projects designed by national 
administrations. A side effect of using OMC for EES-related goals, in the French 
example, has been the “strengthening of a tripartite dialogue on employment issues 
between the unions, the employer associations, and the state”, because “sometimes 
the obligation to write a national action plan…contributes to the integration of the 
respective national field because this task requires an improved co-ordination 
within and between different ministries and a closer co-operation with other 
actors…In France, the co-operation between unions and employers’ associations in 
particular seems to be greatly improved by the requirement to include them in the 
process.” (Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008, 522-524). 
Although alternative forms of governance are arguably appropriate for a 
wide swath of social and labour policies, the legal and thus more linear form of 
Europeanization visible in the implementation of EU directives is a means of 
assessing systematic domestic adaptation to the supranational level with more 
rigorous empirical evidence. It is thus reasonable to surmise that Europeanization 
hinges on EU policy implementation success in member states. This suggestion 
also helps clarify the distinction between changes in domestic political economies 
that are attributable to Europeanization and those resulting from forces of global 
integration more generally; responses to EU directives in member states offer a 
viable starting point for studying Europeanization. Without the transposition of 




integration would lack the necessary foundation to build upon. A perennial research 
topic for Europeanization is the question of why some member states implement 
EU policy differently than others, and how the style and substance of 
implementation differs between national administrations. The concept of ‘goodness 
of fit’ is pertinent here, as related to Caporaso’s model (2008). The idea behind 
‘goodness-of-fit’ is that EU policies will have a discernible impact on the domestic 
level only if existing domestic policies diverge from EU prescriptions. If the 
domestic framework already fits well with that of the EU, the pressure to change is 
minimal and adaptation is less visible. When the framework fits poorly, the 
pressure to change is stronger and the impact is much more significant. Thus, misfit 
between the European level and the domestic level constitutes the necessary 
condition for expecting change (Börzel and Risse 2000; Cowles and Risse 2001, 
217). This approach is predominantly neo-institutionalist in character as it focuses 
on the response of domestic institutions to EU policies, particularly state structure, 
administrative capacities and the presence or absence of a consensual political 
culture (Ibid, 225). Similarly, a more agency-oriented approach to ‘goodness of fit’ 
concentrates on the socialization of actors in European norms and procedures. The 
extent that existing domestic norms and practices differ from those at the EU level 
is the extent that Europeanization pressure is most visible (Börzel and Risse 2000, 
8).  
Other authors focus on the regulatory authority of the EU and the inherent 




EU as negative integration, responsible for depoliticization, removal of public 
ownership, and general heightened technocratic powers, all contributing toward 
promoting a neoliberal economic platform with few significant matching endeavors 
at positive integration of social protections. One of Scharpf’s central criticisms is 
that a system of European interest representation was, at the time of his writing, not 
suitably complementary or capable to fit the process of negative economic 
integration among EU member states. This theme overlaps with a more general 
definition of ‘globalization’, which refers to the accelerated growth of economic 
activity (to include trade, investment, goods and services, and people) across 
national and regional political boundaries. The central commonality between 
Europeanization and globalization in this argument is the premise of deregulated 
capitalism and heightened competition due to high levels of exposure to globalizing 
economic forces. The central distinction between the two forces is not just 
geographical. Whereas globalization encompasses worldwide market deregulatory 
forces and shared communication, it does not usually include any shared 
understandings of social policy or state protections. Europeanization, by contrast, 
refers to the process of domestic change as a result of being a member of the EU, 
and consequently includes domestic change with regard to labour laws and social 
policies due to shared legislation and understandings emanating from the 
institutional-supranational level. 
 




Europeanization literature generally focuses on (but is not limited to) the 
study of the impact of European integration on national systems of political 
economy. The institutional arrangements that characterize the different political 
economies of industrialized democracies are often referred to as different “models” 
of capitalism (Berger and Dore 1996; Iversen, Pontusson, and Soskice 2000; 
Streeck and Yamamura 2001). The models refer to the enduring features of capital-
labour organization among the advanced industrial countries – financial 
institutions, industrial relations, welfare states, and vocational training systems, to 
name the most predominant features. Literature on the different models of 
capitalism uses different terminologies and contextualizations to categorize the 
various types, but most authors point to a distinction between ‘organized’ and 
‘liberal’ varieties (Hall and Soskice 2001). Organized, or ‘embedded’ capitalism is 
characterized by patient capital, committed labour, highly institutionalized 
relationships among stakeholders (labour, employers and capital, with the 
government often abetting these relationships), and in some cases, an emphasis on 
value-added production. By contrast, liberal capitalism is characterized by a return 
on investment, short-term financing, market competition, and a more deregulated 
and pluralistic environment for interests, labour, and companies alike. Germany 
and Japan are often referred to as the ideal types of organized capitalism, while the 
United States and United Kingdom exemplify the liberal-Anglo, less-regulated 
varieties of capitalism (Boyer and Hollingsworth 1997; Streeck 2001; Hall and 




A key justification for returning to the study of models of capitalism is the 
implication that any disruption in one of the core enduring features of a type of 
capitalism would resonate in other areas – for example, a significant change in the 
organization of financial institutions would reverberate in the organization of 
industrial relations. This would seem to be the case whether a political economy is 
considered to be a predominantly institutional arrangement (Hall and Soskice 2001) 
or a result of political maneuvering (Streeck 2001). The notion that the key features 
of a country’s political economy rest on certain equilibrium suggest that an 
alteration in any of the key features would upset the other components (Thelen 
2004). 
The study of varieties of capitalism is important in political science for the 
ongoing debates over which model performs best and in which conditions. The 
post-WWII politico-economic environment of full employment in industrialized 
democracies applauded organized systems that utilized aspects such as welfare 
spending and solidaristic wage policies. The postwar economic success of 
Germany’s worker compensation schemes, and Sweden’s corporatist networks that 
gave quasi-public status to interest groups in policy making, promoted the strengths 
of the organized models of capitalism up until the late 1970s. After a widespread 
economic recession, the shift towards supply-side economics and monetarist 
policies in the early 1980s emphasized the strengths of flexibility, low government 
spending and worker exclusion in the neoliberal model. Since the resurgence of 




ended, veering away from measuring performance by productivity and focusing on 
the nuances in the divergence and convergence of elements within and between 
both kinds of systems.  
The development of the EU and its related institutions offers a new avenue 
of study as far as models of capitalism are concerned. Rather than investigate solely 
the factors that comprise different systems, the interweaving of the Single Market 
with EU Social Policy legislation poses the question of whether the EU may be the 
conveyor of a new model that joins the flexibility and responsiveness of the liberal 
market with the productivity benefits of greater investment in workers. This trend is 
evident in various EU projects but nowhere more so than the Lisbon Agenda. The 
EU’s concept of “Social Europe” is intended to marry the concepts of economic 
growth and social policies when considering things such as labour market reforms. 
Although Social Europe is arguably much less visible than the economic impact of 
European integration, the efforts of EU legislation in directives on working 
conditions (including directives on health and safety conditions in the workplace, 
working time, and part-time work) demonstrate an empirical commitment to the 
setting of minimum standards in some social policies.  
Rhodes and van Apeldoorn (1997) operationalize different forms of 
Western capitalism along the dimensions of corporate governance and 
macroeconomic institutional environment, resulting in a three-fold classification of 
market-oriented Anglo-Saxon, network-oriented Germanic, and Latin types of 




an Anglo-Saxon neo-liberal regime of capitalism on member states than it does 
integrate elements of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance and economic 
organization with established national institutions, norms and rules, thereby 
allowing for continued national diversity within a framework of “embedded neo-
liberalism” (171). Their argument is helpful for delineating the differences between 
“type”, and for demonstrating how and where convergence of capitalist elements 
might be taking place. Table 2.1 outlines the main characteristics: 
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in France and 
Spain only 
Source: Adapted from Rhodes and van Apeldoorn (1997, 174-5). In addition to the variables listen 




An important development at the EU level relevant to discussions of 
political economy and varieties of capitalism is the concept of “flexicurity”, as 
defined by the European Employment Strategy (EES). Flexicurity generally refers 
to the balance between labour market flexibility and security for employees against 
labour market risks. Specifically, the European Commission identifies four basic 
components: 
 “Flexible and reliable contractual arrangements (from the perspective of 
the employer and the employee, of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’) through 
modern labour laws, collective agreements and work organization; 
Comprehensive lifelong learning (LLL) strategies to ensure the continual 
adaptability and employability of workers, particularly the most vulnerable; 
Effective active labour market policies (ALMP) that help people cope with 
rapid change, reduce unemployment spells and ease transitions to new jobs; 
Modern social security systems that provide adequate income support, 
encourage employment and facilitate labour market mobility. This includes 
broad coverage of social protection provisions (unemployment benefits, 
pensions and healthcare) that help people combine work with private and 






While flexicurity could arguably be a simple semantic political exercise in 
trying to appease employers and employees both, the Commission has been 
emphatic in its publications on how to implement flexicurity policies. The 
flexibility component is the more readily apparent side of flexicurity, referring to 
the ability of employers to become better able to adapt their workforce to changes 
in economic conditions (essentially low firing costs). The security component 
encompasses employment security and social security – basically that of finding a 
new job and income security – but also includes the security of information and 
consultation in existing employment. EU publications specifically focus on the role 
of the social partners at various levels in drafting and implementing flexicurity 
policies, as well as being an example of how flexicurity ought to unfold at the 
company level: “the emphasis on the possible plurality of national flexicurity 
models and on the role of the social partners has added a relevant dimension to 
flexicurity in terms of industrial relations and the contribution of collective 
bargaining, especially at workplace level,” (Ibid, 15). 
The purpose of this dissertation is to consider the effects of European 
integration on capital-labour interactions in member states. In doing so, this 
research tests the possibility of a ‘hybrid’ capitalism that rests on the intertwining 
of market flexibility and worker consultation, and is in part in response to EU 
efforts to balance efficiency with equality. The relevance of social dialogue in 
policymaking concerning the different dimensions of labour market policies 




interest representation at the EU level and the implementation of EU directives 
related to worker rights and working conditions are both plausible catalysts of 
change in domestic industrial relations systems. An early suggestion of such a 
pattern is the initiation of formal consultation systems in businesses in the UK and 
Ireland – countries that previously relied on predominantly voluntarist systems of 
worker consultation – in response to a EU directive. The importance of this 
consideration is to illustrate the evolution of capitalist models as well as to 
highlight the novel role of the EU as a non-state regulator of both business and 
working conditions. In order to test this possibility, this dissertation will study EU 
legislation and domestic interest associations to identify what kind of causal 
relationships are at work between the EU and member state levels in consultation 
dynamics. Focusing on capital-labour interaction in the field of industrial relations 
offers an assessment of how domestic institutions of collective bargaining evolve 
and respond to economic and political conditions. This evolution is also noteworthy 
in considering the role of the EU as an instigator of domestic political economy 
adaptation. In addition, the study of EU legislation and organizations specifically, 
and member states’ response to these factors, potentially helps to distinguish 







In line with Rhodes and van Apeldoorn (1997), convergence within the EU 
may also mean the growing resemblance of member states’ political economies to 
one another, and not necessarily a distinct shift to Anglo-American capitalism. The 
scope of scholarly literature on this topic is wide. One strand relevant to the 
purposes of this dissertation is the examination of the evolution of domestic forms 
of neo-corporatism in Western Europe against the backdrop of EU-related 
regulations. The bulk of this literature examines a ‘paradox’ present in many EU 
member states: adjustment to the requirements of single market integration 
(particularly those requirements of Economic and Monetary Union [EMU]), which 
ought to promote liberal deregulatory trends in domestic political economies, has 
instead often tended to heighten or reinforce patterns of social concertation – a 
formalized method of interest negotiation that would seem to contradict the 
deregulatory forces of market integration.  
Pérez (2002, 1200) address the question of how monetary union is likely to 
impact the preferences of governments, employers, and unions regarding the 
organization of wage bargaining. The experiences of Italy and Spain reveal that the 
combination of a strict monetary policy with fragmented wage bargaining will, 
perversely, induce the social partners to adopt the strategy of centralizing 
negotiation in order to reduce fragmentation and respond more coherently to the 
challenges presented by EMU. The two countries underwent the functional 
equivalent of decentralizing wage bargaining in relation to EU monetary policy in 




levels that involved greater coordination across bargaining sectors. Pérez extends 
this analysis to the supranational level, and suggests that a similar dynamic might 
play out across the Eurozone. Similarly, Royo (2002, 99) argues that the resurgence 
of national level bargaining in Spain and Portugal is the result of the changing 
strategies of social actors in a new economic and political context. A fragmented 
and decentralized wage bargaining system led trade unions to seek social 
bargaining primarily as a defense mechanism to assert more influence. Royo allows 
that EMU offered the social actors important incentives to reach agreements, but 
disavows EMU as a full explanation given that both countries began some form of 
tripartite concertative procedures before EMU was initiated, and continued such 
procedures after EMU had arrived. Royo finds that the weakening of trade unions 
is a more compelling explanation for the expansion of social concertation, as the 
unions’ traditional confrontational strategy became less effective as their 
membership eroded. Combined with the institutional learning of the social actors 
and the failure of national governments to achieve macroeconomic policy 
objectives, the depletion of union confrontational capacities shaped new incentives 
and constraints for union strategies.  
Ebbinghaus and Hassel consider whether there has been a generalized 
renewal of tripartite concertation at the national level in response to the need to 
coordinate policies across policy fields, and examine why some countries have 
adopted formalized negotiation strategies to enact reforms while others have not. 




importantly the governance of policy fields,” (Ebbnghaus and Hassel 1999, 46). 
There are three implications from the findings: that concertation is not necessarily 
always a suitable tool for reform; that state capacity to intervene plays a large role 
in reorganizing governance; and that concertation must serve the interests of the 
social partners.  
The above works illustrate a new dynamic at work within EU member 
states. The delegation of monetary policy in Eurozone members to the European 
Central Bank (ECB) limits conventional economic adjustment mechanisms, such as 
currency devaluation. As a result, structural areas that have the potential for 
increased competitiveness are targeted as alternative adjustment mechanisms to 
stimulate economic growth, such as labour markets. The economic assumption is 
that increasing the activity and flexibility of labour market structures will lead to a 
higher economic growth rate, from the standpoint that a relationship exists between 
wage rigidity, price, and output performance. Higher labour market rigidity will 
encourage the persistence of high unemployment and rigidity; thus, activation and 
deregulation of labour markets ought to promote employment and flexibility 
(Antonelli and De Liso 2004, 60). Given that EMU places limitations on 
conventional economic adjustment mechanisms, governments and social partners 
alike perceive the need to tackle labour market rigidities, and are more likely to 
work together towards the similar objective of higher employment rates. 
Should neo-corporatist practices increase among eurozone members, 




resemble one another. Hancké and Rhodes argue, “the different forms of 
institutional innovation in wage setting found in the EU depended on the 
combination of the character of external pressures and preexisting protoinstitutional 
structures in the labour market.” While macro-economic shifts can be largely 
attributed to EMU and its related shocks, the micro institutions conditioned the 
ability of countries to “embed” new arrangements with social partners in formal 
structures (Hancke and Rhodes 2005, 196). The main implication of this argument 
is that although EMU acted as a strong impetus for the re-emergence of social 
bargaining at the national level in certain areas, it cannot be identified as the cause 
of any reorganization of social partners. 
Notably, the need for consensus is particularly strong in areas where 
flexibility is particularly difficult. Crouch argues that the introduction of the ECB 
and the single currency is likely to produce some pressure for a convergent search 
for concertative processes in countries that have difficulty enacting straightforward 
neoliberal solutions to labour market passivity. Because labour market institutions 
still retain the capability to adapt at national and/or regional levels, wage 
determination systems in some areas may be able to facilitate adjustment to 
monetary union: “The most striking conclusion...is that the paradoxical 
renationalization of industrial relations systems which seemed to be provoked by 
the single currency can coexist positively with, rather than undermine, a potential 
growth of Europe-wide coordination”, (Crouch 2002, 302). To avoid widespread 




alike have a shared interest in concertative strategies to reduce labour costs in the 
most painless manner possible. 
The above literature summary illustrates the importance of potential 
Europeanizing processes to member states’ economies and labour markets. In the 
context of industrial relations, it is theoretically reasonable to surmise that the 
evolution of the EU as a whole and the growing influence of its regulatory 
institutions have had a marked affect on the institutional systems of member states’ 
modes of negotiations with social partners. The significance of such research is that 
it contributes an understanding of what consequences – intended or unintended – 
single market integration can have on domestic modes of negotiation and 
representation. Although many such consequences are indirect effects of European 
integration, the results are still important for considering the efficacy of worker 
organization within the context of liberalizing market integration. 
 
Collective Bargaining  
A specific subset of Europeanization literature focuses on industrial sectors 
rather than study EU industrial relations as only a supranational-national 
dichotomy. Such studies focus on the internationalization of EU businesses (Due et 
al. 1991) or the role of multinational companies as a distinctive form of 
organization for industrial relations (Marginson 2000). European Works Councils 
(EWCs) feature prominently in such arguments; EWCs are the firm-level 




ETUC is not considered to be a national form of trade union that has been uploaded 
to the European level (Falkner 2000; Hyman 2001), neither are EWCs seen to be 
simple extensions of national works councils. Because of the transnational 
character of multinational companies, the functional constraints of the sector in 
question play a heavier role in conditioning the structure of an EWC, as opposed to 
the more political constraints that condition a national works council in different 
member states (Marginson 2000). The central implication here is that national trade 
unions that deal with multinational companies will come to prefer the supranational 
level for negotiation and articulation of interests as the internationalization of 
businesses means a loss of control over capital at the national level (Bieler 2005). 
In a study comparing different production sectors, Bieler finds that domestic 
sectors that have been relatively sheltered from globalization – such as education – 
are unlikely to develop strong cooperative initiatives at the supranational level. 
Conversely, those production sectors that have been transnationalized are much 
more likely to have trade unions supporting cooperation at the international level 
(Strange 2002; Bieler 2005). The evidence illustrates that trade unions will utilize 
the European level when they perceive it as an arena in which to further their 
interests. 
Other studies considering the impact of the EU on national systems of 
industrial relations emphasize the institutional legacies within the unions 
themselves to explain why and under what conditions trade unions make use of the 




studies is that trade unions are essentially rational actors, who perceive the 
European level as an additional sphere in which to campaign for their interests. 
Often times there are variations in how trade unions pursue their goals at the 
European level. This variation has been explained by the generosity and stability of 
the national system of social provision in which a particular trade union is 
enmeshed (Mitchell 2006), the absence or decrease of fundamental divisions 
between unions as neo-liberal economic policies become increasingly predominant 
(Strange 2002), and the strength of the legacy of corporatism in the member state in 
which the trade union is housed (Molina 2008). 
Lastly, a central trend running through literature on Europeanization and 
industrial relations concerns the decentralization of collective bargaining away 
from the national level and toward the company or plant level. Decentralized 
collective bargaining is largely preferred by employers who seek maximum 
flexibility and adaptability for their respective businesses or undertakings, whereas 
unions tend to prefer centralized bargaining as it presents strong opportunities for 
employees to achieve greater protections from the state. Whereas the EU has no 
policy or jurisdiction into the industrial relations of member states, the integration 
of the single market holds the potential for many unintended consequences 






Taken together, previous research on the Europeanization of EU member 
states’ industrial relations systems illustrates a number of different dynamics at 
work between the supranational and domestic levels. Europeanization as a process 
offers an analytical means of understanding how European integration affects the 
political and institutional decisions of member states. One part of this process is the 
climate of deregulation and liberalization that the EU single market seeks to 
achieve; however, the accompanying social models of many EU member states 
have served to strengthen the EU social model at the supranational level and to 
introduce the objective of “flexicurity”, which seeks to marry active labour market 
policies with employment and social securities. The concept of Europeanization 
offers a model wherein one can analyze whether common policy instruments can 
produce consistent effects across diverse political economies. The introduction of 
the Euro as common currency created incentives for the reorganization of wage 
bargaining and determination systems across sectors at the national level, as a 
means of facilitating adjustment to macro-economic pressures. The EES pushed 
employment levels to the forefront of all labour market issues, helping to enshrine 
the norm of competitiveness among both social and political actors. 
Simultaneously, the decreasing levels of membership in national trade unions 
(Royo 2002) along with the advent of multinational companies and growth of the 
ETUC encouraged local trade union confederations to seek out alternative 
strategies to existing modes of operation – either by increased tripartite 




This dissertation seeks to build upon these existing studies to contribute to 
theoretical work on the conditions for institutional evolution that might potentially 
indicate a new model of capitalism. Because industrial relations lie directly at the 
intersection between capital and labour, they are a crucial component of the 
organization of capitalism and fertile testing ground for institutional evolution. 
Social dialogue and social partners at the supranational level have the potential to 
slowly shape domestic institutions of industrial relations through incremental 
maneuvers that complement the legislative and policy-making procedures taking 
place through EU institutions. This work will contribute to convergence/divergence 
political economy arguments by arguing that convergence/divergence may not be 
an either/or process, as well as contribute to neo-institutionalist theories by offering 
a picture of layered institutionalist strategies. The pressures of European integration 
have encouraged the decentralization of bargaining from unions to companies; 
following this, those sectors that are significantly internationalized are slowly 
emulating the more managerial or lobbyist style of the ETUC and BusinessEurope 
and are relying more on supranational worker confederations for interest 
articulation. The impact of these changes suggests a shift towards “meso-level” 
corporatism that relies on company level bargaining to mediate between 





CHAPTER 3: Theory and Research Design 
 This chapter discusses the choices of methods employed for this 
dissertation. This begins with an outline of the research question and a discussion 
of the theoretical approaches used to frame the inquiry into the research question. 
Next, the chapter outlines the research design, including the case selection, 
hypotheses, variables and data for the variables. Finally, the chapter addresses the 
manner of data analysis used for this dissertation.  
 
Research Question 
The research question asks: how does European integration affects patterns 
of capital-labour interaction? More specifically, how is the inclusion of interest 
associations at the European level affecting the behavior of domestic interest 
associations? And how is legislation at the EU-level related to consultation 
mechanisms affecting national patterns of industrial relations? The premise for 
these questions is that domestic organized interests are likely to reorganize 
themselves so as to capitalize on new opportunities in a supranational environment. 
Therefore, this research asks how and to what extent the domestic institutions of 
interest consultation in EU member states are being transformed by 
Europeanization. 
 





Using the starting point of Europeanization as an important external 
influence on domestic systems of industrial relations, this dissertation examines the 
impact of relevant European level actors and EU directives on the behavior of 
interest associations in Ireland and Italy. European level actors and EU directives 
each provide a source of potential adaptation/transformation for the existing 
dynamics of industrial relations in EU member states; through new avenues of 
access, new sources of ideas, and new forms of pressure. This dissertation 
examines both the nature of this adaptation and the domestic response to such 
opportunity. The European level is thus an important instigator of change, through 
the notion that the consideration of relations between social partners at the 
European level has had a profound influence on the bargaining dynamics of social 
partners in member states. To examine this premise, this dissertation examines the 
patterns of adaptation in Ireland and Italy to EU-induced changes. 
 The concept of Europeanization in political science often centers around 
institutional arguments on the potential for the convergence or divergence of EU 
member states’ domestic institutions. Broadly speaking, convergence refers to the 
possibility of national political economies beginning to resemble one another more 
and more, usually with the characteristics of heightened market reliance and 
deregulation found in the Anglo-American model of capitalism. Literature 
pertaining to convergence identifies the key forces encouraging this resemblance as 
heightened capital mobility, globalization, and the end of socialism (Crouch and 




literature is regarding the shift to an emphasis on financial capital over industrial 
capital in the last 30 years. The shift placed considerable pressure on domestic 
institutions distinct from Anglo-American market capitalism; market forces impose 
high costs on countries sustaining domestic institutional arrangements that do not 
fit with a market-based financial system, competition among national systems leads 
to a voluntary emulation of systems that seem to work best, and international 
regimes and institutions (i.e., WTO, World Bank, IMF) lead governments to make 
criticisms of other government’s practices. Ultimately, the heightened 
interdependence within global trade and capital flows creates a source of leverage 
and pressure to comply with the most effective market-based model – usually 
considered to be those of the US and the UK. In addition, there are political 
consequences of converging institutional arrangements – specifically those that 
derive from systems of interest representation. Less organized systems of 
capitalism are characterized by a less regulated and more dynamic pluralist system, 
whereas capitalisms more carefully controlled by the state or other institutions are 
more likely to have embedded interest systems, such as formalized neo-corporatist 
bargaining (Crouch and Streeck 1997, Chapter 1; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000, 2-8; 
Hall and Soskice 2001, Chapter 1; Streeck 2003, 1-5). 
 The idea of convergence offers one possible explanation for the behavior of 
interest associations and the dynamics of industrial relations in Ireland and Italy. 
Indeed, the overarching project of European integration necessitates a degree of 




single market and achieve the benefits of integration. EU legislation in the form of 
directives concerning social affairs and employment indirectly fosters a certain 
amount of harmonization of labour laws and social standards. However, this 
influence remains indirect and exists more in the form of guaranteeing minimum 
standards rather than reorganizing domestic industrial relations systems along a 
single model. What convergence cannot explain is the amount of variation and/or 
unexpected results within the integration project. Although DICE – like many 
pieces of EU legislation concerning social affairs and employment – remained 
suitably flexible in order to allow member states discretion in how to implement the 
directive, it still had the effect of modifying the form of consultation mechanisms 
in member states that remained previously committed to a high degree of autonomy 
in their industrial relations systems. This was the case in Italy where workers were 
given the legal right to consultation, and not just information, and where the right 
was legally extended to the private sector. In Ireland, the sheer creation of legal 
worker information and consultation rights was a sizeable departure from the prior 
voluntary norms of labour-management relations at the company level. In this 
sense, convergence helps explain the content of legislation but not the form of 
implementation or the norms arising from that implementation. The important 
research context here is that while the EU is certainly an agent of change, there is a 
great deal of uncertainty about what this change might look like in each member 




dynamics offers purchase on the nature of influence between the EU and member 
state institutions. 
Divergence theories assert that the individual elements of national 
economies are not necessarily compatible with one another. Each domestic political 
economy is a complex individual system and may not have the interchanging parts 
that are easily comparable to other systems. In essence, states are not functionally 
equivalent. The notion of path-dependence plays a heavy role in divergence 
literature. The institutions of each domestic system are politically entrenched and 
very sticky; global forces may provide the pressure to change, but these forces are 
mediated through domestic constraints and national institutions. Institutions create 
their own politics and generate resistance to outside pressures, in the form of 
“increasing returns” of maintaining institutional consistency (Pierson 2002, 251-
252). Domestic actors are reluctant to abandon the familiarity of national 
arrangements. This familiarity over time increases trust and lowers levels of 
uncertainty between actors, providing more efficient sources of information, 
bargaining mechanisms, and conflict resolution. Consequently, even though states 
are exposed to identical external pressures, their responses vary according to the 
manner in which their domestic institutions continually reproduce themselves. 
Institutionalist theories hold that by adapting to such pressure, country-specific 
institutions become even more robust and durable as they continually adapt and re-




The idea of divergence holds a great deal of potential explanatory power for 
the implementation of DICE in both Ireland and Italy, as it offers a means of 
understanding the variation and unexpected developments in each country. As well, 
it acknowledges the specific politico-economic conditions in each country that act 
as an equally strong or stronger force towards conditioning legislation than the EU 
level might. The weakness of divergence as a full explanation is that it remains a 
primarily static explanation, relying on analyses of domestic behavior at single 
points of time. The notion of path-dependence allows for critical junctures and 
important windows of opportunity that may break a specific domestic pattern and 
change the institutional path, but it neglects the effects of cumulative incremental 
changes that build and shape the evolution of institutional paths. Put another way, 
the idea of divergence does not always allow for gradual institutional change that 
has come about over a lengthy period of time. This point is evident when 
examining the effects of the presence of EU-level organized interests. The 
representation of federations of trade unions and employers organizations, 
respectively, at the supranational level provides an (arguably) influential example 
of industrial relations conduct in both style and substance. Style-wise, the bipartite, 
independent role of EU-level interests offers a “best practice” model of how to 
engage social partners – a stronger formality on the consultative role of “social 
dialogue” that simultaneously moves away from neo-corporatist modes of 
mandatory tripartite mechanisms. Substantively, EU legislation on works councils, 




practice of industrial relations across the EU by establishing a minimum standard 
of dialogue between employers and employees and by delineating the importance 
of consultation as a general practice. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Neo-institutionalist political science theories generally hold that actors are 
embedded in institutional milieus. Institutions in this sense are the array of formal 
organizations inside the macro-structure of the state, economy, and civil society, 
and act as “ligatures” fastening sites, relationships, and large-scale processes to 
each other (Katznelson 1997). Historical developments are always patterned by 
context and circumstance, as are the key decisions made by political agents who 
possess particular clusters of preferences, interests and identities. As such, 
institutional design is connected to the particular configurations of politically 
salient elements and variables, both as causes and effects (Putnam 1993; 
Katznelson 1997).  
The idea of path dependence is prevalent in studies of institutional evolution 
and change in comparative politics. Path dependence emphasizes the historical 
origins of institutions, and allows that the “processes responsible for the genesis of 
an institution are different from the processes responsible for the reproduction of 
the institution” (Mahoney 2000, 4). The original historical path taken conditions the 
possibilities for institutional change at a later point in time; such changes occur due 




institutions, once selected, reproduce themselves and also shape the trajectory of 
institutional development by constraining subsequent choices” (Thelen 2004, 27). 
While path dependence provides compelling explanations for the historical 
legacies of institutions and for comparative differences, more recent comparative 
political studies have built upon existing arguments to consider patterns of 
incremental institutional change through periodic political realignment and 
renegotiation (Palier 2000; Seeleib-Kaiser 2000; Thelen 2004). The strength of 
these contributions is that the focus on incremental institutional changes illustrates 
how elements of stability and change are often linked. This dissertation utilizes the 
concept of incremental institutional change to study the supranational political 
dynamics at work influencing industrial relations in EU member states. Rather than 
viewing national patterns of worker-employer relations in a deterministic, locked-in 
manner, this dissertation suggests that slow incremental reactions to similar 
pressures over time may cumulatively point to significant institutional adaptation, 
and may even indicate a fundamental Europeanization of domestic industrial 
relations. Thelen argues: 
 “Once in place, institutions do exert a powerful influence on the 
strategies and calculations of – and interactions among – the actors 
that inhabit them. As power-distributional theories suggest, 
however, institutions are the object of ongoing political contestation, 
and changes in the political coalitions on which institutions rest are 
what drive changes in the form institutions take and the functions 
they perform in politics and society” (Thelen 2004, 31). 
 
While the EU and its major institutions are consistent sources of external pressure, 




political influence for domestic industrial relations configurations. These 
organizations are well situated to have access to – if not influence on –EU agenda 
setting and are thus well placed to potentially unsettle the current status quo of 
regional and national trade union confederations.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, previous literature has examined the indirect 
effects of EMU and the EES on the behavior of organized labour and management 
interests in different member states. Once European imperatives are agreed upon 
and accepted by all actors, the use of national social pacts and other similar 
concertative strategies in certain countries have been frequently utilized to meet 
key economic targets. Based on this, the dissertation asserts that the pressures of 
European integration on interest configurations warrant a focus on the role of the 
major European social partners in key EU directives. The purpose of such focus is 
to demonstrate that the Europeanization of forms of interest representation takes 
place through incremental institutional realignments of relationships between 
domestic and supranational interest representatives.  
This dissertation uses the theoretical framework of ‘layered’ 
institutionalism that accounts for multiple political influences on the political 
economies of EU member states. While there are undoubtedly both convergent and 
divergent forces at work shaping the trajectories of industrial relations in member 
states, the acknowledgement of new and unforeseen political actors that are 
incorporated into decision-making and strategy-making allows for a fuller 




the same time. This perspective is borrowed in part from Kathleen Thelen’s How 
Institutions Evolve (2004), which illustrates how new political dynamics can add a 
layer to existing institutional arrangements. Thelen’s work examines how four 
countries arrived at the institutional arrangements governing skill formation, partly 
by studying the political processes which induce changes that are incremental but 
cumulatively transformative – “transformation without disruption” (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005, 4). In the context of the EU, this dissertation proposes that 
supranational developments contribute to such incremental changes by adding a 
new layer of regulation. Included in this new layer, however, are new points of 
access for organized interests and new venues for ideas and contestations – in short, 
a new layer of politics. These new layers shape and influence the evolution of 
institutional behavior over time. This approach complements the multi-level 
governance approach to the EU as a regulatory state (Hooghe and Marks 2001) and 
illustrates how member states can incorporate external political influences without 
dissolving their own internal structures and without maintaining full institutional 
resiliency in the name of strict divergence. 
 
Research Design 
The research design for this dissertation is a qualitative, process-tracing, 
comparative analysis of two main external developments on domestic industrial 
relations systems in two case studies: the EU member states of Ireland and Italy. 




patterns of capital-labour interaction. This can be broken down into three sub-
questions: (1) how interest representation and aggregation at the European level has 
influenced domestic interest configurations; (2) how negotiation at the 
supranational level affects the strategies of central actors in domestic industrial 
relations systems; and (3) if and how pressure from the European integration 
project modifies the institutional legacies of domestic IR systems. Thus, in order to 
find evidence to answer each sub-question sufficiently, data was collected toward 
the purpose of: (1) identifying changes in domestic interest configurations (which 
actors/groups are present, which actors/groups are strong, and what approach is 
favored by each group); (2) identifying changes in the strategies of key domestic 
actors/groups (what issues are targeted and when, the level of confrontation versus 
consensus between actors/groups, and whether actors/groups are confronting the 
regional, national or supranational level); and (3) identifying changes in the 
institutional legacies of domestic systems of industrial relations (whether a country 




This dissertation studies the effects of Europeanization on domestic systems 
of industrial relations in two EU member states: Ireland and Italy. The logic in 
selection was to target cases where the pressure from the EU level might be most 




industrial relations that are substantively different from continental models of 
industrial relations. Comparison to a continental model (often called a “Germanic” 
model)5 is valid for the reason that many regulatory aspects of the European Union 
complement institutional features and systems that are – more often than not – 
found in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, and to some extent France and 
Scandinavia. These features include strong neo-corporatist elements of 
institutionalized collective bargaining and policymaking with key organized 
interests, moderate to robust welfare states, a relatively high commitment to patient 
capital and a strong floor of minimum worker rights and protections. Ireland and 
Italy each deviate from such continental ‘norms’ in a number of ways. Ireland 
belongs to the market-oriented Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism and has a largely 
voluntarist (meaning, not legally enshrined) system of industrial relations, a climate 
of deregulation in economic and social arenas, and a great degree of foreign direct 
investment from non-EU members. Italy is generally grouped in the Latin network-
oriented model of capitalism, and has the differentiating characteristics of a large 
economy with a high number of small and medium sized enterprises, a high degree 
of industrial conflict, a relatively conflictual and fragmented system of political 
parties, and a technically voluntarist system of industrial relations that nevertheless 
rests upon numerous legal statutes affording rights and protections to sectoral 







These countries were selected on the basis of having existing systems of 
industrial relations that are substantively different from each other; at the same 
time, each country has important qualifications to the ‘type’ of capitalism it belongs 
to. Ireland has traditionally been grouped into the ‘voluntary’ category of industrial 
relations, meaning collective bargaining and negotiation that is undertaken on a 
completely voluntary basis on the part of all social partners and that is done without 
any legal obligation to government for process or outcome. ‘Voluntary’ also entails 
a lack of definition as to whether government participates in collective bargaining 
or whether the results of collective bargaining are translated into formal regulations 
or legislation. However, the use of national-level social pacts since the 1980s as a 
means of achieving specific economic goals has become accepted practice for 
large-scale policy making; the collapse of social partnership in 2010 has reduced 
the importance of national pacts somewhat, but the recognition that national social 
pacts are useful to economic programs remains (see Chapter 4). Italy, by contrast, 
is characterized by mandatory collective bargaining at industry level and the 
frequent use of concertative, non-binding tripartite mechanisms for national level 
social pacts. Almost all collective bargaining occurs through unions or unions 
representatives at various levels, but union membership and activity is heavily 
disproportioned toward the public sector and pensioners, with low membership and 
little activity occurring in the private sector. In essence, the voluntarism of the 




legal protections for collective bargaining and other areas utilizing collective 
bargaining on a more occasional basis. 
An important similarity between the two countries’ systems of industrial 
relations is that each has utilized the national level for achieving social pacts to 
meet significant economic goals in recent decades – in particular, since the advent 
of EMU. Although Ireland is often classified within Anglo-American liberal 
economic groups, policy makers have emphasized the importance of national social 
pacts between social partners and government in the past 20 years. Italy has had 
experience with collective bargaining and workplace representation through trade 
unions only and frequently at the national level, but the Italian use of concertation 
is informal and often inconsistent in its form (ie., whether discussion is bipartite or 
tripartite). While both countries have utilized the process of national level social 
pacts since the 1980s to achieve specific (and usually economic) goals, the context 
of these social pacts is in a different type of capitalism for each case – liberal 
economy for Ireland with minimal state intervention, extensive public ownership 
for Italy with heavier bureaucratic regulations in policy making. More detail on 
each case is included in Chapters 4 and 5.  
There is also variation among each country’s success rate of transposing 
directives into national legislation on time and among each country’s record of 
infringement related to directive transposition – an appropriate consideration given 
the directive under study in this dissertation.  An additional consideration is each 




as Anglo-American capitalism, yet the country exhibits notably little of the Euro-
skepticism that the UK is so notorious for (Ebbinghaus and Manow 2001). Italy is 
one of the original members of the European Community and is sometimes 
grouped into the category of a ‘Southern’ European political economy.  While 
historically one of the most avid proponents of European integration, Italy has also 
regularly had significant difficulties meeting EU deadlines and criteria (Sbragia 
2001), and has been frequently penalized by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
for failing to implement EU directives on time (Duina 1997). 
The existing system of industrial relations in each country is necessarily an 
intervening variable, interacting with the two independent variables to condition the 
effects of potential Europeanization. The legacy of industrial relations in each 
country must be accounted for in order to appropriately capture significant changes 
and modifications at a systemic level. ‘Goodness-of-fit’ arguments would hold that 
those industrial relations systems that have the most institutional similarities with 
the directives in question will be the most likely to implement directives 
(relatively) easily and to exhibit the effects of Europeanization. Neither Ireland nor 
Italy had an industrial relations system containing elements that were analogous to 
the activities of the social partners at the EU level, and neither country had pre-
existing legislation to do with worker consultation that would have made the 
implementation of DICE unnecessary (as it was in Germany and Austria) or even 
straightforward (as it was in Scandinavia). ‘Goodness-of-fit’ arguments would 




independent social partners and the implementation of DICE, and that each country 
would remain illustrative of domestic institutional paths being stronger than 
Europeanizing forces. As Chapter 5 will discuss, each country did in fact encounter 
significant obstacles with transposing DICE, but these obstacles were to do with the 
details and not with the introduction of the context of legalizing mandatory worker 
consultation. 
Overall, these cases were selected with the intention of choosing countries 
that differed on the dependent variable – the configuration of industrial relations as 
established previous to significant European developments. In-depth study of the 
particularities of each case is found in Chapters 4, 5, & 6 as the dissertation 
chapters are organized by variables rather than by cases. 
 
Hypotheses 
The generation of EU-level labour law pertaining to worker information and 
consultation meant that member states that previously relied on very different 
systems of worker consultation would have to implement substantial changes. 
Given this development, it is evident that some nature of influence exists between 
the EU and domestic levels. The consequence of DICE in such member states is not 
only the introduction of regulations where there were previously none, but the 
broader enforcement of formalized and organized representation at the workplace 




As such, I first hypothesize that the development of EU-level, supranational 
interest confederations generate pressure over time toward a form of social 
dialogue that is simultaneously mandatory but less formal. The EU Commission 
itself explicitly recognizes the need for social partners and has granted European 
social partners the right to be consulted by the Commission. The Commission also 
funds social dialogue initiatives, such as capacity-building for social partner 
organizations (Eurofound 2011a). However, the bulk of social dialogue remains 
bipartite (without the involvement of public authorities) and results in mostly 
autonomous agreements between the social partners themselves; meaning, they 
result in expected conventions that are passed down through the tiers of workers 
unions and employers’ organizations, but do not often result in legislation. The 
efficiency of this example for reducing the potential of industrial conflict is one that 
is being increasingly emulated in member states, as it presents a more consensual 
alternative to free-form debate and lobbying and less of a bureaucratic load than 
heightened formal modes of neo-corporatist institutions. 
I then hypothesize that EU legislation related to worker-employee relations 
generates pressure over time on domestic systems of industrial relations to 
decentralize collective bargaining to the company level. This is because the content 
of EU legislation establishes the need for a minimum floor of worker-employee 
relations but does not dictate precisely how this need is to be met. As such, 
countries that had purely voluntary bargaining systems previous to EU legislation 




companies rather than sectors, and avoiding anything akin to collective bargaining 
at a national level. Countries that already had some form of mandatory consultation 
system are likely to rely more and more on independent works councils and 
company representatives rather than introduce additional mechanisms at national or 
sectoral levels, in order to allow for subsidiarity and avoid conflict. 
The significance of these hypotheses points to the new dominant trend of 
social dialogue. Social dialogue is more formal and regulatory than in voluntary 
systems once it becomes institutionalized within a political system (connoting a 
step away from conventional neo-liberal rhetoric), but much less formal and 
regulatory than neo-corporatist systems (connoting a step toward competitiveness 
and efficiency). The institutionalization of social dialogue is helping usher in a mild 
form of convergence around “meso-level” corporatism – bargaining at the company 
level. This level of bargaining illustrates a new productivity model that is neither 
completely liberal nor coordinated. Instead, this model incorporates both the 
flexibility and responsiveness of the market and the social and productivity benefits 
of worker consultation. The significance of this potentially new model is that it 
contributes to the literature on models of capitalism in a manner that goes beyond 
the organized/liberal division as well as points to the EU Single Market supported 
by EU social policies as important innovators of growth. 
 




This dissertation examines the inclusion of European-level organized 
interests as new political actors as an independent variable. There are four 
foundational organizations that make use of interest aggregation and representation 
at the EU level: one workers’ confederation (ETUC) and three employers’ 
associations (BE, CEEP, and UEAPME). 
This variable identifies the presence and influence of the above four 
organizations in labour market policy issues and relevant directive formulation and 
implementation. Research on each entity includes a review of the organizations, the 
organizational publications that are relevant to the two directives under study, a 
thorough reading of news sources and academic literature pertaining to each 
organization’s activities, and most importantly, interviews with significant officers 
from each organization’s headquarters in Brussels. The purpose of this data was to 
gather information on what each interest group’s perspective was on DICE, and to 
worker-employer relations more generally across the EU. The question motivating 
study of this variable was to ascertain whether each EU-level organization has re-
shaped any part of domestic interest confederations in the countries under study. 
The assumption here is that each entity presents a specific source of political 
pressure that is emblematic of the Europeanization process, and that pressure, in 






Independent Variable 2: EU Directive on the Information and Consultation of 
Employees (DICE) 
This dissertation uses the 2002 EU Directive on the Information and 
Consultation of Employees (DICE) to examine the impact of Europeanization on 
the patterns of capital-labour interaction in Ireland and Italy. Directive 2002/14/EC 
focused on social dialogue between management and labour and can be construed 
as contentious to the extent that industrial relations are contentious in each member 
state. EU legislation on worker representation has the potential to set the stage for 
increased harmonization of social laws in Europe, as such legislation is likely to 
lead to changes – or at least lead to important discussions leading to changes – in 
the organization of labour. “Establishing a standing structure for worker 
representation throughout Europe, it is an important feature and even an element in 
the definition of the continental model of labour relations in Europe, having a 
major impact in countries with a voluntarist tradition such as the United Kingdom 
and Ireland.” (Schömann et al. 2006) 
The EP and the Council formally adopted DICE in February 2002; member 
states had until March 23, 2005 to comply with its requirements. Under DICE, all 
undertakings with at least 50 employees (or establishments with at least 20 
employees) must inform and consult employee representatives about business 
developments, employment trends and changes in work organization. As Ireland 
and the UK each had no history of formalized in-company information and 




the full application of the directive – until 2007. The voluntarist tradition of labour 
organization in both countries meant that there was no standing structure for 
worker representation as there was in the continental model of labour.  
Data for this variable includes study of the directive’s content, provisions, 
and origins, along with analyses of the role of the European Social Partners in the 
directive’s formulation. Data on the directive’s content and provisions comes from 
EUR-Lex, the official legal database of the EU.  EUR-Lex houses all EU 
legislation, preparatory acts, references to national implementing measures, case-
law of the ECJ and parliamentary questions. More recent material provides 
publication references to member states’ national provisions enacting directives. 
Examination of these materials provides a thorough account of what the directive 
entails, the mandated deadlines, and the amount of flexibility in implementation. 
The analysis of the directive’s composition is based on first-hand interviews with 
Commission officials, relevant Members of European Parliament (MEP), and 
experts within the major European Social Partners. The purpose of such interviews 
was to gather information on the germination of EU legislation to assess what, if 
any, intended or unintended political and/or national biases may exist in the form of 
a directive’s design and related policy prescriptions. Included in this analysis is a 
thorough reading of academic literature pertaining to the EU legislation process 
along with reliable news sources relevant to the directives at hand.  
Analysis at the national level includes detailed case studies on the general 




a thorough reading of all primary and secondary literature pertaining to the 
transposition processes in the two countries under consideration. As well, the 
analysis builds on interviews with officials in each country’s Ministry of 
Labour/Employment, trade union confederations and employers’ organizations to 
collect perceptions on the DICE’s implementation process. These interviews will 
supply the political focus of the domestic analysis, which will provide insight into 
what interests or what power sources may be influencing the implementation 
process. The overarching goal with this independent variable is to examine the 
formulation and implementation process of this directive in order to assess whether 
the DICE had any lasting impact on the way in which worker consultation systems 
are organized in each country. 
Previous research on Europeanization would suggest that there are two 
categories of theoretical expectations for how the DICE ought to affect member 
states’ consultation systems. On the one hand, pressure from European integration 
might foster a convergence of interest behavior that organizes itself in a 
Europeanized neo-liberal direction. One the other hand, the distinct and 
idiosyncratic institutional dynamics of each member states’ system of industrial 
relations might reinforce the divergence of national industrial relations. Those 
member states that already have consultation systems in place that are similar to the 
DICE model would have little trouble with implementing the directive, while those 
member states’ whose industrial relations systems differ sharply from the DICE 




implementing the directive in a necessarily idiosyncratic manner. The cases of 
Ireland’s and Italy’s implementation of DICE offer a challenge to each set of 
arguments. Neither country had equivalent pre-existing consultation mechanisms 
that would have made implementation of DICE straightforward, or even 
unnecessary, as was the case with Austria and Germany (Eurofound 2009). The 
results of this dissertation analysis show that each country did implement the 
directive in a manner heavily shaped by each country’s institutional particularities; 
however, the results to date reveal a great deal of similarities in how the legislation 
was debated and how the domestic legislation was implemented. 
Using directives to help assess the influence of the EU on national systems 
of industrial relations is appropriate because it provides the opportunity to chart a 
linear course of events that involve both supranational and national deliberation. In 
the context of industrial relations, directives also offer the opportunity to trace the 
involvement of the EU-level social partners in the development and articulation of 
EU legislation. Duina defines directives as “the most powerful and probably the 
most commonly used legal tool.” In contrast to decisions, which are administrative 
acts with limited impact, or framework regulations, which do not need to be 
transposed into national law and are thus less transformative, directives are 
supranational legislation passed through the European Parliament that must be 
translated into national law and then applied into action: “thus, they harmonize 
national legal systems before harmonizing the social, economic and political 




on the Europeanization of industrial relations systems has focused on the policy 
areas of employment and wage determination (see review of literature in Chapter 
2). Studying directives offer another avenue by which to assess the direct and 
indirect effects of EU policy on national interest representations.  
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the amount of change or modification in the 
domestic systems of industrial relations in each country, from 2002 to present. I 
operationalize this variable in two parts. First, by looking at the domestic 
configurations of trade unions and employers’ associations at the systemic level 
and assessing any changes in structure, objectives, and operation. This entails any 
change in the content and form of dialogue between social partners, what level of 
government (regional, national, supranational) unions and associations are targeting 
and for what purpose, and what role unions and associations are playing in labour 
policy formation and implementation. Such assessments help clarify the roles of 
interest articulation between the social partners as well as illustrate where major 
decisions are being made and in what context (i.e., in reaction to market behavior, 
EU agendas, economic policy, etc.).  
The second method of operationalizing the dependent variable is by 
studying specific trade union confederations and employers’ associations in each 
country. In Ireland, this was the Irish Congress for Trade Unions (ICTU) and the 




Italian trade union confederations (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, 
Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori and Unione Italiana Lavoratori), and 
the central employers’ association (Confindustria). This dissertation concentrates 
on any significant changes in the strategies of central actors. Examples of this 
include lobbying at the European level rather than the national level, decentralizing 
the implementation of key labour market reforms to the company level, and efforts 
to adopt a shared platform among all unions and associations to present to either 
the national or supranational level. In both parts of this operationalization I give 
special attention to those changes associated with the European level. 
 Data for the dependent variable comes from academic literature, news 
sources, and interviews. I conducted interviews with key officials within each 
country’s Ministry of Labour, and relevant officials in each country’s main trade 
unions and employer associations. Such data provided first-hand perceptions of the 
impact of each of the two independent variables. As well, such data also offers 
insight into the strategies of each confederation and association towards labour 
market reforms. Such strategies include enhanced communication and cooperation 
between social partners in areas that were previously more problematic, an 
increased likelihood of decentralizing the implementation of key policies to the 
company level, a greater reliance on the European level for lobbying and agenda-
setting, and a realignment of objectives towards employment over worker 






I collected data for this dissertation through three routes: (1) academic 
literature searches and reviews; (2) reading official documents available online 
pertaining to relevant organizations, directives, and governments; and (3) 
conducting interviews with officials and professionals in relevant areas of the EU 
itself, national governments, and social partner organizations at both European and 
national levels. The first route was done repeatedly throughout the course of this 
study in order to stay informed on academic analyses relating to the dissertation 
subject. Similarly, the second route was also done regularly and repeatedly, but also 
on the basis of finding documents recommended by interviewees. The third route, 
conducting first-hand interviews, was done in person and by telephone. Prospective 
interviewees were contacted by email or phone, given a brief description of the 
study, and asked to participate in a 30-60 minute interview. Those interviews done 
in-person were held in Brussels, Dublin, and Milan in 2008. Those interviews done 
over the telephone took place in both Europe and North America between 2008 and 
2009. I took notes during these interviews and did not use a tape recorder. In total, 
35 people were interviewed; of those, approximately 22 of those interviews 
resulted in material useful to this research and are indirectly quoted in the following 
chapters. These interviewees held various kinds of professional positions at: 
• ETUC, BE, UEAPME, CEEP 





• ICTU, IBEC, Irish Ministry of Labour and Employment 
• UIL, CSIL, CGIL, Confindustria, Italian Ministry of Labour and 
Employment 
• Trinity College Dublin 
 
Conclusion 
 The theory guiding this research is that of institutional adaptation. This 
entails the concept of gradual institutional evolution as a result of small incremental 
changes that end up having a cumulative effect. The growth of the EU adds a new 
institutional layer to domestic systems of industrial relations through new 
regulations, new actors, and new sources of opportunity for existing actors. This 
contributes to a definitive degree of Europeanization in areas of political economy 
that are normally taken to be heavily path-dependent. The larger context is that this 
process of Europeanization in the industrial relations of member states is 
contributing to a hybrid model of capitalism that entwines neo-liberal logic with a 
thorough and non-reactive social model that underscores security with labour 
regulations. 
 The next two chapters provide the data for each independent variable. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of social partner activity in Europe and discusses 
the data gathered to do with social dialogue at supranational and national levels, 
while chapter 5 outlines the development of DICE and discusses the data gathered 




incorporates the material from the previous two chapters to provide an analysis of 
the data speaks to the hypotheses in the context of the theoretical framework. 
Chapter 7 then summarizes the results of the dissertation and offers implications for 





CHAPTER 4: EU-Level Organized Interests 
Introduction 
 This chapter describes the independent variable of EU-level organized 
interests, outlining what their role and function is at the supranational level and 
providing an analysis of what their influence is on domestic industrial relations 
systems. Despite the largely coordinative role that EU-level social partners fill, 
organized interests at the European level and their style of interaction have an 
impact on domestic industrial relations in three areas: by encouraging a form of 
social dialogue that is highly coordinated yet highly autonomous from government; 
by indirectly encouraging the use of social dialogue as a central manner of 
economic adaptation during debt crises and other difficult economic periods; and 
by encouraging national social partners to centralize and coordinate in order to 
boost their own capacity to utilize the EU-level to their respective advantage. 
The chapter begins with a detailed definition of what an EU-level social 
partner is and then offers a brief historical outline of the main organizations 
fulfilling the role of social partner for the main European institutions. Following are 
descriptions of the four main European-level social partners – ETUC, BE, CEEP, 
and UEAPME – along with descriptions of their interactions with each other and 
with European institutions, and an overview of their chief successes. Then, the 
chapter discusses the social partners in Ireland and Italy, respectively, and analyzes 
the interactions between domestic social partners and European-level social 




specialize in the evaluation of European industrial relations6 – this chapter then 
analyzes the measure of influence the European level has had on the domestic level. 
The central argument in this chapter is that “social dialogue” at the EU level 
does in fact stimulate patterning of labour-management relations in Member States 
in a similar direction. This is done by the EU level offering a prominent example of 
best practices that emphasizes social partner independence and through the 
initiation of “softer” mechanisms of joint opinions and framework agreements 
more often than legally binding directives (see Chapters 2 and 6 for more on the 
softer mechanisms of EU governance). This example is highly coordinated, yet 
does not transcend a fundamentally ‘voluntarist’ approach to industrial relations – a 
central feature of how EU processes are able to ‘hybridize’ some of the formal 
features of Western European-style capitalism with single market liberalization. As 
successive EU treaties have increased the rights and recognition given to European 
organized interests, both sides of industry at the EU level have become better 
prepared to negotiate based on the contributions from respective affiliates in 
Member States. 
Autonomous social dialogue carries with it a central feature that is 













binding framework agreements. Interview data illustrates that concepts such as 
“flexibility” and “adaptability” are much more important to business and managers, 
whereas unions and workers are fundamentally more concerned with binding 
agreements (preferably with legal force) that demand concrete worker protections. 
Whereas autonomous dialogue might allow the social partners to negotiate without 
the constraints of the executive, in the EU context it arguably allows employers to 
shape the concept of ‘employability’ (employment security within a competitive 
marketplace, rather than ‘job security’) and the objectives surrounding that concept. 
The underlying impact of the EU example is to reinforce growth, employment and 
competitiveness over working conditions, and as such to implicitly nudge industrial 
relations in a neo-liberal direction that supports the goals of employers more than 
unions. The Commission actively promotes the idea of “Social Europe” and social 
cohesion, and offers financial assistance to all EU-level social partners in order to 
level the playing field of resources between employers and employees, yet it is 
largely governments and industry that benefit from the mechanisms designed to 
support “flexicurity” within EU-level processes. Interviews and reports reveal that 
employer associations have a much more positive view of EU labour market 
initiatives than trade unions, which remain largely skeptical. In essence, as the 
single market is an effective transmitter of liberalization (Smith 2006), and EU 
social dialogue exists in order to moderate the effects of single market integration, 
EU social dialogue has the accompanying and indirect effect of (gently) re-shaping 





The European Level 
European-level Industrial Relations 
 The level of EU involvement in domestic matters pertaining to social 
policy, employment policy, and labour-related policies has grown correspondingly 
with the growth of EU institutions and EU areas of regulation as a whole. To speak 
of a specifically European form of industrial relations that is a direct result of EU 
governance is a stretch, or at least an oversimplification. However, the influence of 
EU governance upon employer-worker relations in member states, along with the 
influence of member state practices into the wider body of EU regulation, has 
nudged member states closer toward an EU system of employment and industrial 
relations, in that both the form and process of industrial relations at country level 
and supranational level has begun to mirror each other more and more over recent 
years. Eurofound, in December 2011 states: 
“Without any doubt the influence of the European Union in the field 
of employment and industrial relations has assumed greater 
importance since the mid-1980s than in the decades before. This is 
mainly due to three factors. The first was the idea of a European 
type of capitalism which includes a specific social model and the 
idea of a ‘social dimension’ of European policies that was adopted 
by the European Commission in the mid-1980s. The second factor 
was the move towards a common currency and more liberalized 
markets within the EU since the 1990s, which led to attempts to 
improve the coordination of economic and social policies among EU 
Member States across a whole range of issues. And the third factor 
was an increasing pressure from different actors of what is now 
being called the ‘civil society’ to have their positions being taken 





For the purpose of arguing the salience of Europeanization, the second factor is 
undoubtedly the most salient, as it addresses the need to “coordinate” sets of 
policies in order to support economic and monetary integration. It also could be 
argued that this need to coordinate is what created the conditions for the third factor 
to take root, in that coordination of certain relevant economic policies galvanized 
relevant groups in civil society to lobby and gain access at the EU decision-making 
level. 
 The history of industrial relations at the EU level could perhaps also be 
referred to as an evolution of the term “social dialogue” as it pertains to organized 
interaction between the channels of management and labour. Table 4.1 offers a 
succinct summary of the main elements of EC/EU initiatives that spurred forward 
the process of social dialogue. 




Treaties of Rome 1957 • To create a common market in services, 
good, capital and labour 
• Basic principles of social and 
employment policies (equal pay between 
men and women; enhancing 
geographical and occupational mobility 
of workers) 
• Recognized the general need for a 
“social dimension” of Europe, 
particularly in matters relating to 
employment (Article 118) 
First Programme of 
Social Action 
1974 • Emphasized need to ensure more 
cooperation between the Member States 
in the social field 
• Council adopted directives on equal 
opportunities and on health and safety at 
work as well as action programmes for 
vulnerable groups within society 
• Included recommendations for the 




employees and their legal position in 
undertakings, such as in the cases of 




1985 • Regarded as the starting point of 
European social dialogue 
• Jacques Delors, President of the 
European Commission from 1985-1994, 
invited representatives of national 
organizations affiliated to the EU-level 
employer and worker organizations and 
the EU level social partners themselves 
to a meeting at the castle of Val 
Duchesse 
Single European Act 1986 • Act was adopted in order to facilitate the 
implementation of a Single European 
Market by 1992, and included the 
objectives of: 
o Greater effort to improve 
workers’ health and safety at 
work 
o Same conditions for all workers 
in terms of their working 
environment, regardless of 
which Member State they work 
in 
o Prevention of ‘social dumping’ 
as the internal market was 
completed 
• In addition, the SEA stated that “the 
Commission shall endeavour to develop 
the dialogue between management and 
labour at European level which could, if 
the two sides consider it desirable, lead 
to relations based on agreement” 
(Article 118b). 
Social Charter 1989 • “Community Charter of the fundamental 
social rights of workers” – a range of 
social rights that are to be guaranteed in 
the European labour market 
• Not legally binding, but demonstrated 
political intent 
• UK opt-out 
Maastricht Treaty 1992 • Introduced the’ Social Protocol’ and the 
‘Agreement on Social Policy’ (UK opt-
out of latter) 
• Gave a major boost for the role of social 
partner, giving employers and unions the 
right to negotiate binding European 
framework agreements 
• Extension of qualified majority voting in 




employees in working environment, 
working conditions, information and 
consultation of workers, equal 
opportunities for men and women on the 
labour market and equal treatment at 
work, and occupational integration of 
people excluded from the labour market 
o Several directives derived from 
the basis of the Agreement, 
such as those on European 
Works Councils, Parental leave, 
and Part-time work 
Amsterdam Treaty 1997 • Integrated the Social Protocol and 
Agreement from the Maastricht Treaty 
into a new comprehensive ‘Social 
Agreement’ that also included the UK 
• Introduced an Employment Charter 
which required the coordination of 
employment strategies and an annual 
report by national governments on the 
employment situation of their respective 
countries 
• Renewed the commitment to combat 
discrimination 
• Renewed  the obligation that the 
principle of equal pay is applied 
Treaty of Lisbon 2009 •  “The Union recognizes and promotes 
the role of the social partners at its level, 
taking into account the diversity of 
national systems. It shall facilitate 
dialogue between the social partners, 
respecting their autonomy (Article 152, 
TFEU) 
• Shift of responsibility of promoting 
social dialogue from the Commission to 
the EU, and institutionalizes in primary 
law the “Tripartite Social Summit for 
Growth and Employment” 
• European Parliament to be informed if 
social partners wish to extend their 
framework agreements via Council 
decision 
Source: adapted from Eurofound (2011b), p.1-3. 
Taken together, the history of industrial relations at the EU level highlights three 
processes: the interaction between European industrial relations and the national 
and local levels; the interaction between bipartite and tripartite processes at 




interaction between the sectoral and cross-sectoral levels. These processes are 
discussed toward the end of this chapter. Particular dynamics involved in shaping 
these processes are EU-wide social dialogue, the collective representation of 
interests, and the EU’s growing role as an employment and industrial relations 
regulator.  
 
European Social Dialogue 
 The Val Duchesse initiative in 1985 launched a bipartite social dialogue that 
started to become a forum for negotiation on a European level. This bipartite 
(meaning independent from government, or in this case, the European 
Commission) dialogue produced declarations and opinions from the social partners 
but nothing with any binding power. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 allowed 
agreements negotiated by the social partners to potentially be given legal force 
through a Council decision, which would then have to be integrated into the 
legislation of each Member State, or through an ‘autonomous’ agreement, whereby 
the social partners themselves take responsibility for implementing measures at 
national, sectoral and enterprise level. Council decisions – also known as directives 
– become a part of EU law. Three agreements have been implemented by Council 
Directive: the parental leave (1996) and revised text in 2008, the part-time work 
(1997), and fixed-term contracts (1999) agreements. Four autonomous agreements 
have been negotiated: the telework (2002), the work-related stress (2004), the 




(ETUC 2011a). With these resulting events, the Maastricht Treaty definitively 
helped establish a more formal role for the major European social partners by 
giving substance to their agreements and by further legitimizing the process of 
social dialogue. 
 Since Maastricht, European social dialogue has grown in independence and 
autonomy, as well as in scope. Cross-sectoral dialogue involves the main 
European-level organized interests (ETUC, BE, CEEP and UEAPME), while 
sectoral dialogue involves sector-specific European social partners along with some 
of their national analogues. The Commission has placed increasing emphasis on the 
European sectoral social dialogue in the past ten years, stating that social dialogue 
at the sectoral level “is the proper level for discussion on many issues linked to 
employment, working conditions, vocational training, industrial change, the 
knowledge society, demographic patterns, enlargement and globalization” (EU 
Commission Communication 2002). This emphasis has resulted in 40 sectoral 
social dialogue committees which have produced more than 500 texts and seven 
binding agreements (Eurofound 2011b, p.5). 
“Social partners” is a term generally used in Europe to refer to the main 
representatives of labour (trade unions) and management (employers’ associations). 
At the EU-level, “European social partners” refers to the organizations engaged in 
“European social dialogue”. The Maastricht Treaty established the Protocol on 
Social Policy that formalized the manner of introducing and adopting social 




to be consulted by the Commission on the direction of Community social policy 
and the content of Community action in this area. Maastricht was also significant in 
setting a precedent for what kind of organization could be considered a European 
social partner – an important definition considering that social partners gained the 
right to be consulted under the Treaty. Organizations should “be cross-industry or 
relate to specific actors or categories and be organized at the European level; 
consist of organizations, which are themselves an integral and recognized part of 
Member State social partner structures and with the capacity to negotiate 
agreements, and which are representative of all Member states, as far as possible; 
have adequate structures to ensure their effective participation in the consultation 
process,” (Eurofound 2011a). While this definition initially appears quite broad, the 
criterion requiring organizations to have ‘adequate structures’ is what excludes 
actors that might wish to be included. Adequate structures include the resources 
necessary to participate at meetings in Brussels and elsewhere and the internal 
logistics necessary to quickly and effectively communicate information throughout 
an organization and back and forth to the European level. Organizations that lack 
the adequate structures to participate as a European social partner on their own 
might choose to join a larger federative type organization, i.e., a small regional 
trade union choosing to belong to a larger national trade union confederation in 
order to be able to be a part of European social dialogue. 
The European social partners engage in either sectoral or cross-industry 




partners includes 79 sector-specific organizations (such as those in metalworking, 
chemicals, transport, etc.), three general cross-industry organizations (CEEP, 
ETUC, BE), three cross-industry organizations representing certain categories of 
workers or undertakings (UEAPME, and two others representing executive, 
professional and managerial workers), and one specific organization 
(Eurochambres, representing the Association of European Chambers of 
Commerce). Representativeness is based in large part in the “mutual recognition” 
between the social partners on their capacity to engage in collective bargaining, 
rather than a term referring to the extent of coverage in European civil society 
(Eurofound 2011a).7 
The most recent EU treaty – the Lisbon Treaty or the “Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union” (TFEU) – contains key articles addressing the 
protocol for the role of the European social partners. Article 152 states: “The Union 
recognizes and promotes the role of the social partners at its level, taking into 
account the diversity of national systems. It shall facilitate dialogue between the 
social partners, respecting their autonomy.” Article 153 outlines the areas that the 
EU supports and complements the activities of member states, including (but not 
limited to) the protection of working conditions, social security and the social 
protection of workers, the information and consultation of workers, and the 









The Union is not allowed to engage in co-determination in areas dealing with issues 
of pay, right of association, right to strike and lock-outs. Articles 154 and 155 
outline the procedure for social partners (Lisbon Treaty 2012). The Commission is 
responsible for promoting consultation of management and labour at EU level and 
helps facilitate dialogue that ensures balanced support for parties. ‘Facilitation’ 
primarily consists of creating working groups and providing technical/financial 
assistance “deemed necessary to underpin the dialogue,” (EU Commission 1993). 
Facilitation in the form of funding cannot be underrated, as it provides the social 
partners with the capabilities necessary to enact social dialogue. This is particularly 
the case with ETUC. The Commission funds the major cross-sector social partners 
disproportionately in order to bring them to a relatively equitable playing field 
between management and labour, contravening the commonly-held belief that 
employers’ associations have more equity than workers’ organizations and trade 
unions to raise the money necessary to be an effective actor at the European level 
(Interview B1)8. The funding comes under the rubric of “capacity-building” 
through the European Social Fund9 or through direct Commission initiatives on 













Any proposals coming out of the Commission in the field of social policy 
must be given to the social partners for consultation, who are then responsible for 
submitting an opinion and/or a recommendation. The most general form of debate 
usually arises between ETUC (representing workers and trade union federations 
from all member states) and BE, CEEP, and UEAPME (together representing 
employers in businesses, public sector entities and small-to-medium enterprises). If 
both sides of management and labour agree to do so, they may initiate autonomous 
bipartite dialogue between them. The purpose of this dialogue is to develop 
contractual relations (i.e., a contract) on the subject of the dialogue under 
negotiation. As the Commission must suspend legislative initiative during the 
period of bipartite dialogue, the time frame for autonomous negotiation is limited to 
nine months – the social partners can jointly ask the Commission for an extension 
on this time period, which the Commission may or may not choose to approve. 
Contractual relations are agreements made between the social partners for how to 
move forward on a certain issue, either in accordance with the procedures and 
practices in member states or by asking for a Council decision on a Commission 
proposal (Eurofound 2011a). Any agreements resulting from such contractual 
relations “shall be implemented according to the practices of management and 
labour and Member States,” (Lisbon Treaty, Article 155). 
Articles 154 and 155 of TFEU (Lisbon Treaty 2012) define the prerogatives 




• “social partners are procedurally involved in the genesis of any Commission 
initiative in the social policy field (Art. 154.2 and 154.3 TFEU), both in the 
direction and the content of a proposal; 
• they may decide on how they wish to implement their agreements – ‘either 
in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and 
labour and the Member States or, in matters covered by Article 153, at the 
joint request of the signatory parties, by a Council decision on a proposal 
from the Commission’ (Art. 155.2 TFEU); 
• they may decide on autonomous agreements in all social policy fields – 
even those not falling under the competences of EU institutions as defined 
in Art 154 EC (Art. 155.1 EC).” 
 
European cross-industry social dialogue has resulted in over 300 joint texts which 
are housed in a database and are used consultatively by various enterprises and 
organizations. These joint texts are considered as suggestive guidelines that do not 
necessarily result in binding agreements. The most outstanding achievements of 
cross-industry social dialogue (according to Eurofound 2011a) have been: three 
agreements implemented by Council Directive, on parental leave (1995), part-time 
work (1997) and fixed-term contracts (1999); three autonomous agreements on 
telework (2002), work-related stress (2004) and harassment and violence at work 
(2007); and two frameworks of action on the lifelong development of competencies 
and qualifications (2002) and gender equality (2005) (EU Commission 2011a). 
Several interviewees in the course of research for this dissertation opined that the 
European social partners have not used their rights very extensively, meaning that 
each “side” of management and labour has maintained a mostly “reactive” role to 
the Commission, rather than asserting specific platforms or proposals that are self-
generated (Interviews B3 and B6). This is mainly due to the difficulties in 




successful agreements (listed above) in the cases of parental leave, part-time work, 
stress at work, harassment and violence in the workplace, and inclusive labour 
markets, are all (according to source) “mostly ideologically straightforward for all 
social partners, workers and businesses” (Interview B4); meaning that the positions 
of each side and their differences are precisely what one would expect, with worker 
representatives desiring more accommodations and employers desiring more 
restrictive practices. The social partners have either failed10 to reach autonomous 
agreements (meaning that management and labour have not been able to 
successfully negotiate a contractual agreement after an extended time period, or 
have not been able to reach agreement after nine months and have not opted to ask 
the Commission for an extension) or have had significant obstacles in coming to 
some kind of agreement in cases that have “more of a bottom line” or are more 
related to worker consultation mechanisms, such as the information and 
consultation of employees, temporary agency work, and European Works Councils 
(Ibid).  
 Since 2002, the Commission has called upon the European social partners 
to establish joint work programs and to develop their autonomous dialogue further. 
This was for the purpose of developing social dialogue between relevant actors 











autonomy for the social partners was, in essence, a move toward more bipartite 
social dialogue that would not involve the European public authorities, with the 
goal of strengthening the social partners. The first joint work program was for the 
time period 2003-2005 and focused on framework agreements for telework and 
work-related stress, action on gender equality, and actions for the lifelong 
development of competencies and qualifications. The second joint work program 
for 2006-2008 was aimed toward further building the autonomy of the social 
partners; mainly, through the construction of joint analyses and framework reports 
on instruments used to enhance the effectiveness and inclusion of various labour 
markets. Some key achievements during the second work program were the 
negotiation of framework agreements on harassment and violence at work and on 
parental leave (the latter resulting in a Council Directive), and the publication of a 
joint analysis on the key challenges facing European labour markets. The third 
work program (2009-2010) saw the main European social partners negotiate an 
autonomous framework agreement on inclusive labour markets and one on a 
framework of actions on employment, as well as manage a project on national 
studies on economic and social change in the entire EU in order to effectively 
manage change and restructuring. The current 2012-2014 work program is centered 
on the recent financial crises and efforts toward balancing labour market recovery 









Collective Representation of Interests at the EU level  
 A key facet of the organization of European social dialogue concerns the 
organizational context of worker and employer relations. The collective 
organization of these interests has given rise to what is widely referred to as the 
“social partnership model”, which generally moves beyond a  very narrow 
conception of the employment relationship as a function of the labour market and 
towards a consideration of work in a broader, social context.12 The organizational 
structure of workers into trade unions is highly centralized at the European level 
and sectoral organization is very strong – similar to the trade union organization of 
countries such as Austria or Germany, where one finds the existence of a few 
strong trade unions that are organized along industry sectors. At the EU level, the 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the growing number of 
European industry federations provide members with a clear organizational profile. 
The collective representation of employers at the European level is similarly 
centralized, although with more separation between public/private employers and 
the distinct representation of small businesses. Employers’ sectoral organization, in 
contrast to trade union industry federations, remained underdeveloped until late 














the dialogue between the social partners in the sectors at European level. The 
purpose of these committees was to establish centralized, autonomous bodies for 
consultation, joint initiatives, and negotiation, and to reinforce the autonomy and 
representativeness of social partners on either side of management and labour (EU 
Commission 1998). In doing so, the Commission directly demonstrated a 
preference for centralized organization, presumably because the centralization of 
key interests provides an important mechanism for undertaking effective social 
dialogue which streamlines the opinions of representative social partners into 
general categories and removes some of the more competitive aspects of a more 
pluralistic style of interest representation (where random lobbying tends to be more 
the norm than formalized social dialogue mechanisms). 
 The key cross-industry European social partners involved regularly in 
European social dialogue are:  
1. European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
ETUC was founded in 1973 and is an umbrella organization that affiliates 
national trade union confederations and European industry committees. The 
structure of the ETUC comprises a Congress, Executive Committee, Steering 
Committee, and Secretariat, all compiled mostly by democratically elected 
representatives. Funding comes mainly from contributions made by its member 
confederations and the European Commission. The ETUC’s main activities are to 
negotiate with employers at the European level through the European Social Model 




collective bargaining, social dialogue and good working conditions. To address 
these concerns, the ETUC involves itself with economic and social policy-making 
in all EU institutions (Presidency, Parliament, Council and Commission). This 
involves participation in regular summits, coordinating trade union participation on 
advisory bodies, and acting as an information resource for individual MEPs and 
Commissioners as well as EP groups such as the Employment and Social Affairs 
Committee and working groups within the Commission Department (DG) of 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (ETUC 2012, Interview B1).  
 Although influential, the ETUC does remain an organization of 
organizations, rather than an organization of workers – a feature shared with other 
major social partners at the European level. In many ways its activities are more 
analogous to a political lobby group rather than to a typical trade union, and has in 
the past been characterized as more pluralist than corporatist due the sui generis 
nature of the EU itself: “many of the avenues of access to the Commission used by 
pressure groups occur through highly developed networks of informal exchange 
relations…As the pre-eminent representative of European labour, the ETUC’s 
access to the Commission, both formally and informally, is long established and 
particularly well-developed…It has provided ETUC with a means of feeding 
information into the political process,” (Abbott 1998, p.615-616). Keith Abbott 
(1998) writes that the ETUC was best described as a ‘regional’ trade union that is 
only able to operate in transnational or regional contexts and is not functional in 




supranational structure of authority; when the structure of authority is dominated by 
intergovernmentalism, the ETUC’s effectiveness is low. As such, ETUC’s 
effectiveness within EU policy-making has at times varied somewhat across issues, 
in that ETUC was able to have more influence over those issues that were more in 
the realm of supranational policy-making (i.e., part-time work, which accompanied 
many features of single market integration and multinational businesses) as 
opposed to those that were more heavily dominated by national concerns and 
policies (i.e., parental leave). The ETUC’s effectiveness is also limited to the 
political context of getting issues on agendas and promoting specific, European-
level objectives – this stands in contrast to more orthodox national trade unions that 
are dominated by material imperatives (arguing for redistribution in favor of 
workers) or ideological imperatives (a common vision of the trade union’s role in 
society) (Abbott 1997; 1998). However, as EU jurisdiction into matters pertaining 
to employment and labour law has increased notably over the past decade – in 
larger part due to some of the wage adjustment pressures stemming from EMU-
controlled inflation and the price stability commitment of the ECB – ETUC’s 
effectiveness has increased as far as it has become much more relevant as a 
political (representative) actor for workers and trade unions across the EU. 
Since Abbott’s writing in the late 1990s, procedural changes in EU policy-
making – such as a gradual allocation of powers to the EP and a general 
commitment by Member States to introduce a greater social dimension into the 




and decision-making within European integration at large. This has in turn 
contributed to ETUC’s role having increasing salience within the context of social 
dialogue on policies relating to employment, inclusion, and social affairs. In 
essence, ETUC’s relevance as a political actor at the European level has expanded 
more or less parallel to the extension of competency of the EU’s supranational 
institutions to act in policy areas that were previously the domain of national 
governments. More recent literature has examined ETUC in the context of social 
dialogue in the EU at large (Falkner 2000), in the context of international labour 
movements and organizations (Dølvik 2000), or in the context of trends of 
declining union membership (Martin and Ross 2001, Dølvik and Visser 2001, 
Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000).  
The ETUC’s main achievements thus far have been to negotiate cross-
sectoral framework agreements with its European employer counterparts.  These 
agreements were later ratified by the Council and implemented as directives: 
parental leave (1996), part-time work (1997), and fixed-term contracts (1999). The 
ETUC can also call upon its affiliates to take action, through demonstrations and 
campaigns. One notable event was a major Euro-demonstration in Strasbourg in 
February 2006 protesting the proposed 2004 Services Directive. The Directive on 
Services in the Internal Market (often called the Bolkestein Directive, after the 
European Commissioner for the Internal Market) proposed a vast liberalization of 
public and private services within the EU. This initially came under fire from 




the idea that a worker from Poland could (hypothetically, according to the ‘country 
of origin’ principle) become a more attractive employee in the UK because a UK 
employer would only have to respect the labour laws and regulations of Poland. 
Many politicians across EU Member States called for significant revisions to the 
Directive that would prevent ‘social dumping’, in particular that environmental and 
welfare regulations across Member States would not be subject to competition. 
ETUC, along with politically left-wing organizations and other labour 
organizations called for a large demonstration in Strasbourg during the European 
Parliament’s plenary session reading of the Directive. The EP approved significant 
changes to the Directive, including the removal of the ‘country of origin’ principle 
and amending the rules for public services to guard against social dumping 
(Interview B1, ETUC 2009).  
In order to give a fuller picture of ETUC’s role (as well of the roles of the 
other main social partners), a description of the evolution of one of the negotiations 
leading to a directive is useful. Discussions for a directive on parental leave 
actually began in 1983 through the initiative of the Commission. These discussions 
began and continued in the Council for more than ten years, and a proposal for a 
directive was not put to vote until 1994. The UK government’s veto rejected this 
proposal, and so the Commission began a new initiative in 1995 on the basis of the 
Social Protocol, by engaging and utilizing the Maastricht Treaty’s provisions for 
the enhanced role of social partners to create binding framework agreements for EU 




in July of 1995, reached their conclusion in November 1995, and a first EU draft 
framework agreement was ratified by the executives of the three organizations in 
December 1995. The agreement was then adopted as a Directive in June 1996, and 
was heralded by the Commission and the social partners themselves as a real 
achievement in both content13 and as an exercise in demonstrating the capacity of 
social dialogue (Clauwaert and Harger 2000, p.5). The Directive was then revised 
in 2010 to update provisions in recognition of changing family dynamics and work-
life balance considerations; this revision took approximately six months of 
negotiations between the main social partners.  
 While the achievements of the ETUC are far from insignificant, many 
authors note that its role is mostly reactive to agendas set by the Commission and 
the Council – again, a feature shared with other major social partners at the 
European level. Members of the ETUC regularly exchange views at annual 
Tripartite Summits, but do not develop agendas or engage Commission objectives. 
This reactive quality is characteristic not only of ETUC but also of EU social 
dialogue in general. A report by the ETUC addressed the lack of space for social 
dialogue within the EES mechanisms between national governments and the 
Commission. After evaluating 14 out of 15 member states’ implementation of 
employment guidelines and the actions of the social partners therein, the report 










social partners (ETUC et al. 2004). The consideration of the report – of 
implementation over formulation of EES guidelines – demonstrates the inherently 
reactive role of both the ETUC and the domestic social partners they are evaluating 
(Cressey, Gold and Leonard 2007, 13).  
2. Business Europe (BE) – formerly UNICE 
 UNICE began in 1947 as a European-level organization comprised of eight 
employer federations from the six founding member states of the European 
Community. Both the structure and the activities of BusinessEurope parallel the 
ETUC in numerous ways – particularly as its role as the European level 
organization of organizations. The original aims included “uniting the central 
industrial federations to foster solidarity between them; encouraging a Europe-wide 
competitive industrial policy; and acting as a spokesperson body to the European 
institutions,” (BusinessEurope 2012). In 2007, UNICE switched its name to 
BusinessEurope in order to more clearly express its purpose as a confederation of 
European businesses. The current objectives of BusinessEurope include 
implementing the reforms for growth and jobs, helping to further integrate the 
European market, and shaping globalization to “fight all kinds of protectionism,” 
(Ibid). At present, BusinessEurope has 39 member federations from 33 countries 
and over 60 working groups. Similar to the ETUC, the overarching objective of 
BusinessEurope is to coordinate informed responses and policy statements in 
response to EU operations that represent a balanced opinion from its member 




towards EU agenda setting. In terms of social dialogue, in 2007 Business Europe 
along with the ETUC, CEEP and UEAPME presented a joint analysis on the key 
challenges facing European labour markets along with recommendations on how to 
balance flexibility and security (Ibid). 
 There is much less research on UNICE / BusinessEurope and related 
employer confederations than on the ETUC or other representative bodies at the EU 
level to do with trade unions. This is similar to research on domestic level industrial 
relations, which concentrates much more heavily on trade unions rather than 
employers’ associations (Thelen and Kume 1999, 477-479). It also complements 
studies on party politics and political party evolutions, which have a 
disproportionately large degree of literature on socialist and centre-left parties than 
on centrist, conservative, or Christian-Democratic parties (Kalyvas 1996). 
Presumably, this reflects in part numerous parallels between the EU’s Single 
Market (and European integration more generally), and the interests of the business 
community at large – workers organizations and trade unions at regional and 
national levels have long perceived their cause as being confrontational, or at least 
on the defensive, against the interests of the state or the economic status quo. This 
perception is accurate in the sense that within capitalist systems, owners of capital 
have structural advantages in terms of organization and resources. This conflict 
informs a great degree of study and analysis. Despite this disproportion of existing 
research, it is safe to say that in composition and in procedure, BE shares more 




the domestic or sector level – the feature of being an organization of organizations, 
and a reactive quality toward Commission agendas and proposals. 
3. CEEP (European Centre of Employers and Enterprises Providing Public 
Services) 
CEEP is one of the major general cross-industry European social partners 
recognized by the Commission, representing public employers within the European 
Social Dialogue. CEEP was established in 1961 to represent employers and 
enterprises providing services of general interest in many sectors such as transport, 
energy, water, environment, housing, hospitals, education and training, postal 
services, telecommunications, local administration, etc. The public services that 
CEEP represents employ approximately 25-30% of the European workforce. Like 
the other major social partners, CEEP is consulted regularly by the Commission on 
draft regulations, directives, and other legislation of interest to its members, and is 
frequently asked to produce opinions. The priorities that differentiate CEEP from 
BE and UEAPME are to use social dialogue as a means to modernize public 
services, address regional disparities, and to promote a stronger development of 
partnerships at regional and local levels (CEEP 2012). 
4. UEAPME (European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises) 
UEAPME is recognized by the Commission as a European Social Partner and is the 
employer’s association representing the interests of crafts, trades, and SMEs (small 




consisting of national cross sector SME federations, European branch federations, 
and other associate members, for an estimated total of over 12 million enterprises 
with nearly 55 million employees (UEAPME 2012). The logic of having a separate 
employer’s organization for crafts and SMEs, distinct from BE, is that some of the 
policy areas that affect European businesses have differential impacts depending on 
the size and capabilities of the businesses in question. For example, in the key 
legislative areas where social partners are active – including (but not limited to) 
economic and fiscal policy, employment and social policy, enterprise, policy, 
internal market, research & development – the interests and needs of European-
based businesses might differ dramatically depending on the size and scope of an 
enterprise. UEAPME thus supports its members academically, technically and 
legally on all areas of EU policy, and identifies the ways in which SMEs can adapt 
to the challenges of the open and competitive EU economy (Ibid). 
 
Collective Bargaining 
 Collective bargaining is the most common way for trade unions and 
employers to interact. It is the process by which the two groups negotiate over the 
central terms and conditions of employment, such as issues of pay, working time, 
benefits, and job security as it relates to competitiveness. In Western Europe – or 
more applicably, the former EU 15 Member States – collective bargaining has long 
been one of the most important processes of regulating working life and in 




commonly been the case in Belgium, Finland and Ireland) or the at the sectoral 
level (as has been the case in Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden) (Eurofound 2011c, p.2). Such bargaining on explicit 
issues (such as pay determination) is not a feature of EU social dialogue; however, 
a certain amount of coordination of the collective bargaining in Member States can 
be observed. “National trade unions and European industry federations, such as the 
European Metalworks Federation, have developed what has become known as 
‘virtual’ or ‘arms-length bargaining’. This involved national actors’ awareness of 
cross-national developments as well as agreeing to comply with minimum 
standards: for example, that all pay agreements exceed inflation.” (Ibid) 
 According to reports by Eurofound and EIRO, and statements made by 
interviewees themselves, the decentralization of collective bargaining has increased 
in importance in recent years, with company and plant-level negotiations 
complementing agreements signed at the sectoral and cross-sectoral levels. 
Centralization of collective bargaining means that collective agreements will cover 
all employers in the country or the sector, regardless of whether certain groups of 
workers are or are not members of trade unions. Decentralization means that social 
partners agree to delegate the right to negotiate on certain issues to company-level 
representatives; this is significant because it has the likely effect of redefining 
relations between employers and trade unions, as well as redefining boundaries and 






EU as employment and industrial relations regulator 
 In addition to the growing social profile of the EU as a whole and its 
accompanying increase in the authority of European social dialogue with each new 
Treaty development, the EU has increased its regulatory profile with the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which entered in force in EU Law with the 
ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The Charter mostly serves to reinforce 
existing rights that were already explicit at national and international levels in a 
European context, but goes further in enshrining certain political, social, and 
economic rights for EU citizens and residents into EU law. The charter is divided 
into seven titles; the fourth title covers social rights and worker rights, including the 
right to fair working conditions, protection against unjustified dismissal, and access 
to health care (Lisbon Treaty 2012). Eurofound states: 
“The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has important implications 
for the European social model in general and for the concept of EU 
citizenship, particularly in the spheres of employment and industrial 
relations…[this European model] requires legitimate institutional 
governance structures and the EU Charter can play a major role in 
this regard. The Charter’s fundamental rights ascribe legitimacy to 
collective bargaining and collective action, and information and 
consultation on a wide range of issues at company level. Affirming 
rights to engage in work, vocational training, equal opportunities, 
and other social and labour standards provides support for the 
distinctive EU model of individual employment relationships,” 
(Eurofound 2011c, p.4) 
 
The significance of the Charter with relevance to European social dialogue is that 
the increasing autonomy of the social partners in a bipartite framework 




law (process-oriented texts, joint opinions and tools, implementation by social 
partners) than on “hard” law (directives). This is parallel to what Gerda Falkner’s 
describes as European social dialogue acting in the “shadow” of law; not only does 
a reliance on autonomous social dialogue provide an organized legitimization of 
final output, given that the actors involved in the dialogue are non-governmental 
and unattached to major EU institutions, it also offers a non-threatening mechanism 
for suggested practice (Falkner 2000, 709; Bercusson 1992, 105). Texts, opinions 
and joint tools are non-binding and without the enforcement instruments of 
directives. They are also attractive tools to use for accounting for diversity in and 
among various interest groups and member states, as outputs that remain in the 
‘shadow’ of EU law can be adopted (or not) with a large amount of nuance. 
 
Perceptions of the EU as employment and industrial relations regulator 
 Interviewees at the European level all emphasized the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty as being an important turning point for social dialogue. The new rule that 
obliged the Commission to consult social partners on any labour market issue 
raised the status of social dialogue among supranational actors and domestic 
interest groups alike: “There’s now expectations placed on social partners to 
operate autonomously from government, and this has carried through to new 
enlarging countries…never would have happened otherwise…[a] strong social 
dialogue process given to new Member States by European level, labour and 




potentially new avenues of agenda-setting for social partners at the national level: 
“social partners [that are UEAPME members] might show strong interest in any 
issue at European level, might learn how to grow by exploiting tools or agendas 
from the higher level” (Interview B7). A BE representative emphasized the creation 
of joint work programmes in 2003 as being very significant for European social 
dialogue; whereas previous phases of BE activity were guided by EU objectives, 
social partners are now consulted early, right when the Commission initiates 
(Interview B5). By contrast, CEEP interviewees stated that “CEEP is also auto-
critical of ourselves and of social dialogue as a whole…it’s time to make an 
assessment of how social dialogue is driven and how the future will be carried out. 
We are now very reactive and defensive, too much about Commission and not 
about members” (Interview B6). This statement highlights the instruments 
available to the social partners as set up by the Commission; Treaty Articles 137/8 
lets the social partners address social and working conditions through social 
agreements only, and are then potentially transformed into binding social directives 
on basic working conditions, but more likely are translated into non-binding 
framework agreements (Interview B2).  
As a direct result of the limitations on certain instruments available to the 
social partners, as well as the overarching limitations of EU governance over its 
Member States, one would be careful to say “European Social Dialogue” and never 
“European Collective Bargaining”. In terms of trends with collective bargaining, 




decentralization – meaning, the opening of clauses at enterprise level – has been a 
practice encouraged much more by employers than by workers. “Wages are the 
first natural thing to be targeted for adjustment, this ‘fallacy of composition’…and 
the European recommendations helped this along, because wages in line with 
productivity at the enterprise level equals decentralization” (Interview B2). In this 
context, Europe has played a role in stimulating the use of national social pacts in 
different countries by driving forward the single currency: “Because inflationary 
wage spirals had to be contained, EMU made sense, but crisis and no response to 
demand-side meant that Member States used social pacts to devalue 
wages…beggar-thy-neighbour language and policies. Social pacts for all economic 
problems,” (Ibid). 
A semi-recent development related to decentralization and the interaction 
between EU-domestic systems of industrial relations, brought up by numerous 
interviewees, is the system of European Works Councils (EWCs). EWCs arose 
from Directive (94/45/EC) in 1994, which mandated that companies with at least 
1,000 employees within the EU and at least 150 employees in each of at least two 
Member States would have to set up works councils for the purposes of informing 
and consulting employees (Europa 2009b). The same rules apply to outside firms 
with operations in at least two EU Member States – employee thresholds are the 
sole criteria. According to ETUI-REHS interviewees, EWCs were created to offer 
some balance of representation for workers in the face of increased transnational 




employers and workers in different countries – in essence, establishing the 
circumstances for worker representatives to develop a common European response 
to the transnational plans of management. “For the ‘Europeanization’ of industrial 
relations you could say that worker participation is being Europeanized with the 
EWCs and the revisiting of the directive,” (Interview B4). The directive was 
updated and ‘recast’ in 2009 to improve upon definitions of information and 
consultation, respectively, and to specify the obligations of employers to provide 
the training for EWCs (Europa 2009b). The content of the recast directive was 
disappointing for the trade unions, in both institutional aspects and content, and 
according to the ETUI interviewee this was due to the general pressure placed on 
the Commission and the European Parliament’s Employment and Social Affairs 
Committee (EP ECO-SOC) by BE and its affiliates (Interview B4). The same 
interviewee asserted that the idea of EWCs stemmed from the French system of 
creating “group works councils” out of multiple works councils for French 
companies with multiple subsidiaries; this process caught on at the European level 
as many French companies went international in the late 1980s: “In 1994 the 
[EWC] Directive was against the will of the employers…[now] employers are 
against any legal reinforcement of rights conferred to EWCs…BE thinks excessive 
legal burden on enterprise, as of start of 2008,” (Ibid). However, despite the 
objections of BE in the 1990s, the idea of worker consultation has become 
regularized as a recommended practice within large European companies. This is 




certain threshold of employees (see Chapter 5); however, according to interviewees 
from ETUI and BE, companies that are even just under the threshold criteria are 
sometimes choosing to form works councils – particularly in Scandinavia and 
France and Germany – out of a “best practice” model (Interviews B4 and B5). 
What this tells us is that the process of worker consultation has essentially become 
institutionalized as a feature of the European social model. The objections of 
employers – all of which basically center around wanting to avoid placing undue 
burdens on companies and enterprises – have changed from the notion of arguing 
against consultation bodies in any form and have become arguments in favour of 
maintaining consultation systems as simple, voluntaristic, and non-union affiliated 
as possible (see Chapter 5 for a more in-depth discussion of the EU Directive on 
the Information and Consultation of Workers).  
Interviewees also emphasized the two-way directionality characteristic of 
any influence going in and out of the European level: “Remember that ETUC is in 
a coordinative role only, so what goes in is up to country level. It depends on trade 
union strategies within the countries, and ETUC can help with extent of practices, 
information, campaigns” (Interview B3). At the same time, there is “no individual 
trade union access to the European level. Always has to be through a national 
confederation, unless there’s some expert to bring in the information only” (Ibid). 
An interview with a representative from the EP’s ECO-SOC Committee stated that 
the increase of directives and agreements on contentious subjects such as working 




national level in Member States, as both sides of industry at the European level 
have been better prepared to negotiate based on the contributions from their 
respective affiliates (Interview B9). The essence of this statement signals the 
dependence of European social dialogue on functioning federative peak 
organizations in EU Member States. More critically, this statement suggests the 
part of the substantive impact of the European level on domestic social partners. If 
the opportunity for negotiation, and information-sharing for certain issues exists at 
the European level more so than the domestic level, and if the viability of such 
opportunity depends in large part on the capability of organized workers and 
employers within a national setting, then the process of Europeanization in 
industrial relations is such that domestic organized interests are utilizing the 
European level as a simultaneous avenue for access to agenda-setters and for 
reinforcement of their own capabilities, particularly for issues that remain 
contentious at the national level. 
A 2011 report (Voss 2011) prepared by the major European social partners 
which assesses the results of European Social Dialogue to date, and includes a 
stock-taking survey of national social partners in EU Member States, corroborates 
the above suggestions. In various country responses in the survey, the social 
partners throughout Europe on the whole, 
 “stressed the role of European social dialogue in providing a 
framework and reference point for discussions at national level on 
issues that are already under examination or were regarded as 
important…This important role of autonomous framework 
agreements was also confirmed and stressed by interview partners 




dialogue (p.15)…highlighted the close link between European and 
national social dialogues (p.16)…the EU level agreements and joint 
initiatives had a positive influence on national social 
dialogue…[certain] social partners were able to overcome some 
difficulties in the discussion process,” (p.17). 
 
The report also highlights the commonalities of survey responses between 
employers and unions and the differences between the two groups. Overall the 
report findings suggest a generally positive view of specific labour market 
initiatives at the EU level from employers, and a somewhat skeptical view of the 
same initiatives from unions:  
“A first and quite striking observation of survey replies is that many 
employers have interpreted the joint labour market analysis as an 
important contribution to the flexicurity discussion in Europe, as 
well as in their respective countries…in contrast to this, trade union 
representatives have expressed concerns about this kind of 
‘instrumentalization’ of the joint analysis and also the Europe 2020 
statement that are formulated very broadly ‘thus giving leeway for 
constructive ambiguity’ (p.31, italics in text)…[specific worker 
federations] reports the joint labour market analysis has been 
interpreted by the national government as a recommendation that 
was used to justify liberalization of the law on dismissals,” (p.32). 
 
On a more critical note, some social partners – and trade union 
organizations in particular – indicated that autonomous framework agreements are 
not serious enough mechanisms to have any real influence on labour and social 
relationships in their respective national background. Responses from trade union 
organizations indicated that stronger implementation mechanisms and practices 
would be helpful, along with accompanying mechanisms to measure and assess 
results (p.36). Procedurally, the report states that the most important factor of 




action and has a real impact at national level, according to the interview partners, is 
a “well-structured, operational bilateral as well as trilateral social dialogue” (p.35). 
The trilateral component in particular is emphasized, citing numerous examples of 
national-level committees and councils that facilitate social dialogue. This 
illustrates that certain national conditions – such as the strength or weakness of 
governmental administrations and the various bureaucratic structures that are 
attached to them, for instance economic-social councils or labour-relations advisory 
boards – are “fostering or hindering successful implementation and concrete 
achievements for the outcomes of European social dialogue at the level of 
individual Member States,” (Ibid). This is reinforced more generally with the 
report’s overall conclusions, which include: 
“Perhaps the most important result is that social partners…underline 
the clear added-value of European cross-sectoral social 
dialogue…However, our survey has also shown that social partners 
throughout Europe are concerned about recent developments at the 
European as well as national policy level that are undermining a 
strong role of social dialogue in policy making and decision 
taking…Though there is no single path for successful 
implementation, the responses to our survey and the comments 
made in the conference show that implementation has been most 
effective in those cases where national social partners are able to 
develop joint positions and initiatives and where these fit into the 
agenda of governments…With regard to concrete outcomes and 
achievements of European social dialogue, national social partners 
have highlighted and appreciated many concrete positive results in 
social and working life in Europe, including the strengthening of 
national social dialogue itself, in particular in those European 
countries where social partners and social dialogue do not play a 
very important role at this time,” (p.46, italics mine). 
 
 The next two sections examine industrial relations in Ireland and Italy 




in the country, followed by an analysis of domestic social dialogue and an 
overview of perceptions in the country from relevant interviewees. 
Domestic Level 
Ireland 
Up until 2009, Ireland had been the exemplar of economic success of the 
EU member states, transforming itself from one of Europe’s poorest countries into 
one of the wealthiest. The country’s economic transformation began in 1987 and 
overlapped in time with the Irish institutionalization of social partnership. Whether 
social partnership contributed to economic success or whether economic success 
facilitated the institutionalization of social partnership is a discussion under 
repeated debate among economists (see below); generally noteworthy however is 
that formal tripartite discussion was a permanent feature of the Irish landscape 
during the golden years of 1987-2009. For the Irish case, social dialogue generally 
refers to the national level negotiations between the social partners to discuss 
various aspects of working conditions, but more specifically and more commonly 
refers to the centralized determination of wage increases through three-year 
collective agreements that are negotiated on a tripartite basis. 
The main social partners in Ireland are the Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
(ICTU) and the Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC). Each 
organization is the national level umbrella body for all the respective organized 
interests therein – ICTU representing 55 unions and comprising the largest civil 




approximately 7,500 members, or 70% firms employing the private sector 
workforce in Ireland (IBEC website). Both organizations are the central 
components of labour and management involved in social partnership and national 
social pacts. Unlike IBEC, ICTU is consensus-based rather than an authoritative 
peak federation. The institutionalization of social partnership helped increase 
ICTU’s power position relative to IBEC and government, despite little change in its 
position relative to its affiliate members, simply because the advent of social 
partnership increased the formal powers of organized workers in the context of 
national-level negotiation of Irish “programmes” (O’Donnell, Adshead, and 
Thomas 2011, 113). IBEC also remained generally supportive of partnership, “as 
long as the terms of the pay agreements could be sold to firms and statutory union 
recognition was not conceded.” (Ibid, 114) 
The Irish case is interesting for being a fundamentally voluntarist14 
industrial relations system intertwined with a commitment to semi-formal 
coordination of labour-management dialogue on key economic issues – a definitive 
example of the hybridization of free-market capitalism with traditionally 
conventional Western European social protections. Prior to 1987, bargaining on 
working conditions had taken place on a local level, and the government was 
exerting pressure on unions and employers to invoke national-level agreements 
with the aim of stemming industrial conflict. Irish industrial relations were similar 








between management and unions, and uncoordinated collective bargaining at a 
decentralized level (Ibid, 90-92). Economic conditions during this time were 
characterized by weak economic growth, high unemployment and high inflation, all 
of which led to increased emigration and unsustainable government borrowing and 
national debt. In 1987 the Programme for National Recovery (PNR) was negotiated 
between government, trade unions and employers, and was accompanied by a 
revised National Economic and Social Council (NESC) that produced a 
consultative tripartite body. 
The development and acceptance of the PNR signalled a shared 
understanding of the problems facing the Irish economy at the same, whereas 
previous attempts at centralized negotiations had been marred by a lack of 
consensus on the main determinants of economic crisis. The PNR underlined the 
importance of reducing public expenditures and public debt, maintaining a stable 
exchange rate policy, and of enhancing competitiveness of traded sectors by 
keeping average cost increases below the weighted average of Ireland’s major 
trading partners (Baccaro and Simoni 2004, p.2). The major concessions achieved 
with the PNR were: the trade unions agreeing to limit wage increases to a set 
amount for the three years covered by the PNR, as well as promising to not take 
industrial action that would result in additional cost increases for employers; and 
government agreeing to reform the tax system so that take-home pay would be 





Aside from debates among economists and academics alike concerning 
cause-effect relationships between tripartite negotiation and economic growth, the 
recovery of the Irish economy between the years of 1987-1990 solidified the role of 
social partnership in national economic and social policy. Although Ireland’s 
economic success from the late 1980s onward is frequently attributed in part to the 
institutionalization of national social pacts (Auer 2000; Mac Sharry and White 
2000), there is a substantial debate in the field of economics over whether Irish 
economic improvement and the introduction of social pacts are merely 
epiphenomenal, or just coincidental in terms of timing. The economics literature 
that discounts this overlap explains the Irish boom as resulting in large part from 
massive flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as educational policies 
that increased the supply of skilled labour at the same time that demand was also 
increasing (Barry 1999; Fitz Gerald 1999). Economists writing in the early 1990s 
argued that the benefits of centralized bargaining were more in bringing about 
industrial peace than in lowering wage increases; some even go as far as to say that 
wages could have been lower without centralized agreements, and that high 
unemployment alone might have weakened the unions enough to tame Irish 
industrial relations (Durkan 1992). To others, the effects of social partnership have 
simply been largely overestimated, and have “validate[d] the results which market 
forces had made inevitable” (Fitz Gerald 1999, 162). Those economists that do 
posit that the link between social partnership and economic growth is significant 




formation in Ireland: “Thanks to social partnership, wage increases in the 
‘dynamic’ multinational sector (characterized by high productivity growth) came to 
be tightly linked with wage and productivity increases in the much more sluggish 
domestic portion of the manufacturing sector. This represented an important 
departure from the recent past, when wage settlements stuck in the high 
productivity sector had unduly influenced the process of wage formation in the 
economy as a whole and thus led to labour shedding in the low productivity 
sectors.” (Baccaro and Simoni 2004, 1) 
Economic arguments aside, the view that social partnership played a 
fundamental role in the making of Ireland’s economic miracle is one that is shared 
by a large part of the Irish population (Fitzgerald and Girvin 2000, 283, from poll 
respondents) and policy makers alike. Interviewees in the Irish government spoke 
of the “Irish experience of social partnership helping reduce widespread economic 
problems” (Interview E3) and the experience of how “certainly Ireland...[shows 
how] social pacts can and do play an important role in creating viable economic 
circumstances” (Interview E3). ICTU and IBEC each expressed similar views, 
although from implicitly different starting points. An ICTU interviewee stated that 
social partnership “gets the joint discussion going, whether fruitful or no...[even if] 
employers say no it broaches the topic and has us heard,” (Interview E1), 
insinuating that social partnership is at least one important point of access trade 
unions have open to them to argue the side of workers in the face of large 




“an important method of dialogue to help increase people’s employability with 
more foresight,” (Interview E2), which perhaps implies that the value of social 
partnership is what it does to alleviate industrial action and adversarial relations 
between labour and management. Implications aside, neither ICTU nor IBEC 
interviewees perceived their respective bargaining position to be eroded by the 
process of social partnership, or by what social partnership achieved for employers 
and aggregate productivity. 
Following the PNR, national social pacts were negotiated every three years 
and social partnership “became the backbone of Irish economic policy” (Fitz 
Gerald and Girvin 2000, p.3). These agreements contained wage guidelines and a 
number of social and economic measures, and each agreement was preceded by a 
NESC Strategy Report, which provided the analytical underpinnings for discussion 
on specific issues. In addition to the empirical successes of each national social 
pact, the political component of social partnership was to shape the trajectory of 
Irish industrial relations into a less conventional style of corporatism: corporatism, 
as the formalization of tripartite concertation in regular national social pacts 
follows the basic logic of institutionalized interaction between government and 
single interest representatives; less conventional, because the Irish method of social 
partnership reflected a particular contextual solution to wage restraint and taxation 
only. The Irish method also did not evolve out of the more traditional Christian-
social-democratic ideological approach to interest involvement in broader 




established corporatist models (such as in Austria or Scandinavia) do. Generally, 
the bargaining realm was much more circumscribed than traditionally the case in 
corporatist systems. Also notable in the Irish context is its continued use of national 
pacts during times of economic downturn as well as economic growth, and as 
opposed to the Italian case discussed below, during both the run-up to the adoption 
of the euro currency and in the years following acceptance into the euro zone. 
The basic structure for agreements has remained more or less consistent 
since 1987 – an exchange of wage restraint for tax cuts against a backdrop of 
general fiscal conservatism and international competitiveness. As the Irish 
economy grew throughout the 1990s, social partnership also sought to address 
social inequalities and exclusion, first by keeping constant the real value of 
transfers, and then after a few years of sustained growth, through substantive 
measures such as greater wage increases and more public attention to  / spending 
on areas such as housing, childcare, and skill development. Irish social partnership 
also remained steady during these years despite changes in government and the 
political parties involved in governing coalitions – each new national social pact 
building upon the prior successes of previous social dialogue (Ibid, p.4).  
The connection during this period to developments at the European level is 
the parallel between the evolution of EU social dialogue and the institutionalization 
of Irish social partnership, and how each side used the other’s example to boost 
capacity. As the Irish economy grew in size and strength during the 1990s and early 




for the purpose of arguing that social partnership at home was important for 
economic productivity. Irish employers, according to an ICTU interviewee, at times 
used the example of how the EU social partners were increasingly entitled to 
autonomous negotiations to argue that social partnership in Ireland might benefit 
from similar autonomy – a point not entirely supported by trade unions: “we need 
to keep our piece of the chain...the European dimension has lots of attention,” 
(Interview E1). The EU level – either by official Commission press releases or by 
statements made by EU social partners – has occasionally drawn upon the example 
of Irish social partnership as justification for emphasizing the importance of 
organized social dialogue: “[the] Irish economy has strong parallels to the 
European level...Irish case more so toward the economic situation, economics 
being the main driving force. Fed well however into the European project,” 
(Interview B1). 
Social partnership in Ireland took a turn during the financial crisis 
beginning in 2008, which had an enormous effect on the Irish economy. This event 
is noteworthy for Irish industrial relations as national social pacts up until this point 
had become an institutionalized feature of the social economic policy-making 
process, through times of crisis and times of prosperity equally. The combination of 
the burst of the housing bubble, high debt, and quickly rising unemployment placed 
pressure on the centralized wage agreements of the public sector as compared to the 
wage and job cuts experienced in the private sector. Efforts were undertaken to 




IBEC, the main employer body, formally withdrew from negotiations when ICTU 
failed to agree to a suspension of pay terms. Government then unilaterally 
increased taxation and reduced public pay, severely weakening the position of Irish 
trade unions (O’Donnell, Adshead, and Thomas 2011, 117). IBEC, speaking in 
December 2009, stated: “we are entering a period of enterprise level bargaining in 
unionised employments” (Industrial Relations News 2010, 3), casting doubt over 
the possibility of revitalizing the previous model of institutionalized social pacts at 
the national level. More generally, IBEC’s unilateral abandonment of social 
partnership at large casts doubt over the very notion of “institutionalized” social 
pacts in Ireland. Just as economic crisis spurred the motivation for social 
partnership in the late 1980s, economic crisis spurred the disassembly of the same 
model in 2009-2010. Either event illustrates the fundamentally voluntarist nature of 
Irish industrial relations, where the process of labour-management negotiation has 
been coordinated and binding, but always outside the framework of the law. 
Indeed, in 2011, statements were issued from the Irish government 
indicating that any return to a more formalized style of tripartite negotiation in 
Ireland was unlikely; instead, government announced that legislation was being 
prepared by the Department of Enterprise and Jobs to streamline industrial relations 
machinery, and in doing so would also give effect to a commitment in the program 
for government to reform workers rights to engage in collective bargaining: “The 
Tánaiste said that while a return to social partnership structures of the past was 




dialogue in terms of greater certainty for investors, maintaining industrial peace and 
strengthening social solidarity,” (Wall 2011, The Irish Times). A 2011 EIRO report 
stated that the newly elected Irish government was undergoing efforts to rebrand 
social partnership into social dialogue, citing broad government statements in 
favour of coordination without obligation to specific areas (EIRO 2011). No 
explicit statement was made at the time on what ‘effective social dialogue’ in this 
new form might look like, but a certain amount of urgency is visible in news 
statements concerning issues on the table. Ireland is obliged to transpose an EU 
directive on the entitlements of agency workers by December 2012, and the current 
government program contains a commitment to ensure that Irish law on the right of 
employees to engage in collective bargaining is consistent with recent judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights: “This is a hugely important issue for the 
unions. However, it is seen as equally crucial by employer groups who strongly 
oppose any suggestion of mandatory trade union recognition.” (Slattery 2010, The 
Irish Times) 
Both social partnership and representation in Ireland have, since 1987, 
remained predominantly at the national level. Despite the growth of social 
partnership, enterprise-level representation and/or negotiation has not been a 
regular feature of Irish industrial relations. Baccaro and Simoni attribute this to the 
“dualistic structure of the Irish economy”, which is divided into foreign and 
domestic components, each characterized by completely different conditions of 




part, foreign-owned, making multinational companies of fundamental importance 
for the Irish economy as the manufacturing sector alone played an enormous role in 
generating the Irish economic miracle of the 1990s. The presence of multinational 
companies and foreign-ownership of industry contributed, arguably, to hindering 
the formation of workplace channels of labour representation: “This is partly 
because under an industrial relations system still largely guided by voluntarism and 
with many competitive strategies open to firms, employers have adopted a diverse 
range of approaches to employment regulation, many of which are guided by 
managerial prerogative and/or weak and diluted forms of employee involvement in 
company decision-making,” (Dobbins 2008, 4). 
At the same time, Hancké and Rhodes (2005) argue that the conditions for 
national social pacts in Ireland are accelerated by the absence of solid micro-
foundations for wage bargaining and training, making the institutionalization of 
social pacts at the national level a much more functional possibility. O’Donnell, 
Adshead, and Thomas argue instead that more recent industrial relations 
challenges, such as the increased salience of individual employee rights defined in 
both EU and national law, necessarily need government involvement in order to 
appropriately implement legal statutes, thereby encouraging an increased role for 
the state in underpinning employee rights and benefits (2011, 112). Without 
available infrastructure for systematic enterprise level representation in a country 
the size of Ireland (small relative to other EU Member States), the combination of 




institutionalize social partnership at the national level only. This point is relevant as 
the present financial crisis and accompanying failure of social partnership coincide 
with efforts at the EU level to further legalize the rights of employees as 
individuals and to garner consensus in businesses in order to stay competitive by 
promoting effective channels of representation and negotiation that reflect the 
particular characteristics of different companies (see Chapter 5). 
 
Interaction between the EU and Irish levels 
 In general, Ireland has long been held up as an example of an EU success 
story in terms of its economic performance in the context of liberalization and the 
EU’s Single Market. Even the recent financial crisis has not dimmed the generally 
pro-EU stance of Irish politics and Irish public opinion, in part due to the 
perception that the EU will likely play a large part in encouraging economic 
recovery in Ireland (Gartland 2009, The Irish Times). In the time period of 1992-
1998, during which Ireland was attempting to meet the Maastricht convergence 
criteria15 in order to adopt the single currency of the euro, the 1994-6 “Programme 
for Competitiveness and Work” (PCW) was introduced through social partnership 













PCW needed to be dealt with in the overarching context of adopting the euro. 
Ireland successfully became one of the first-wave countries to adopt the euro in 
1999, and as a country with a previously weak currency (after ending its peg to 
British sterling in 1979), Ireland immediately experienced a significant drop in 
interest rates after its transition to the new currency with the resulting ability to 
borrow large sums of money that had previously been unavailable to Irish banks or 
consumers. 
 Eurobarometer data from 2009 shows that the global financial crisis had 
little to no effect on Irish attitudes to European integration, Irish images of the EU, 
or general Irish support for monetary union. At the time of the survey publication 
Ireland had the fourth highest level of support for European integration and was 16 
points ahead of the European average; on the benefits indicator, Ireland shared first 
position with Slovakia. Public perception of benefits accruing from membership of 
the EU was at 79%, while approval rates for the single currency were well over 
80% (Eurobarometer 2009a). 
 Interviewees had markedly varying perspectives on the influence of EU 
social dialogue on the Irish system. An ICTU representative stated that in many 
ways, recent developments (speaking in 2008) in the EU could be construed as the 
“voluntarist system under attack” from two angles: the perception of the 
Commission sharing more interests with employers rather than workers 
(“Commission use to be the workers’ friend, now more on employers’ side”) and 




a general EU model (“Germany’s trying to impose their system [of information and 
consultation], but Ireland doesn’t have big industrial complexes, and it hasn’t 
resulted in the type of union recognition that trade unions had hoped for or 
employers’ feared”) (Interview E1). IBEC, by contrast, indicated that European 
social dialogue in general has been effective because the framework agreements 
and directives it produces allow for a great deal of flexibility and local nuance in 
implementation, depending on the company and/or the nature of the prescription in 
question. The IBEC interviewee also allowed that in general, employers prefer 
much more minimalist direction and legislation from either the European or the 
domestic level, whereas trade unions tend to prefer more detail and stricter 
mechanisms of enforcement (Interview E2). The Department of Enterprise, Trade 
and Employment asserted that arguments concerning the “erosion of voluntarism 
are too strong,” in that national circumstances still dictate the specific shape and 
form of EU mandates. To the extent of national social pacts, and domestic 
developments to do with issues pertaining to industrial relations, the EU holds a 
powerful role in the form of economic policies: “if something is on the table 
domestically, [it] needs to be aware of what’s happening at the EU level if only to 
make sure that nothing will contradict or cause problems down the road. A lot of 
national policy development is the result of EU Directives.” (Interview E3). 
 For both ICTU and IBEC, the implementation of social dialogue in the EU 
and EU Treaties as legitimate instruments of policy making (alongside legislation) 




seen as complementing and reinforcing the national agenda: “gives extra validation 
for the national dialogue…makes us sharpen up at home in order to use European 
social dialogue” (Interview E1). In terms of autonomy or independence, however, 
the Irish social partners both expressed skepticism on the subject of Ireland 
imitating the increasingly bipartite model of social dialogue at the EU level. The 
‘voluntarist’ nature of Irish industrial relations is voluntary in the sense of 
minimum intervention by the law, rather than non-intervention by government in 
collective bargaining (Gunnigle 1998). The main trend in industrial relations from 
1987 onward, aside from the institutionalization of national social pacts, has been 
the growth of individual-rights-based employment law, in large part emanating 
from European labour law (Gunnigle 1998, and Interview E2). Because this growth 
in employment law16 is relatively new for Ireland, the participation of government 
in moving towards an increasingly legalistic system has been invaluable for unions 
(Interview E1). The success of national social pacts from the late 1980s until 2010 
has also not provided an urgent need for independent, rather than tripartite, social 
partnership.  
 Despite the Irish experience with national social pacts, there is widespread 
awareness and some criticism of the fact that the social partnership approach has 
not extended to the enterprise level. In large part, criticism was expressed by 
employer organizations only. IBEC stated that wage agreements at the national 








problem to competitiveness” (Interview E2). The Irish Small and Medium 
Enterprises Association (ISME), as quoted in the 2011 report by the EU Social 
Partners, stated that, “The impact [of European social dialogue and its resulting 
agreements], particularly on parental leave and fixed term contracts, has further 
undermined flexibility in the workforce for labour intensive SMEs and added to the 
administrative burdens for these enterprises. The impact also negatively affects cost 
competitiveness of SMEs…There needs to be more emphasis on the unique 
concerns and issues affecting SMEs and less influence by big business and the 
Trade Unions.” (ISME in Voss 2011, 45) 
 In general, most interviewees spoke of the Irish economy (as of late 2008) 
and its parallels to the European level. “Economics have been the main driving 
force towards organized social dialogue in Ireland. Fed well however into the 
European project. Ireland’s also used as model for an example of social partners 
success and fantastic [economic] success of Ireland…Irish ministers often cite 
social partners agreements as big source of stability,” (Interview B1). This 
statement was echoed in the Irish social partners themselves. The perception of the 
potential influence of the European level for Irish industrial relations, broadly 
speaking, was in the import of specific legal requirements in the forms of directives 
and individual employee rights, and to a lesser extent, in the validation of social 






The industrial relations context in Italy is more complicated than in Ireland, 
due to a larger number of actors, a less streamlined system of negotiation and 
interaction, and a much higher degree of politicization of labour-management 
relations in general. Also in contrast to Ireland, where foreign direct investment in 
the manufacturing sector plays a significant role in the background of economic 
and employment systems, Italy has a few distinct economic characteristics: 
manufacturing in terms of both GDP and employment is higher than the EU 
average and is similar to that of Germany; unlike Germany, the average company 
size in Italy is small; a sharp difference in industry, economics and employment 
between the north and south of the country (Pedersini 2010, 2). These 
characteristics are also set in the context of a significant degree of adversarial 
politics and relatively weak governments. Taken together, industrial relations in 
Italy offers a much more intricate and convoluted picture of labour-management 
relations, relative to both Ireland and the EU level. 
 There are three dominant trade union confederations: Confederazione 
Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL General Italian Confederation of Labour), 
Confederazione Italiana dei Sindacati Lavoratori (CISL, Italian Confederation of 
Workers’ Unions), and Unione Italiana del Lavoro (UIL, Italian Union of Labour). 
Each confederation represents a different political orientation, or at least a different 
legacy of political orientation. CGIL was mostly linked to the former communist 
and socialist parties of the post-war era. Despite the disappearance of these parties 




the long-standing former Christian-Democratic party of the post-war era, which 
also disappeared in the early 1990s, and is now linked with parties of the centre-
left. The UIL is associated with the socialist and republican parties – those of the 
noncommunist, reformist left of spectrum. All three confederations are organized 
by industry, with UIL also being the confederation to represent the public sector. 
All three confederations have also frequently acted as a united front, although there 
have been several instances where divergences in opinion have derailed proposed 
agreements (Ibid, 5). 
 There are several large employer confederations, the most important one 
being Confederatione Generale dell’Industri Italiana (Confindustria). Confindustria 
acts on behalf of private employers in relations with trade unions as well as the 
employers’ common representative responsible for economic and industrial policy. 
As of late 2011, Confindustria represents 123,000 industrial enterprises employing 
more than 4.7 million workers over a total of 17.6 million people employed in the 
entire private sector. 85% of member companies employ less than 50 employees, 
and 60% less than 15 employees. The political affiliations of employers’ 
organizations are less significant than those for trade unions, due in part to 
significant changes in the national political scene in the early 1990s and to a large 
scale privatization program of the late 1990s (Ibid, 6).  
 The legal context of Italian industrial relations has both voluntaristic and 
heavily formal components. On the one hand, legal institutions are rare and the 




voluntarism in the absence of codified legal rules. On the other hand, the 
widespread political and economic reforms of the early 1990s (an outgrowth of the 
anti-corruption scandal and aftermath) have helped to institutionalize important 
framework agreements that have arguably set the stage for formalized tripartite 
concertation in Italy. One significant legal statute is the Workers’ Statute of 1970, 
which identifies a basic set of individual and union rights and a legal code for strike 
action in public services. The major institutional framework coming out of the anti-
corruption scandal was the central tripartite agreement of 1993, which introduced 
new systems for incomes policy, a restructuring of bargaining procedures, 
modifications of forms of workplace union representation, and new policies on 
employment: “This agreement can be regarded as the first effort to create a 
systematic framework for workplace-level representation and collective 
bargaining,” (Ibid, 4). Since this framework, tripartite agreements have addressed 
numerous issues in the 1990s, including incomes policy, pension reform, labour 
market reform and economic growth, as well as general public spending reforms set 
in the context of adopting the euro.  
In the 2000s, tripartite negotiations were used less often and with less 
success, culminating in the failure of the CGIL to sign the 2009 tripartite accord. 
This accord introduced experimental reform of the collective bargaining system by 
breaking up some of the national bargaining structure into diversifications across 
sector and confederations through intersectoral agreements (Ibid). It also included 




productivity and competitiveness, underlying the assumption that companies need 
greater adaptability to compete in the market. The then Vice-President of 
Confindustria stated: “at company level it is possible to respond more directly to 
the needs of workers and employers, thereby improving productivity and 
competitiveness, two crucial elements in this phase to cope with the economic 
situation,” (Pedersini 2009, 1). While ultimately the January 2009 agreement was 
upheld, CGIL’s refusal to sign was a big drawback. The agreement left much of the 
implementation details to further intersectoral and industry-wide bargaining, and 
CGIL’s absence has been significant in stalling any real reform of collective 
bargaining in the time since 2009. CGIL’s perception of the agreement was that it 
was intentionally designed to weaken the trade union front and industrial relations 
in general, and that it had the potential to erode real wages and weaken worker 
protections (Ibid). The larger significance of CGIL’s objection was that it cemented 
the division between itself (the largest trade union confederation) and the rest of the 
national trade union front, thereby reinforcing the volatility of the labour front. 
 An immediate parallel between the Irish and Italian cases is each country’s 
debt-crisis-era response in the realm of social dialogue as a measure both of its 
institutionalization and functionality for economic adjustment. The failure of Italian 
industrial relations to fully institutionalize tripartite concertation in the past 20 
years is what Regini and Colombo refer to as the Italian “rise and decline of social 
pacts,” and what they explain by three major factors. First, all successful social 




emergency only, whereas unsuccessful attempts at tripartite concertation took place 
almost exclusively during times characterized by a lack of economic urgency. 
Second, a general feature of social pacts in Italy has been the weakness of the 
governmental coalitions that looked to concertation as a means of enhancing their 
legitimacy. Third, the major trade unions in Italy are moderately strong compared 
to major trade unions across Europe yet are beset by frequent internal divisions, 
thus hampering the potential of social partnership to fully institutionalize (Regini 
and Colombo 2011, 118). The three factors taken together indicate the power 
dynamics of the actors involved in social partnership – government, unions and 
employers. When economic crises were not the central motivation for negotiation 
and resolution, the centrality “of the degree of organizational unity [became] an 
important variable affecting the perception of actors’ relative power…whenever 
power shifted to governments and employers for either structural reasons to due to 
trade union divisions, social pacts entered a path of deinstitutionalization.” (Ibid, 
118-119) Baccaro and Lim’s findings (2007) support this argument by emphasizing 
the role of employers in institutionalizing social partnership; while the rise of 
national social pacts, and the social dialogue that goes along with it, may be 
attributed to internal and external economic factors, the degree to which social 
partnership becomes institutionalized in domestic systems of industrial relations 
depends in large part on whether employer organizations perceive utility for their 
own interests in negotiation, either in an autonomous or tripartite manner. In this 




dialogue or of supporting a productive workforce; instead, national social pacts 
(and related trends of social dialogue) in both Ireland and Italy reveal a certain 
amount of initiative on the part of management to bring labour along on a path that 
tries to reap the benefits of European integration by using social dialogue to 
enhance productivity and competitiveness. 
 The links between the major trade unions and political parties are, 
according to some interviewees, very powerful and yet completely informal 
(Interviews I4 and I5). In one interviewee’s opinion, (UIL), the politicization of 
unions has almost always been a factor in the destabilization of negotiations; the 
period of 1992-1998 may have been characterized by a great amount of social 
partnership only because of the need to manage fiscal policy in the direction of 
adopting the single currency, rather than because of any temporary depoliticization 
of industrial relations (Interview I2). After the European Commission officially 
approved Italy’s participation in the first-wave of euro-zone members, the climate 
of unusual consensus among the major social partners failed to capitalize on any 
existing momentum (Sbragia 2001); the overarching context of EMU in the 1990s 
highlights the limited range of viable options available to policymakers during 
times of economic crisis – real or perceived (Regini 2003). This same time period 
is also one where a series of ‘technocratic’ governments took office in the 
aftermath of the Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) anti-corruption investigations, in 1992 
(Amato government), 1993 (Ciampi government), and 1995 (Dini government). 




and thus benefitted from the political support of the major social partners (Regini 
and Colombo 2011, 122). 
 A breakdown of union unity is often cited as a cause and effect both of the 
decline of social partnership in the 2000s. Social concertation in this period became 
“less frequent and more controversial,” (Pedersini 2010). Employers associations 
and trade unions signed a major labour market reform in 2002 without the approval 
of CGIL, beginning a period of union fragmentation that has continued since, apart 
from a social concertation agreement on the welfare system in 2007. The beginning 
of the 2000s saw a shift in concertation from the climate of actor interdependence 
and economic crisis to a climate in which some actors – namely employers – were 
increasingly aware of their growing independent power. This was particularly 
reflected in the roles of the government and Confindustria, who together began to 
develop a coalition against concertation and social pacts in general (Regini and 
Colombo 2011, 132). CGIL’s exit from negotiations on labour market reforms to 
do with flexibility, redundancies, pensions and taxations was framed by observers 
as a result of its political bias and its “militant” left ideology (Barber 2004, The 
Financial Times). A shift in government in 2006 to the Prodi-led centre-left 
coalition created a political climate that encouraged CGIL to return to the 
negotiating table when pensions were once again up for reform. An agreement was 
reached (the “Pact for Welfare) in July 2007 through tripartite concertation, and 
was then put to approval in a referendum among workers and pensioners before 




harmony was undone in 2009, when CGIL once again walked away from 
negotiations over an agreement to reform the collective bargaining system. The 
January 2009 agreement was intended to focus on economic growth and 
employment creation in the context of the immediate aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis, and contained proposals to introduce new experimental rules on 
collective bargaining. Such rules included a dual bargaining structure, based on 
sectoral and decentralized agreements, intended to support the diffusion of 
decentralized bargaining for small and medium enterprises, as well as the 
possibility of introducing “opening clauses” to cope with restructuring. CGIL 
objected to the proposal to diversify wages across sectors and stated that the 
erosion of real wages was a very real possibility in the reform, given that energy 
prices were excluded from the adjustment mechanism. CGIL also felt that “opening 
clauses” would make it easier to weaken worker protections (Pedersini 2009).  
Despite CGIL’s withdrawl from negotiations, the January 2009 reform was 
still put forward and signed as a ‘separate agreement’ with the approval of UIL, 
CISL, Confindustria and government. According to the General Secretary of CGIL 
at the time, Guglielmo Epifani, the “conclusion of a separate agreement was a 
deliberate objective of the government, aiming to weaken the trade union front and 
industrial relations in general,” (Ibid). The other two union confederations 
approved of the separate agreement, stating that it would help strengthen national-
level and decentralized bargaining at the same time, thereby promoting an increase 




stated that the agreement was a necessary step in the “modernization” of collective 
bargaining – where ‘modernization’ equals decentralized bargaining: “at company 
level it is possible to respond more directly to the needs of workers and employers, 
thereby improving productivity and competitiveness, two crucial elements in this 
phase to cope with the economic situation.” (Ibid) 
 For some observers, the Italian labour movement has long been beset by 
internal struggles between moderate and more radical elements, each of which with 
competing understandings of what it is a union ought to do; moderate union 
elements (more in line with contemporary UIL and CISL) seek to defend worker 
interests within the context of firms embedded in a capitalist economy, and do so 
through negotiation and cooperation rather than conflict, whereas  the more radical 
elements tend to push for more fundamental social change by mobilizing social and 
political dissent (Baccaro and Lim 2007, 33). Arguably, much like how labour-
friendly critics of Irish social partnership assert that Irish social partnership was in 
large part a strategy of employers and government to make Irish unions more 
business-friendly, one could find a similar dynamic in the context of Italian 
industrial relations. As Italy entered the euro-zone, and as Italian businesses and 
economics in general became more intertwined and generally dependent on the EU 
single market, major Italian interests would have to re-shape their orientation and 
objectives to accept the context of European integration. For a union as large, 
established, and decisively left of center as CGIL, the emphasis of the single 




main principles of protecting workers and increasing wages. This challenge has at 
times been successfully reconciled elsewhere,17 but the rigidity of the Italian labour 
market and the context of Italian politics have exacerbated the challenge for CGIL. 
 The continuing trend of union fragmentation during the 2000s is reflective 
in part of the changing dynamics of power and opportunity among the major actors. 
Entry into the euro-zone brought increased pressure to use wages as an adjustment 
tool instead of currency devaluation. More generally, continuing single market 
widening and deepening brought with it the European concept of “flexicurity”, and 
with it employer-led conceptions of how to define and implement new ideas of 
employability. Domestically, the position of the Italian government was 
considerably stronger (relative to Italian terms) in the 2000s under Berlusconi than 
it had been in 1992/93 when social pacts first emerged as a viable tool, and 
Confindustria’s willingness to continue negotiated pacts reflected a strengthened 
position of business interests: “Employers [in Italy in 1993] had nothing to lose and 
everything to gain from an agreement that eliminated a major source of inflation 
inertia while simultaneously ‘outlawing’ compensatory wage claims at enterprise 
level” (Ibid, 36) while in 2009, the range of policy options available to attend to the 
financial crisis involved neoliberal measures (disinflation, greater labour market 
flexibility) that were generally favourable to the business interests that employers 
represent. By contrast, CGIL’s opposition to holding up a united front with the 
                                                            





more moderate union confederations is indicative of a political stance in the face of 
a general weakening of the trade union position. 
 Social dialogue in Italy takes place at multiple levels, with the most visible 
area of concertation at the national level. The social partners at national level have 
for the most part been sufficiently capable of engaging in bipartite dialogue, 
particularly in the face of relatively ‘weak’ government coalitions;18 however, the 
circumstances of social pacts have usually involved the pressures of a critical 
economic situation and/or pressures arising from EU membership. Both of these 
circumstances led government to initiate tripartite social pacts when the national 
political and economic situation was “too critical” to be dealt with by the 
government alone (EU Commission 2011b); some examples of ‘too critical’ 
include the danger of being left out of the first wave of EMU membership in 1998, 
or repeated governmental attempts to reform Article 18 of the Worker’s Statute 
which protects workers from “unfair dismissals” (Eurofound 2002). The national 
level of social pacts has allowed for extensive bargaining coverage and 
comprehensive national standards through sectoral agreements. Increasingly, the 
focus of collective bargaining has been decentralized, either at company or 
territorial level. Territorial pacts are a form of social dialogue that have taken place 
since the 1990s, and are a means of improving the attractiveness of specific 
locations; i.e., speaking to the regional disparities that exist between the north  and 
the south of Italy. In general, since 1993, company-level or regional-level 
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bargaining must confine itself to matters and practices that are not already covered 
in an industry-wide agreement at the national level (Ibid).  
 An additional feature particular to the Italian system of industrial relations 
is the institutionalization of unitary union workplace representation, or 
Rappresentanza sindacale unitaria (RSUs). With the July 1993 pact, employees at 
plant-level were able to elect RSU bodies through trade union lists. RSUs are able 
to negotiate at plant-level on issues that are delegated from the industry-wide level. 
Pedersini writes that the “establishment of RSUs confirms the traditional system of 
single-channel representation in Italy, whereby union and employee represtation are 
entrusted to a single body, as opposed to dual-channel systems where union 
delegates operate alongside works councils.” (Pedersini 2010, 9) 
Interaction between the EU and Italian levels 
 Italy, one of the founding members of the European Coal and Steel 
Community, has long had a population that is largely supportive of European 
integration. Eurobarometer shows that 48% of Italians consider their country’s EU 
membership as positive, compared to 30% who hold a neutral opinion and 16% 
who hold a negative opinion – all slightly more favourable than the EU average 
(Eurobarometer 2009b). Trust levels for European institutions have risen strongly 
in comparison to former polls and in comparison to the EU average, while trust 
levels for national institutions are viewed with much lower confidence: “the clear 
majority of Italians are in favour of greater power for Brussels not only in the 




appropriate, such as Foreign Affairs or the fight against terrorism, but also in those 
fields where national management had usually been favoured, like the fight against 
unemployment and the protection of social rights,” (Ibid). Italians also show a 
relatively high level of support for the euro, despite the financial crisis of 2008. The 
majority of the Eurobarometer sample, 49%, believe that euro zone membership 
enabled Italy to be more stable economically. 61% were in favour of EMU, and 
52% maintain that in 2030 the euro will be a stronger currency than the dollar 
(Ibid). 
 Many authors point to the fact that Italy has long used the EU as a 
legitimate, modernizing force. Italy’s self-conception of its post-war success 
depended in such large part on its role in European integration that the possibility 
of not being a part of all EU processes has been inconceivable to Italian political 
elites, no matter how painful the process at hand. Tied into this are historical 
circumstances. Unified as a country since only 1870, and followed shortly after by 
a 21-year reign under Mussolini and a civil war from 1941-43, it is unsurprising 
that much of the modern Italian national identity paralleled the European ideal 
(Sancton 1997). This idea is particularly evident with EMU and Italy’s entry into 
the euro zone. Large deficits and public debt in the mid-90s made it likely that Italy 
would join EMU at a later time than the first-wave of euro-zone countries, putting 
it in company with Greece. Italian governments – under both centre-right and 
centre-left coalitions – sought to enact painful budgetary cuts and economic 




discourse throughout these reforms emphasized the need for responsible public 
finances in the name of Europe above and beyond all other considerations. The fear 
of being left behind in the European integration process was powerful enough to 
surmount most opposition to budget cuts and social insurance reforms. Combined 
with this were a number of opinion surveys that indicated high public support for 
adopting the euro currency (Sbragia 2001, 92). Political debate and discourse, then, 
relied heavily on the idea of Europe as such a valuable goal that virtually all 
societal interests should be secondary in importance. Prime Minister Amato in 
1992 stated: “Without membership Italy would become Europe’s Disneyland” and 
with the explicitly stated need to meet EMU, political discourse was able to garner 
a general consensus on the need to reform fiscally (Della Sala 1997, 26). 
Alberta Sbragia finds two overarching explanations for why Italy 
acquiesced to such austere reforms; firstly, the fear of being left out of EMU was so 
great as to spur consensus on conceding any dramatic fiscal measures necessary. 
Not only was full EU and EMU membership highly advantageous to Italy, but the 
costs of being left behind would be debilitating both economically and 
psychologically. Secondly, EU membership and integration provided an invaluable 
context for imposing much needed economic reforms. The opportunity arising with 
EMU built on the “history of using the external constraints of the EU to favor those 
authorities wishing to have a more responsible budgetary and macroeconomic 
policy” (Sbragia 2001, 91). As well, “for the Italian case, the lack of confidence in 




 Perceptions of EU influence on Italian industrial relations were notably 
positive across organizations. A CISL representative said, generally, that European 
cross-industry social dialogue has had a beneficial impact on social dialogue at the 
national level because employer and worker representatives from the various 
Member States have had to be regularly engaged (Interview I3). The same 
representative stated that various framework agreements have, at times, helped 
provide a foundation for negotiations and have even accelerated discussions at 
national level, meaning that the framework in question has shaped the agenda for 
discussion and provided starting points of negotiation for labour and management, 
respectively. European level instruments such as joint texts and joint opinions have 
introduced objectives at the national level and shaped the discussion on domestic 
policy agenda topics on areas like employment and labour market reform through 
things such as the Lisbon Strategy of 2000 and the Europe 2020 growth strategy 
(Interview I3). This perception is shared by Confindustria: “It [the specific topics 
contained in the directives and frameworks that arose out of European social 
dialogue] has reinforced the national agenda a lot. In many cases it produces effects 
on the national level. The agreements were stated as references for the social 
dialogue on the national level. The Italian social partners always tried to enrich and 
complement the results of the European social dialogue with their own specific 
regulations. There is a close link between the European and the national levels. 
There is an interaction and a mutual relationship as the Italian social partners also 




representative with links to Italian industrial relations stated that for public 
administration concerns in Italy, “being a player at European level is used more and 
more to get reform accepted at the national level,” through mechanisms like 
benchmarking, comparing, and arguing for the necessity of change (Interview B6). 
Engagement at the European level augments the abilities of social partners to 
advance domestic reform, because of the source of legitimacy each of the European 
social partners provides to each national-level affiliate, and because of the support 
that European-level interest confederations – information support, non-financial 
resource support, and ideological support – lend to the country-level interests that 
comprise them. 
 In line with general academic arguments about Italy’s relationship to the EU 
in terms of legitimization and modernization, many interviewees emphasized the 
role of the single currency and the preparations for EMU as essential for 
understanding changes to the Italian wage bargaining system in the 1990s and the 
inflation and wage agreements within. The end of wage indexation in 1993 was not 
the result of pressure from Confindustria – who, typical of most employer 
associations, had long pushed to abolish the scala mobile (the automatic pay 
adjustment mechanism) in favour of linking wages to performance at individual or 
group levels in the interest of flexibility and competitiveness – but was rather 
undertaken in a tripartite, concertative manner because of the need to introduce 
anti-inflation policies to meet EMU criteria (Pedersini 2010). Unlike Ireland, the 




bargaining agreements are extended to any employees working for an employer 
that is covered by the agreement (EIRO 2005). The National Statistical Office 
(Istituto nazionale di statistica, ISTAT) carries out a regular survey of sectoral 
bargaining, which focuses on wage dynamics. Surveys have shown that the sector 
remains the most important level for wage bargaining in Italy, rather than the 
national level, and like many countries in northern and western Europe, this 
produces a larger than average area of coverage under wage agreements (Ibid). The 
complementary bargaining at company or territorial level is often aligned with the 
sectoral level in order to avoid discrepancies; should points of conflict between 
company level and the sectoral framework occur (such as an objection by workers 
within a company as to what they are earning compared to the sectoral average), 
the framework rules that define the sectoral agreements have ultimate authority 
(Ibid). A push toward more decentralization of agreements at the company level 
has support from the government, Confindustria, and UIL and CISL – but firmly 
objected to by CGIL (Ibid). The difference in trade union opinions in Italy is 
interesting; while it is logical for Confindustria to support decentralized 
negotiation, as it seemingly in line with a general employer preference for having 
flexibility as an option to enhance competitiveness, and while CGIL objection to 
decentralization is also seemingly in line with a general labour preference for more 
large-scale binding agreements that inhibit the power of employers to renegotiate 




decentralization contradicts the more expected trade union platform of advocating 
centralized bargaining practices in order to maintain union strength.  
 Italians perceive a positive effect of European legislation on working 
conditions has been positive: “The parental leave directive is an example of a 
successful negotiation in the framework of social dialogue. The implementation of 
the directive also provided for fathers’ rights under this kind of provisions. In some 
countries these measures have represented a completely new and innovative right 
for workers,” (CISL in Voss 2011, 19). Italian social partners reported comfort with 
being able to implement EU law in line with respective national conditions: “The 
fix-term directive has been implemented by an agreement of the social partners’ 
(except CGIL) in 2001 and afterwards by a legislative act,” (Ibid, 20); and, “the 
framework always is a point of reference,” (Confindustria in Voss 2011, 20).  
There also exists an equal perception that social partners in Italy have been able to 
strengthen social dialogue domestically as a result of EU initiatives with 
autonomous framework agreements:  
“Italy had a very early start with telework and was the first country 
to implement this agreement; it was a very important agreement 
because it opened a new season for the social dialogue due to its 
direct implementation. The Secretary Generals of the Trade Unions 
and the Presidents of the Employer Organizations signed an 
agreement for the implementation that is valid in all sectors and in 
all companies. It has the same effects as a law.” (Confindustria, Ibid, 
italics mine) 
 
 The comments taken together offer a picture of the import of EU social 
dialogue in a supportive role, there to reinforce the dynamics within Italian social 




political statement that has no technical or practical value. It is of great value but 
not in a regulatory way…It is a scientific and political analysis that supported the 
discussions [on temporary work and youth employment]…the most important was 
the project on restructuring. As an Employer Organization, we had the opportunity 
to discuss models and see  best practice in national seminars but also to confront 
ideas on a European level and to learn from the experience of others,” 
(Confindustria, Ibid, 33-34). 
 In contrast to some Irish perceptions that recommended stronger 
mechanisms for EU enforcement and monitoring of social policy, Italian social 
partners focused more on the need to maintain autonomy and work on autonomous 
agendas, meaning the ability of domestic social partners to introduce topics of 
negotiation and implement the results of that negotiation in a bipartite manner. 
Each side (labour and management) perceives the value of autonomous dialogue 
differently, however; while Confindustria emphasizes the importance of autonomy 
to “work on being more flexible and with less ritual” (Ibid, 28), the more moderate 
trade unions stated that, “social dialogue is a tool through which social Europe can 
be enforced and consolidated in a framework of solidarity and growth,” (Interview 
I2). 
 
Argument   
 The beginning of the chapter highlights three processes that are significant 




European levels – is primarily visible through the growing norm of social dialogue. 
This is implicitly evident through the EU model of negotiation and dialogue 
between major social partner confederations offering a prominent example of “best 
practice” for EU Member States. A CEEP interviewee stated that “some Member 
States have been able to use European social dialogue to boost the capacity-
building of social dialogue at the national level, where previously no autonomous 
bargaining existed. This is just as much so for employers as for unions, even if it 
started more with unions,” (Interview B6). This is more explicitly the case with the 
advent of social pacts to solve economic problems, in particular those economic 
problems to do with EMU entry and then public debt and deficit control once in the 
euro-zone. 
While the EU recognizes the right to collective bargaining as part of the 
fundamental rights of European citizens, the economic construction of the shared 
currency encourages, if not forces, collective bargaining to effect wage moderation 
for the purpose of competitiveness and macroeconomic growth – very different 
principles from wage indexation systems of previous eras, which prioritized 
working conditions and worker prosperity. More generally, the burgeoning system 
of industrial relations at the EU level serves to reinforce, complement, and 
accelerate parallel processes of social dialogue at national levels by creating an 
important new lobbying opportunity. Social partners in Member States, in order to 
get their interests represented through the European level confederations, must be 




the growth of legislation and framework agreements at the European level either 
introduces new areas of discussion or reinforces existing agendas among the 
national level.  
In Ireland, the introduction of social partnership in the late 1980s had 
numerous parallels to the growth of the EU’s Single Market. The Irish economic 
miracle and the growth of EU social dialogue complemented and reinforced one 
another procedurally (with a formal style of labour-management negotiations) and 
substantively (using social partnership to effect economic recovery, growth, and 
competitiveness). In Italy, the interaction between the European and national level 
provided direct opportunities for Italian governments to restructure public spending 
and wage-inflation systems, by the perceived need to be a part of EMU. The 
example of European social dialogue as a necessary complement to the general 
neo-liberal character of the Single Market is arguably reinforcing the agenda of the 
current technocratic 2012 Italian government, in that social partners are consulted 
for major economic policies, and social partners that are not keen to commit to 
prioritizing goals of competitiveness and economic growth over working conditions 
(i.e., CGIL) are self-selecting themselves out of negotiations. 
 The second process, the differences and/or interaction between bipartite 
social dialogue and tripartite concertation, is evident in the increasing autonomy of 
European social partners and the celebration of this autonomy by the Commission 
and social partners alike. The independence of social dialogue is frequently referred 




labour-management negotiations that is seemingly characterized as offering more 
freedom and room to maneuver than social dialogue tethered to governing 
institutions. Interview comments reveal that this autonomy is not preferred by all 
actors. Whereas business and employers appreciate the results of autonomous 
dialogue, in that things like agreements and joint opinions offer non-threatening 
mechanisms for suggested practice, trade union representatives assert that many 
such mechanisms are not binding enough, and do not offer a concrete degree of 
protections for workers and industry alike. In Ireland, the potential end of social 
partnership with the recent financial crisis is taken by employers as a new 
possibility to concentrate on enterprise-level bargaining – an approach often 
utilized by many strategies relevant to EU competitiveness. In Italy, the context of 
autonomous social dialogue is often a necessity dictated by political circumstances 
and weak governments, but one that finds useful validation through comparison to 
EU processes. Using social dialogue at the European level – either by mimicking 
the example domestically or by utilizing the lobbying opportunities present at EU 
level – is initially attractive to all national social partners because of the 
opportunity to boost an interest group’s own capacity. 
The recent experiences of both countries illustrate how social dialogue has 
become a process that governments tend to recommend in order to enhance 
economic adaptation during hard times. The distinction between social ‘dialogue’ 
rather than ‘partnership’ or ‘concertation’ is not simply semantic – the prominent 




employed in a circumscribed bargaining realm. Autonomy itself is a double-edged 
sword for trade unions; while bipartite negotiation ostensibly begins on a more 
even playing field, in that government is not directly exercising its own policy 
prescriptions, the results of bipartite negotiation are often implemented through 
voluntary agreements. As a result, autonomous negotiation between social partners 
is a tool that is largely preferred by more employers than unions, as it offers further 
avenues for non-binding mechanisms that allow higher flexibility for interpretation 
in different member states. While flexibility in interpretation and implementation 
might well be a necessity in the EU project, where very different domestic 
conditions need to tailor agreements to their own national contexts, non-binding 
autonomous agreements are more threatening to labour movements and trade 
unions, which generally tend to prefer legal underpinnings of protections. 
 The third process, the interaction between sectoral and cross-sectoral social 
dialogue, is the most complex and least visible in terms of impact at the national 
level. The degree of social dialogue that takes place at either level in Member 
States does not appear to have any great relationship to how social dialogue at the 
European level is organized. The legacy of social partnership in Ireland has shaped 
the tripartite organization of industrial relations and has limited the amount of 
decentralization to coordinating activity at sectoral and company levels. In Italy, 
the interaction of (occasional) national level pacts, sectoral agreements, and RSUs 
within individual enterprises, is seemingly more related to internal politics and the 




trend in decentralization at the EU level that has ramifications at the national level 
is the increase of legislation emanating from Europe to do with individual workers 
rights. Implementation of these rights, as noted by Irish interviewees, increases the 
legalistic quality of industrial relations in a Member State, and (arguably) indirectly 
encourages decentralization through the practical available mechanisms of 
implementation – working conditions that better apply directly to the contexts of 
local plants and enterprises rather than national level deliberation. 
 Taken together, the above three processes support a synthesis of neo-liberal 
capitalism with European social models. The emphasis on growth and 
competitiveness trumps concerns about working conditions and individual wages, 
while the emphasis placed on civil society and avenues for valid worker 
representation offer a distinctly European cushion to some of the neo-liberal ideals 
present in the Single Market. The concept of worker information and consultation 
itself, discussed in detail in the following chapter, is another important example of 
how European integration ‘hybridizes’ single market liberalization with a particular 





CHAPTER 5: EU Directive on Information and Consultation of Workers / 
Employees (DICE) 
Introduction 
 This chapter describes the independent variable of the EU Directive on the 
Information and Consultation of Workers (2002/14/EC), outlining the content and 
mandate of the directive and providing an analysis of its influence on domestic 
industrial relations systems. The chapter begins with a description of the content of 
the directive and the accompanying rationale behind its inception. Following are 
descriptions of the implementation of the directive in Ireland and Italy, 
respectively, utilizing multiple sources: observatory reports, first- and second-hand 
interviews with domestic social partners and government representatives, and news 
reports. Then, the chapter provides an analysis of the impact of the directive on the 
industrial relations system of each country since implementation.  
 This directive is a key piece of EU legislation in the area of industrial 
relations. While numerous EU Directives and framework agreements exist on 
various aspects of worker protections – such as working time, parental leave, 
transfers of undertakings – DICE deals with the rights of workers to be informed 
and consulted on numerous areas of business and conduct, and the corresponding 
obligations of employers to provide those rights. Information and consultation is in 
the general realm of EU social policy in that it deals with the communicative 
context of working conditions. The actions necessary with the information and 




relationships between labour and management; as such, the implementation of this 
Directive necessarily brings into focus the overarching context of industrial 
relations at the supranational and national levels. 
The central argument of this chapter is that the Directive is an important 
stepping stone for the longer-term decentralization of organized interests to do with 
labour and management in EU Member States. While the specific and immediate 
impact of the Directive did not have a great deal of immediate effect on either case 
study, the longer term implications of implementing the Directive are that 
company-level means of representation for employees and employers, respectively, 
will be standardized across the EU for all businesses and undertakings over a 
certain size, and that the mechanism of ‘worker consultation’ introduced by the 
Directive standardizes the procedure of formal communication and dialogue 
between employees and employers. In Ireland, the implementation of DICE created 
statutory worker rights for the first time, while mandating forms of worker 
representation that are not based out of trade unions or union representatives. In 
Italy, the information of workers has been an existing part of certain sectoral 
collective agreements, but the consultation of workers introduces a definitively new 
variable in industrial relations. ‘Consultation’ as labour law invokes and 
standardizes (ideally) two-way communication between workers and employers, 
for the immediate purpose of avoiding industrial conflict and for the larger goal of 
maintaining an adaptable workforce – part of the EU mission toward “flexicurity”. 




employment law in the EU: the increasing use of social dialogue at the national 
level for the purpose of making businesses more productive, while at the same time 
fostering an increased reliance on company-level sources of worker representation. 
DICE provides a fundamental example of EU efforts to use social policy to 
enhance productivity, rather than using social policy as a way of softening the 
effects of enhanced competitiveness. 
 
EU Directive on the Information and Consultation of Workers 
Content of the Directive 
 Council Directive 2002/14 established a general framework for informing 
employees and consulting with them in the European Union. It applies to all 
undertakings employing at least 50 employees or EU establishments employing at 
least 20 employees.19 Member States were obliged to implement the directive into 
national law by March 23, 2005; Ireland and the UK, with distinctively voluntarist 
industrial relations systems, were given until 2007 to implement the directive to 
account for the absence of any prior statutory worker information mechanisms. 
Employee information and consultation covers three areas: economic, financial and 













services, and the general financial health of an undertaking or enterprise; the 
structure and foreseeable development of employment, and related measures; and 
any decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work organization or 
contractual relations (Europa 2009a). In this context, information refers to the 
transmission of data by the employer to the employee representatives in order to 
enable them to acquaint themselves with and examine the subject matter at hand. 
Consultation is defined as a process of exchange of views and establishment of 
dialogue between the employee representatives and the employer (Eurofound 
2008). 
 The practical arrangements for providing sufficient information and 
consultation are to be determined by Member States, which can entrust 
management and labour to make voluntary arrangements and even modified 
arrangements, as long as the general framework of the Directive is respected. Like 
many EU Directives, this flexibility in implementation is necessary when 
accounting for the many different forms of employment law, business cultures, and 
industrial relations systems across EU Member States. The principles of Article 1 
in the Directive illustrate the EU’s explicit commitment to subsidiarity and 
proportionality20: 
• “The practical arrangements for information and consultation shall be 










relations practices in individual Member States in such a way as to ensure 
their effectiveness.” (EUR-Lex 2002, Article 1(2)) 
• “When defining or implementing practical arrangements for information 
and consultation, the employer and the employees’ representatives shall 
work  in a spirit of cooperation and with due regard for their reciprocal 
rights and obligations, taking into account the interests both of the 
undertaking or establishment and of the employees.” (Ibid, Article 1(3)) 
 
The practical arrangements which Member States are required to determine for 
information and consultation incorporate a process of nine sequential stages: 
• Transmission of information/data (Article 2(f)) 
• Acquaintance with and examination of data (Article 2(f)) 
• Conduct of an adequate study (Article 4(3)) 
• Preparation for consultation (Article 4(3)) 
• Formulation of an opinion (Article 4(4)c) 
• Meeting (Article 4(4)(d)) 
• Employer’s reasoned response to opinion (Article 4(4)(d)) 
• Exchange of views and establishment of dialogue (Article 2(g)) 
• Discussion (Article 4(4)(b)), “with a view to reaching an agreement on 
decisions” (Article 4(4)(e)) 
 
The underlying rationale of the mandated practical arrangements is to provide 
employees and their representatives with adequate protection and guarantees to 
enable them to perform their duties, as well as to provide employers with 
reasonable confidentiality arrangements to prevent “serious” harm to the 
functioning of the undertaking or enterprise (Europa 2009a). In essence, the 
Directive sets minimum principles, definitions, and arrangements for information 
and consultation within each EU Member State while providing Member States 
with suitable flexibility in implementing the practical arrangements, given the 
range of industrial relations practices within EU countries. 
 The significance of this directive is in two parts. First, the requirement of a 




directly emphasizes the need for a particular kind of worker protection – that which 
is qualitatively distinct from wealthy industrialized countries outside of Europe and 
the EU. Second, the willingness of the EU to put forward this recommendation in a 
directive rather than a framework agreement – so that national legislatures are 
obliged to implement the directive into domestic law and are monitored on the 
status of implementation by the Commission, rather than prompting social partners 
to craft an autonomous bipartite agreement – is notable for the assertion of a 
particular form of worker-employer relations within a Union that contains diverse 
forms of industrial relations. Requiring employers to inform and consult workers 
through legislation is arguably a significant step in using the context of ‘Social 
Europe’ to shape the dynamics of labour-management along more formal lines. 
Although the degree of flexibility allotted to Member States in implementing the 
directive was quite high, the fact of requiring workers in certain undertakings and 
establishments to be informed and consulted sets a stricter tone for communications 
between employers and employees – one that in large part reflects a continental 
model of industrial relations in Western Europe (see below).  
This model is visible in the directive itself and in the language used 
surrounding the directive. A statement from the Commission’s Directorate-General 
on Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion website reads: “Social dialogue helps 
to improve risk anticipation and make work organization more flexible. The EU 
Directive establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees 




labour play a key role in deciding those arrangements [for information and 
consultation].” (Europa 2009a). The statement explicitly establishes the EU’s 
perceived value of increasing the flexibility of work and work arrangements, and 
ties the use of social dialogue to achieving this value. Eurofound asserts that 
“Directive 2002/14 is highly significant since it is the first EC law stipulating a 
general obligation to inform and consult employees. Arguably, it establishes a 
European social model of mandatory employee representation and mandatory 
information and consultation of employee representatives,” (Eurofound 2008a). 
When considering this stipulation of the Directive in the context of international 
competition, multinational corporations, and general concern for productivity, the 
EU is visibly distinct for not only requiring worker information and consultation 
systems but also for recommending that social dialogue be the means by which to 
achieve those systems. This speaks to a vision of productivity that combines a 
certain level of social responsibility – “flexicurity”, in EU parlance21 – that is much 
less visible in either North America or Japan. 
 The directive had more implications for some Member States than others. 
Ireland and the UK, most notably, had no prior statutory provision for employee 
information and consultation other than previous EU directives on European Works 
Councils, collective redundancies, and transfers of undertakings. In recognition of 










DICE – an additional two years over the 2005 deadline in effect for other EU 
Member States – in recognition of the extensive legislative reform likely needed to 
accommodate DICE. By contrast, Austria, Germany and Slovenia had no need to 
implement DICE because existing national legislation on employee information 
and consultation already went beyond the requirements of DICE (Eurofound 2009, 
2).  
The initial premise of worker information and consultation stems from 
existing (and very different) traditions in French and German plants, which each in 
their own forms had long standing statutory works council systems. The variety of 
adaptive responses to the directive depended in large part on existing structures of 
employee information and consultation, existing employment legislation, the 
strength of trade unions and works councils, and the legacy of industrial action in 
particular sectors (Ibid, 2-3). Although the directive left considerable latitude to the 
Member States to tailor its implementation according to national policies and 
concerns, the influence of a continental (German) model of employee information 
and consultation on the content of DICE is arguably shaping social dialogue among 
EU Member States. At the very least, one could say that the directive (in 
combination with other related directives to do with employment law) is reducing 
the amount of divergence in industrial relations across the EU. 
 




 Previous to DICE, a number of directives related to general consultation of 
workers had already been adopted in the EU. Directive 98/59/EC provided for 
informing workers in advance of collective redundancies, depending on the size of 
the workforce and the number of proposed redundancies; Directive 77/187/EEC 
(later amended in 1998) provided for the safeguarding of employee’s rights and 
obligations in the event of a transfer of an undertaking, business, or part of a 
business; and Directive 94/45/EC on European Works Councils, which provided 
for plant-level works council in larger European level companies with operations in 
at least two Member States and with a number of employees over a certain 
threshold. Despite these provisions, the Commission published a Communication in 
1995 emphasizing the need to redefine the EU’s legal framework in order to 
establish more binding rules on general worker information policies. In this 
Communication, the Commission set out various options for action to be taken and 
encouraged the EU social partners to begin to outline arrangements for a general 
framework (Eurofound 2008a). In June of 1997 the Commission then launched the 
second phase of consultation with the social partners on the basis of Article 3(2) in 
the Maastricht Treaty’s Agreement on Social Policy (also Article 154 of TFEU). 
ETUC and CEEP were willing to begin social dialogue and autonomous 
negotiations on the topic, but BE (then UNICE) declined, “as it considered the 
project to be at odds with the principle of subsidiarity and felt that the subject 
concerned the internal organization and management of companies and therefore 




with Article 155(2) of TFEU, where the social partners decide against pursuing 
autonomous negotiations between themselves and instead request that the 
Commission take its proposal to the Council, in order for the Council and European 
Parliament to negotiate legislation between themselves, the Commission presented 
a proposal for a Directive in the absence of consensus among the social partners. 
 The political impetus for generating a Directive came from multiple 
sources. Member States and domestic social partners from both sides of labour and 
management were vocal about some of the weaknesses of Directive on EWCs, in 
particular how communication between EWCs and employers ought to be 
specifically implemented – employers arguing that the information of workers 
could be used as an obstacle to making workers redundant, and workers arguing 
that the mechanisms for information were not strong enough. The political party 
PES (Party of European Socialists) was quick to argue that more legal rules for 
worker information were necessary in order to keep employers accountable 
(Interview B8). The Commission’s rationale for going forth with the directive is 
found in the legal body of the directive itself. The introductory body of the 
published directive reminds that Article 136 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) states that a particular objective of the Community and the Member States is 
to promote social dialogue between management and labour, and that Point 17 of 
the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers holds that 
information, consultation and participation for workers must be developed along 




• “(6) The existence of legal frameworks at national and Community level 
intended to ensure that employees are involved in the affairs of the 
undertaking employing them and in decisions which affect them has not 
always prevented serious decisions affecting employees from being taken 
and made public without adequate procedures having been implemented 
beforehand to inform and consult them. 
• (7) There is a need to strengthen dialogue and promote mutual trust within 
undertakings in order to improve risk anticipation, make work organization 
more flexible and facilitate employee access to training within the 
undertaking while maintaining security, make employees aware of 
adaptation needs, increase employees’ availability to undertake measures 
and activities to increase their employability, promote employee 
involvement in the operation and future of the undertaking and increase its 
competitiveness.” (Ibid, p.0029-0030) 
 
Reiterated throughout the body of the directive are the concepts of “anticipation”, 
“prevention” and “employability”, all used in the context of prioritizing 
employment while enhancing competitiveness through the mechanism of social 
dialogue. Put another way, the development of the EU’s single market need to be 
balanced against social values on which Member States societies’ are based: “Entry 
into the third stage of economic and monetary union has extended and accelerated 
the competitive pressures at European level. This means that more supportive 
measures are needed at national level.” The Commission further states that existing 
legal frameworks for employee information and consultation at Community level 
and at some national levels tend to adopt “an excessively a posteriori approach to 
the process of change,” and neglect risk prevention or genuine anticipation of 
employment developments (Ibid, p. 0030. 
 The conclusion of the introductory body of the directive states that the 
purpose of the directive is to establish minimum requirements throughout the EU 




providing employee information and consultation mechanisms that go further than 
the minimum requirements. The Commission states that the objective of the 
directive is to establish a framework on employee information and consultation 
“appropriate for the new European context described above, and therefore…be 
better achieved at Community level,” (Ibid, italics mine). In respect of the 
subsidiarity and proportionality principles, the Commission emphasizes not only 
the need to account for the particular variants of national employee-employer 
relations and channels of communication, but also the specific mechanisms of 
information and consultation at sectoral and company levels: “Member States may 
entrust management and labour at the appropriate level, including at undertaking or 
establishment level, with defining freely and at any time through negotiated 
agreement the practical arrangements for informing and consulting employees,” 
(Ibid, Article 5 p. 0032). 
 Taken together, Commission statements in the body of the EU directive 
offer a sensibility of providing businesses and employers a means of adapting to 
challenges in a manner that works with social policy provisions and not against 
them, by enhancing the everyday rights of workers and consequently broadening 
the possibility by which to avoid industrial conflict and/or action. In addition, the 
Commission also utilizes the EU’s own principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality in recognition of the more decentralized options for information and 
consultation systems, by reinforcing the ability to have social partners and social 




The European level 
 Despite the disinclination of BE to address the issue of information and 
consultation of workers through autonomous social dialogue during the second 
phase of Commission consultation, the formation of the directive on the 
information and consultation of workers was a relatively smooth process, according 
to most perspectives. Almost all interviewees at the European level referred to the 
growth – in both scope and content – of legislation concerning employee 
protections (including the information and consultation of employees) as being 
largely beneficial. ETUC interviewees on the whole stated that this accumulation of 
legislation was beneficial because it provided “stepping stones” for enhanced 
workers protection in the Single Market (Interview B3), while industry largely felt 
that such legislation was beneficial because it helped to reduce ambiguity in a 
number of areas concerning the information of workers, and thus reduced the 
potential for conflict (Interviews B5 and B7). A CEEP interviewee stated that most 
EU labour laws were designed to allow Member States a fair amount of flexibility 
in implementation – a feature very reassuring for employers and businesses 
(Interview B6).  
At the same time, the most contentious legislative proposals within the EU 
had to do with EWCs. ETUC interviewees offered the viewpoint that BE preferred 
to concentrate its opposition in the area of EWCs, and as such decided to let the 
opportunity to hash out an autonomous framework requirement in the more general 




in contrast, stated that the businesses and employers represented by BE were in 
favour of DICE, as it was less controversial than legislation on EWCs and that it 
filled a need for trust between management and labour: “a good method of 
improving workers’ perceptions of policy,” (Interview B5). In addition, the context 
for implementation of the directive – where operational arrangements are left up to 
the Member States – was an approach favoured by BE, as it left room for national 
policies, practices, and idiosyncrasies in the execution of national legislation (Ibid).  
 From the perspective of ETUC, DICE was generally speaking a positive 
development for furthering legal coverage for employees and for the implications 
of setting the stage for amending the existing EWC directive with sharper language 
in an amendment.22 At the same time, ETUC expressed a number of concerns 
about weaknesses with DICE: that information and consultation arrangements do 
little to protect employees against job losses (mainly ensure only that employees 
receive advance warning); that DICE legislation is limited to enterprises and 
undertakings above a minimum size employee threshold, leaving many companies 
and services not covered; and more generally, that traditional trade union-based 
systems of representation could potentially be undermined by the possibility for 
employees to opt for direct representation (Interviews B1 and B4;  European 











between management and labour under DICE was valuable, but that actual business 
decisions should belong to management themselves in order to avoid placing undue 
burdens of obligation upon employers: “[the directive] can help with social 
consequences but should not affect nature of decisions or goal of competitiveness,” 
(Interview B5).  
Another concern noted by trade unions was also a feature welcomed by 
businesses and employers – the directive’s prescription to allow Member States to 
choose alternative thresholds for the number of employees in a company or 
organization in some cases, creating some uncertainty over the coverage of 
employees depending on their work status within the company (i.e., temporary, 
contract, part-time). In general, this juxtaposition of perceptions between 
representatives of management and labour is reflective of not only the specific 
interests surrounding the content of DICE, but also of interests between the two 
groups more broadly for all EU-level initiatives in the field of social policy and 
employment: “Employers don’t want EU to regulate but to give frame and scope so 
that it [framework or directive] can be adapted for social partners at enterprise 
level…trade unions want to expand definitions so that each [Member State] does 
things exactly the same way, but binding like this is not practical,” (Interview B5). 
Neither CEEP nor UEAPME had any divergent viewpoints from BE for this 
directive, each organization stating that they were satisfied with both BE’s stance 




During the final stages of negotiation for DICE, the EP adopted a series of 
amendments to the Council’s common position on the (then) draft directive. These 
amendments came from the “Ghilardotti Report”, named after a MEP from the 
Party of European Socialists (PES), and contained provisions for penalties, stricter 
definitions, recommendations for enhanced social dialogue in SMEs that do not 
meet the threshold of employees needed to apply the Directive, and provisions for 
the implementation of the Directive in public administrations (European Parliament 
2002). The Ghilardotti Report was, according to an ETUC Interviewee, developed 
in consultation with some ETUC lobbying efforts (Interview B1). Most of the 
proposed changed were welcomed by trade union bodies, but criticized by 
employers’ organizations. The bulk of the amendments – to do with more specific 
definitions on key words and more explicit protections for employee 
representatives – were adopted, while three amendments failed to pass. The failed 
amendments were: the proposal that Member States should provide more stringent 
sanctions when employers seriously breached their information and consultation 
obligations, particularly when regarding employee termination, and to enable 
employees’ representatives to have such decisions suspended; to require Member 
States to prevent undertakings from reducing the size of their workforce or 
changing their structures with them aim of being exempt from the directive’s 
parameters; to reduce the period of the directive’s implementation for Member 




A notable amendment that was approved was the EP’s specification that 
“agreements [within the Member States] must be between the ‘social partners’ 
(rather than ‘management and labour’)” (Ibid). The semantic emphasis in this 
amendment is important because it seemingly encourages social dialogue in 
addition to mandating information and consultation systems. Requiring ‘social 
partners’ to help transpose the Directive in Member States allows for practical 
arrangements to take place at whichever level (national, sectoral, company) is 
appropriate for the Member State in question while still building consensus 
between the two points of view (management and labour, in aggregate form) ahead 
of the fact. Put another way, the “social partner” emphasis speaks to a longer-term, 
co-responsibility for economic prosperity between social actors (see quote below). 
In late 2008, three years after the directive came into force in most EU 
Member States (and one year after the deadline for implementation of the directive 
in Ireland, the UK, Bulgaria and Romania), the European Parliament’s Policy 
Department on Economic and Scientific Policy published a report on the impact 
and assessment of the directive on information and consultation, at the request of 
the EP’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs. Its most prominent 
recommendations were to: advocate more monitoring and comparative EU-wide 
research regarding information and consultation practice in the Member States, 
with the particular aim of improving enforcement; encourage the  Member States to 
work individually and together to ensure more effective enforcement of EU 




with resort to the European Commission infringement procedures where they feel 
national governments are not acting correctly; and to promote the wider economic 
and employment benefits of the EU social model, “with the information and 
consultation of employees at  its heart, and raise public and political awareness of 
the EU’s strong performance in terms of competitiveness, productivity, and its 
ability to combine modern and effective quality business practices with social 
justice and democracy at the workplace through the effective use of legislation.” 
(European Parliament 2008, vi) The report also provides an overview of the 
directive’s implications for industrial relations practices in Europe. From the 
perspective of potential institutional convergence resulting from EU mandates: 
“…the EU is seen to be creating a solid basis for the long-term 
development of collabourative industrial relations within Member 
States, and across the EU as a whole – shifting away from reactive 
responses to difficulties such as redundancies, towards a more 
positive, forward-looking, approach to cooperation between 
employers and employees inside businesses.” (Ibid, 16) 
 
At the same time, the actual impact of DICE has limited visible convergence 
mechanisms because of the fairly general breadth of the legislation and the 
variation in transposition to national legislation. Systems of workplace 
representation are complex and vary considerably within as well as between 
Member States: “even such a wide-ranging directive such as 2002/14 will not 
harmonize the mechanics of workplace representation across the European Union. 
This complexity is difficult to capture in concrete analytical terms, not least 




limited to a study of the institutional arrangements and not the actual practices,” 
(European Commission 2006, 7). 
With DICE, there is scope for national implementation to tailor the 
directive’s provisions on a number of important issues to reflect national practice. 
Member States were allowed – but not required – to enable the social partners to 
negotiation information and consultation arrangements that depart from and even 
fall short of the standards established by the directive (European Parliament 2008, 
9). An early report from the European Trade Union Research Institute 
(ETUI/REHS) found that as a result of the freedom allotted to Member States to 
implement the Directive according to national particularities, significantly different 
arrangements have been put in place by different EU countries. Of big concern was 
the role of worker representatives. The Directive allowed for the possibility of 
workers’ representatives to be drawn directly from the workforce, or to be 
represented (most likely, and usually, by trade unions). This was seen by trade 
unions in some countries as a potential source of conflict and difficulty – the room 
for employers to create channels of worker representation that are independent of 
unions could potentially threaten the foundation and rationale for union 
membership. The ETUI report also criticized the vague wording of the directive 
with regards to the lack of support available for employee representatives, stating 
that this lack of support could be a further source of conflict between representative 
bodies and overarching unions in the future, if representatives did not have to be 





The Domestic Level 
Ireland 
 At the time of the Directive’s publication at the EU level, an article in the 
Irish newspaper The Sunday Business Post stated that: 
“The European Information and Consultation Directive will have 
far-reaching implications for employers in Ireland. According to 
[Tony] Dundon [college lecturer, Department of Management, NUI 
Galway], it will also bring about a fundamental shift in the industrial 
relations system. The directive will change the ‘voluntarist’ system 
of industrial relations currently operating in Ireland, providing the 
social partners with an opportunity to implement a ‘competitive’ 
information and consultation system for all stakeholders, says 
Dundon.” (26 March 2003) 
 
Ireland introduced new legislation titled “Employees (Provision of information and 
Consultation) Act 2006” to do with worker information and consultation in July of 
2006, despite having until 2007 by which to do so. From a legal perspective, this 
transposition of DICE is significant as it is the first time Ireland has had statutory 
provisions for employee information and consultation rights. The Act initially 
established a right to information and undertakings in Ireland with at least 150 
employees as of September 2006, and incrementally reduced the employee 
threshold to undertakings with at least 50 employees as of March 2008. The main 
features of the Act are: 
• A 10% employee trigger mechanism is required for negotiations setting up 
an information and consultation structure, through applications either 
directly to the employer or to the Labour Court in confidence, unless 





• Trade unions are not the sole channel for employee representation (as 
intended in the EU Directive); 
• If a negotiated settlement is not possible, standard fallback rules providing 
for elected representative Information and Consultation Forums (along the 
lines of employee representative works councils); 
• Potential for employers to avail themselves of direct form of information 
and consultation, to suit local circumstances, or a mix of direct and 
representative, so long as employees are agreeable to this; 
• Provision for the Labour Court to issue binding determinations. (Dobbins 
2009, 1) 
 
By all accounts, the most controversial aspect of the Act refers to the first bullet 
point – that negotiation to set up an information and consultation structure must be 
triggered by the workers themselves, unless the employer sets one up on a 
voluntary basis. This “trigger mechanism” is allowed for in the language of the 
original EU Directive in order to account for the vastly different employment 
situations in each Member State (Europa 2009a). The trigger mechanism takes the 
form of a written request from at least 10% of employees of the undertaking, 
subject to a minimum of 15 employees and a maximum of 100. Once employees 
make such a request, an employer must enter into negotiations to agree to some 
form of information and consultation procedure, or introduce the standard rules as 
transposed from DICE. (Ibid) 
 Another element of controversy during the drafting of the Act was also the 
provision for direct information and consultation arrangements through plant-level 
representatives. Irish trade unions argued that information and consultation should 
take place through independent representative channels (that is, independent from 
the working environment itself), intending those channels to be filled by unions. 




representative channel, and – according to interviewees from ICTU and DETE – 
this was a point heavily reinforced by big employers and powerful employer lobby 
groups in Ireland during transposition, such as the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Ireland (Interview E1 and E3). Section 6 of the Act defines 
employees’ representatives as being “employees of the undertaking, elected or 
appointed for the purposes of the Act” (Ireland 2006, 7). The employer is obliged 
to arrange for the election or appointment of representatives. Where it is the 
practice of the employer to conduct collective bargaining negotiations with a trade 
union or excepted body that represents 10% or more of the employees in the 
undertaking, the Act provides that employees who are members of that trade union 
or excepted body are entitled to elect or appoint from their members at least one 
employees’ representatives (Ibid). However, employees are free at a later stage to 
exercise their rights through representatives of their choosing, should they so wish. 
 The transposition process began with the Irish government publishing a 
consultation paper on how the Directive should be transposed into Irish law. The 
main social partners and other interested parties then made submissions to the 
government. IBEC’s immediate concern was that the Directive could potentially 
open the door for de-facto union recognition in previously non-union firms – this 
concern was reiterated by IBEC stressing the need for direct forms of employee 
involvement with information and consultation, in order to avoid creating a role for 
external trade union officials. IBEC’s objection to de-facto union recognition was 




business and management that would have an adverse impact on investment 
decisions, such as frightening away foreign investors who are opposed to collective 
representation. A great deal of foreign investment in Ireland comes from U.S. 
multinationals: “in recent decades, this factor [U.S. multinationals] has had a 
significant influence on Irish Government policy,” (Dobbins 2008, 3). The 
American Chamber of Commerce in Ireland submitted a position to the 
government, parts of which stated:  
“Any implementation of this legislation must take into account the 
structure and practices of voluntarism in Industrial Relations in 
Ireland. The existence of such an approach has added to the 
attractiveness of Ireland as a location for many multinationals. The 
implementation of this legislation should be designed to support 
such an approach rather than hamper it in any way…Representatives 
from outside the workforce should not be invited to be 
representatives. The purpose of the Directive is to ensure that 
employees are informed and consulted and this is best done directly. 
Furthermore there may be difficulties in the areas of confidentiality 
and corporate governance where non-employees are given access to 
company information” (Ibid)  
 
In light of the above concerns, employers and businesses together lobbied heavily 
to request the ‘trigger mechanism’ – that employees should have to make a request 
for information and consultation rights, and show a minimum level of support, 
before management has to actualize the practice. Employers also suggested that 
organizations which already have a good relationship between employers and 
employees should not have to replace their current practice, in order to avoid 
placing an unneeded heavy burden on the functioning of undertakings (Ibid). 
 ICTU, representing the trade union perspective, was emphatic that Irish 




statutory fallback mechanisms should not be watered down at the behest of 
employers.23 Trade unions definitively wanted the opposite consideration that the 
employers did; to bolster the traditional single channel of collective representation 
through trade unions alone. The unions feared that if there was a dilution of the 
standard rules, employers could simply bide their time until the fallback 
mechanism is triggered. “At the time, the ICTU viewed the Directive as potentially 
acting as a catalyst for the diffusion of enterprise-level union-management 
partnership.” (Dobbins 2008, 4) 
 Eurofound’s analysis stated that Ireland had enacted a minimalist 
interpretation of the Directive, and that the Government had transposed into Irish 
law only the measures it deemed necessary to comply with the terms of DICE and 
nothing more (Ibid). IBEC’s position was mostly positive, applauding the 
government’s decision to facilitate local agreements (as a “welcome 
acknowledgement of our voluntary tradition”) and to prioritize flexible 
implementation in light allowing employers to adjust to new market conditions 
(IBEC statement in Dobbins 2008, 5). ICTU’s response toward the final legislation 
was more critical: 
 “A current example of pro-business sentiment is the approach of the 
Government to the transposition of the EU Directive on Employee 
Information and Consultation. On all of the key issues the legislation 
now going through the Oireachtas [parliament], this comes down 
heavily in favour of the submission made by IBEC, the Chambers of 
Commerce and the American Chamber of Commerce. We shall end 








Directive. A significant opportunity to enhance workplace 
cooperation has been sacrificed to appease business interests.” 
(ICTU statement, Ibid) 
 
An ICTU interviewee stated that the transposition and implementation of DICE in 
Ireland was hugely disappointing, as it did not result in the type of union 
recognition that trade unions had hoped for. The interviewee expressed 
disappointment that the Act didn’t result in collective bargaining at the national 
level, and as such ignored the Irish situation (up until that point) of social 
partnership. The Act also left no provisions for certainty at the national level: “if 
it’s voluntary, then no one has to comply.” (Interview E1) 
 Interviews with the Industrial Relations Unit of the Irish Department of 
Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) described the “open-ness” of DICE and 
the resulting lack of prescription for domestic transposition, leaving lots of room 
for argument between ICTU and IBEC given that there was no existing precedent 
for the information and consultation of workers in Ireland beforehand. Legally 
speaking, “it’s left up to parties to make own agreements on how they will work 
consultation…there are the ‘Standard Rules’ to fall back on, but otherwise it’s not 
prescriptive, just a framework…the Act allows a lot of flexibility depending on 
company and nature, it’s left to parties to decide, so it’s still quite voluntarist and 
not set in stone,” (Interview E3). DETE also emphasized the extent of redress 
procedures available under the Act; monitoring provisions that offered strong 





 Whereas in practice, the Act may have had little direct effect on the 
everyday actions of workers and managers, the larger context of DICE’s 
transposition into Irish law has potential for longer-term, far-reaching effects. 
Eurofound (writing in 2008) stated that the Directive had very little impact on 
industrial relations practices in Ireland on the ground – attributable to the perceived 
minimalist nature of the Act, a certain degree of apathy among the social partners 
in the face of more pressing priorities, and the lack of knowledge about the Act 
among workers (Dobbins 2008, 5) There still remain, however, two unquestionable 
developments from DICE that pose larger significance for Irish labour law: the 
creation of statutory worker rights for the first time, and the precedence of creating 
forms of worker representation that are not based out of trade unions or union 
representatives. 
 “At the time of its adoption, the 2002/14/EC Directive was 
expected to have its biggest impact on the ‘voluntarist’ industrial 
relations systems of the UK and Ireland (since these were, at the 
time, the only EU MS without a generally applicable system of 
information and consultation through works councils or similar 
bodies established by law or by central collective agreement) and 
thereafter in the new Member States…but the review…suggests that 
it could be a gradual, evolving process, that will depend on the 
wider development of workplace representation and bargaining, and 
that this could be a medium to long term process, which depends 
partly on what the countries can achieve themselves, and the amount 
of support they can obtain from other Member States where good 




“In Italy, the relationship between information and consultation has long 




further than the first stage, and because a shared concept of consultation as 
understood at EU level did not exist. The introduction in Italy of legislation 
information and consultation rights fulfils, thirty years later, what the trade 
unions and government envisaged in the second half of the 1970s, with such 
rights seen as part of a wider process of industrial democracy.” (Muratore 
2009, 5) 
 
DICE was implemented in Italy by legislative decree no.25/2007 in March 
2007. Perhaps because of pre-existing statutory bodies for worker information, the 
Directive received little attention in Italy both after EU approval and after 
transposition in the national legislature. In contrast to Ireland, this decree did not 
involve major new legislation or set new precedents, but instead involved 
extensions and adaptations to pre-existing provisions on worker information and 
consultation regulations. In effect, the decree filled a legislative gap in an area that 
had previously been regulated by collective bargaining alone, on numerous specific 
issues and in numerous sectors. The decree filled those legislative gaps by 
systematically recognizing information and consultation rights from a legal point of 
view, and by affecting all employers and all dependent employees covered by 
collective bargaining, excluding only freelance workers. The stipulations of DICE 
were that Member States could choose whether to apply the Directive to 
undertakings with at least 50 employees or to establishments with at least 20 
employees; Italy chose to apply the decree to “all enterprises employing at least 50 
workers”, in response to negotiation between the social partners and with regard to 
the specific circumstances of SMEs (Ibid, 1). The decree grants information and 




collective bargaining, which in practice delegates such rights to RSUs (unitary 
workplace union structures) and local trade unions (Ibid).24  
 The decree assigns responsibility for the concrete application of information 
and consultation rights to collective bargaining at the national level, but without 
excluding territorial and company-level bargaining frameworks on the precise 
definitions and practices of worker information and consultation. The issue that 
provoked such disagreement in Ireland – the tension between employers wanting to 
transpose legislation that avoided de-facto union control and emphasized direct 
employee representation, and unions that wanted to mandate independent union 
representation for worker information and consultation – was not a part of the 
Italian landscape in crafting the legislation, in large part because of the pre-existing 
RSUs that, in many sectors, already provided for some form of worker information 
and already had union representatives to do so. The key features that were a part of 
DICE implementation in Italy are: the tardiness of the Italian decree in relation to 
deadlines set by the EU; the autonomy of the main Italian social partners in drafting 
the decree; and the introduction of the concept of ‘consultation’ as understood by 
the EU into Italian industrial relations. 
 The deadline for transposition of DICE for most EU Member States 












2006, the European Commission lodged a complaint against Italy for failing to 
meet the deadline; in March of 2007, the European Court of Justice censured Italy 
with infringement proceedings for non-compliance with the Directive. Eurofound 
states: 
 “The reason for this delay was not just the usual slowness with 
which Italy transposes EU norms. The Italian State justified the 
tardiness of the directive’s transposition on the ground that it was 
necessary to respect bilateral dialogue between the social partners, 
as well as their autonomy from the political sphere. The Directive 
affects crucial components of the Italian industrial relations system, 
profoundly innovating that part of collective bargaining which 
regulates information and (at times) consultation rights – that is to 
say, trade-union relations and rights,” (Muratore 2009, 3) 
 
By contrast, an interviewee who was formerly an employee with the Italian 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Ministero del Lavoro e Politiche sociali con 
delega alle Pari opportunità) expressed a more dismissive opinion: “It [the decree] 
was late because it was late…there is no appropriate reason…they are comfortable 
with the infringement from the EU,” (Interview I5). 
 The main Italian social partners played a central role in transposing DICE 
into national legislation through autonomous, bipartite collective bargaining, 
resulting in a signed common opinion given to the government on the transposition 
of the Directive. The signatories comprised Confindustria and all related 
employers’ associations, CGIL, CSIL, and UIL. The resulting legislative decree 
was almost exactly in line with the social partners’ common opinion, including 
only specifications on the administrative sanctions applicable to those breaching 




bipartite procedure, all main social partners expressed positive opinions of the 
decree (and of the EU Directive that initiated the decree), perceiving it as an 
important step to improving communication between management and labour and, 
from the trade union perspective, helping to ameliorate the effects of the market. 
Confindustria expressed some criticism of the government’s addition of 
administrative sanctions (to be implemented as fines), arguing that such penalties 
could discourage employers from properly initiating discussion with worker 
representatives on the new rights arising from the decree. All trade unions 
applauded the provisions of the decree, stating their general approval of legislation 
for worker rights. CISL and UIL both stated that the exercise of such rights could 
help foster a climate of participation in industrial relations, rather than one of 
antagonism (Muratore 2009, 4; Interview I1). 
 Trade unions were especially satisfied by the introduction of prior 
workforce consultation on corporate decisions within the decree’s general body on 
worker information rights. Previous to the implementation of the EU Directive, 
existing mechanisms for worker information and employee representatives in Italy 
were designed to funnel information in a one-way direction from employers to 
employees, without any mandates for collabouration. The definition of 
“consultation” as stipulated by the EU Directive25 necessarily included a more 
thorough, two-way manner of communication between labour and management: 







non-conflictual and socially shared manner, problems that are otherwise difficult to 
manage by the firm alone…[the rights are] therefore important, not only to prevent 
and resolve critical issues, but also to safeguard industrial relations against a 
management style exclusively founded on power relations and conflict.” (Muratore 
2009, 4) CSIL and UIL emphasized the room for involvement of workers’ 
representatives in the decisions of firms, stressing the language of “co-decision” 
and “co-determination” (Ibid). In this manner, the distinction that employers in 
Ireland placed on informing employees from consulting employees – in that 
employers emphasized the need for employers to be the ones making the decisions 
concerning restructuring, redundancies, transfers, and corporate crises – was not 
visible in Italy, despite the fact that the decree introduced the legal concept of 
consultation for the first time (Ibid, 5). 
 The Italian experience with the transposition of the EU Directive also 
differed from the Irish experience in that there was no discussion of a “trigger 
mechanism”, as Irish employers had successfully lobbied for. The Italian decree 
legislates that employers are required by law to establish information and 
consultation bodies, guaranteeing the right for workers regardless of employee 
‘trigger’ or interest, and providing for administrative sanctions in the absence or 
violation of that right. While the lack of debate over the process of transposition 
may speak in part to the way in which the decree was composed in Italy – in that 
the bipartite autonomous process of crafting a common opinion encouraged 




conditions underpinning each country are significantly different. Whereas Ireland 
depends on a great deal on U.S. multinational companies and foreign direct 
investment, Italian industry is characterized more by small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, many of which are family-owned and operated.26 As such, the 
implications for worker information and consultation are significantly different 
between the two economies. For Ireland, the introduction of law proscribing 
specific workers rights for industries and businesses, many of which are large and 
foreign-owned, has greater potential impact on the ability of those businesses to 
move their operations elsewhere, where worker protections are less. Free capital 
and its ability to move from country to country poses a greater threat to local 
actors, in terms of job creation and investment opportunities (as evidenced by the 
heavy lobbying on the part of the American Chamber of Commerce in Ireland). For 
Italy, the economic investments and the political culture of small, locally-owned 
businesses would presumably find less threat in accommodating an additional layer 
of regulations for employers – employers who have next to no mobility to move 
industry to avoid such regulations, and who have ‘grown up’ in the Italian 
industrial relations culture. 
 A final notable component of the Italian experience in transposing the EU 
Directive is that while information and consultation rights are assigned by Italian 









for employers which voluntarily apply a collective agreement of any level. The 
consequence of this is that there are no information and consultation bodies in 
undertakings that are not covered by collective bargaining. As well, “in the 
undertakings covered by collective bargaining, the implementation of the Directive 
has added very rarely any substantial rights other than those already obtained by 
trade unions themselves through collective agreements,” (Pallini 2011, 1). Only 
employers who apply a collective agreement of any level are obliged to establish an 
information and consultation body, if the union representatives at plant level 
(RSUs) require it; put another way, an undertaking that is not covered by a 
collective agreement is not obliged by law to establish an information and 
consultation mechanism. According to the Italian National Statistics Institute 
(Istituto nazionale di statistica, Istat), collective agreements covered practically all 
of the public sector and almost 90% of private employees in 2010, for a total of 
around 13 million workers (Pedersini and Coletto 2011). This statistic indicates that 
there are still gaps (albeit relatively small ones) in the provision of information and 
consultation rights to Italian workers, a fact that could perhaps trigger a complaint 
in the European Court of Justice for legislation that contradicts the intention of 
DICE (Interview I5). Just as importantly, the limitation of information and 
consultation rights to those employers who are covered by a collective agreement 
also indicates the strength of trade unions in resisting independent plant-level 
worker representation. The prior existence of RSUs made transposing the EU 




employees already at undertaking level. It also meant that trade unions did not have 
to argue with employers as strenuously over what facet of representation would be 
provided to employees, as was the case in Ireland. All of these points are worth 
noting given the often political and adversarial nature of Italian industrial relations 
To date, the visible impact of implementing DICE in Italy is low, which 
Confindustria and CSIL each attribute to a short span of time since transposition by 
which to measure the effects of the Directive. However, some sectoral renewals of 
collective bargaining agreements (such as metalwork) have included claims for 
information and consultation rights regarding decisions concerning employment 
and organizational change (Interviews I1 and I3; Eurofound 2009, 29). As well, the 
transposition itself of the Directive utilized a qualitative shift towards more 
autonomous action by the social partners in Italy: “this was a good example of how 
the bipartite way can go well…encouraging…” (Interview I1). According to trade 
union interviewees, the agreements implemented by Council Directives are the 
most efficient and have the biggest impact because they directly influence 
legislation and as a result must be abided by, as opposed to framework agreements 
which are sometimes limited in application (Interview I2). For this particular 
Directive, European legislation has had a positive effect by introducing more 
regulations that went beyond the statutory RSU bodies in Italian workplaces. 
Despite the relative ease of transposing and implementing EU Directive 
2002/14/EC, all social partner interviewees acknowledged a “pressure” toward 




“logical” part of business regardless of EU legislation, and dismissed by trade 
unions as pressure resulting from the lobbying efforts of employers to have more 
control over collective bargaining (Interviews I1 and I3). 
 
Analysis and argument 
 The development of the EU Directive 2002/14/EC has the potential to 
significantly improve the quality of workplace relations in EU Member States. The 
content of the Directive introduces a solid basis for the long-term development of 
collabourative industrial relations within Member States and across the EU as a 
whole on a broader framework that is not simply on an ad-hoc basis: “[the 
legislation shifts] away from reactive responses to difficulties such as redundancies, 
towards more positive, forward-looking, approach to cooperation between 
employers and employees inside businesses,” (European Parliament 2008, 16). The 
Directive is crafted in appropriately general terms to account for the different 
institutional cultures across Member States, and allows Member States – and 
employer and employee representatives – considerable flexibility regarding the 
practical arrangements for implementing its provisions. There is scope for national 
implementing provisions to tailor the Directive’s stipulations on a number of 
important issues to reflect national practice. Member States are allowed to enable 
the social partners to negotiate information and consultation arrangements that 




 Research expert perspectives on DICE, coming from a 2006 European 
Seminar on labour law and employee representation in the workplace found that the 
Directive created a universal right to information and consultation in the workplace 
for companies above a minimum size, but the issues to be included are not defined 
very precisely. As well, the Seminar concluded that the Directive created some 
potential uncertainty for existing trade unions-based systems of representation since 
other forms of worker representation are possible under the legislation, and that 
linked to this is the issue of who is granted collective bargaining rights at the 
workplace – the trade unions or worker representatives in some other form – given 
“the move towards more decentralized forms of bargaining in Europe,” (Ibid, 18; 
Van Gyes 2006).  
 The impact of the Directive has to be understood in the context of each 
Member State’s industrial relations system. National systems vary a great deal 
across the EU in general, and between Ireland and Italy more particularly. These 
variations are visible with institutional structures, the powers and politicization of 
social partners, the importance of collective agreements, the extent to which 
national systems already addressed issues of workplace information and 
consultation prior to the arrival of EU legislation, and the legal systems of each 
country (to include the general culture of respect for the law in general, and the 
more specific presence or absence of appropriate mechanisms at national level, 
such as labour courts or arbitration systems) (European Parliament 2008, 56). This 




greater impact given that it created a regulation for worker information and 
consultation for the first time, as well as creating recourse to the Irish Labour Court 
should these rights be breached. The adoption of the “trigger mechanism” reflects 
the voluntarist legacy of Irish industrial relations in implementing the Directive 
while at the same time the Irish government’s consultation of the social partners 
after first draft of the legislation reflects the evolution of social partnership in 
Ireland. The opinions expressed by Irish social partners offer a picture of an 
industrial relations system that is heavily shaped by foreign investment and 
multinational capital flows. In Italy, the combination of the prior existence of 
RSUs, the overarching economic context of a country with many SMEs (indicating 
that numerous firms and undertakings are too small to meet the threshold of 
needing to obey the regulations of the EU Directive), and the manner of 
transposing the Directive by autonomous bipartite social dialogue made for a 
comparatively smooth – if delayed – transposition and implementation of the 
Directive. 
 Some issues are, however, shared between the countries. While trade unions 
in general welcomed the Directive as an opportunity to strengthen the rights of 
workers, there was concern that existing union systems of representation could be 
undermined by the possibility of opting for direct representation in both Ireland and 
Italy. In both places, there was a further concern that this could lead to a 
fragmentation or decentralization of collective bargaining rights to the company 




the part of employer associations in each country. For both IBEC and 
Confindustria, the room to utilize direct worker representation instead of union 
bodies or union lists offered the enticing possibility of agreeably raising the bar on 
legislated worker rights without having to burden businesses with trade union 
obligations (if there were previously none). As well, although employers in general 
tend to minimize any changes required to worker rights and protections in domestic 
legislation (as stated by BE), the potential to use the implementation of the 
Directive as a way of further decentralizing collective bargaining away from the 
national level would benefit industry as it would offer increased flexibility in 
adjusting to market conditions. 
 In this sense, social policy in the EU to do with rights and regulations of 
workers and employers is indeed a way of creating a minimum floor of protections 
for workers, but is done with an eye to protecting the economy as whole rather than 
the specific employment opportunities for specific workers. This speaks to the 
larger context of changes in overall labour market policies in the direction of 
“flexicurity”, where the emphasis shifts from protecting specific jobs to protecting 
long-term employment prospects and income through wider support and retraining 
(European Parliamen 2008, v). Just as relevant, social policy in the EU to do with 
industrial relations places an emphasis on social dialogue and related mechanisms 
to garner consensus and avoid industrial conflict. The goal of DICE is indicative of 
this trend; furthermore, the emphasis on consulting social partners in the 




Parliament) contributes to the institutionalization of social dialogue as a legitimate 
instrument of policy-making. This institutionalization has the paradoxical potential 
to reinforce or invigorate the role of national peak-level unions and associations, 
while at the same time enhance or create a role for bargaining and negotiation at 
company levels. In effect, the Directive offers an empirical example of the EU’s 
emphasis on ‘consultation’ being the social complement to various forms of neo-





CHAPTER 6: Argument and Analysis 
Introduction 
 This chapter analyzes the data from the previous two empirical chapters 
(Chapters 4 and 5) in order to argue that: 1) the effects of Europeanization are 
visible in the realm of industrial relations in both Ireland and Italy, and; 2) these 
effects are part of a larger trend of adapting free-market capitalism to a distinct EU 
model. First, the chief points of ‘convergence’ in the Irish and Italian systems of 
industrial relations are the general decentralization of representation away from 
national-level peak federations and the reduction of power of trade unions relative 
to that of employer’s organizations. Both of these trends are a response to 
deepening single market integration and to the recent global financial crisis. 
Second, the area of industrial relations offers a significant example of how the EU 
as a whole is conditioning its neo-liberal integration project with a distinct, and 
somewhat paradoxical, trajectory of enhancing flexibility through regulatory 
structures. This is found through analyzing the type and quality of social policies 
that accompany the pressures on businesses to be ready to quickly adapt and 
respond to increased exposure to the EU and a the global market as a whole. 
 The chapter proceeds in four parts. First, the chapter summarizes the 
findings from Chapters 4 and 5 to compare areas of significance and divergence 
across the two case studies. Second, using Caporaso’s (2008) model of 
Europeanization’s influence and interaction, this chapter argues that the 




the supranational level on Member States. Third, this chapter posits that the 
evidence to date points to a ‘hybrid’ of liberalization with social protections as a 
large-scale attempt to respond competitively to the pressures of globalization with a 
distinctly formal approach of creating new labour laws and strengthening the role 
of key organized interests. This ‘hybridization’ is interesting because it doesn’t 
simply demonstrate a compromise between the Anglo emphasis on deregulation 
and other contrasting models from the postwar-Western-European variety (“social 
capitalism”, “protected capitalism” – see Chapter 2); instead, this hybrid offers a 
unique approach of ‘regulating deregulation’, in that the central (neo-liberal) goal 
of taking advantage of the opportunities in the single market in order to gain 
competitive advantage on international markets is sought after by using social 
policies to encourage businesses to be as adaptive and competitive as possible. This 
is distinct from other large industrialized democracies outside of the EU that 
generally adopt similar social policies as a way to attend to the effects of businesses 
trying to be competitive, rather than using such policies and labour law as a way of 
increasing competitiveness. Finally, the last section of this chapter summarizes the 
points made in the first three sections to respond specifically to the hypotheses laid 
out in the first and third chapter of this dissertation, and as such to purposefully 
answer all parts of this dissertation’s research questions. These hypotheses are: (1) 
how European-level trade unions and employers’ organizations as new political 
actors have influenced domestic interest configurations; (2) how negotiation at the 




relations systems; and (3) if and how pressure from the European integration 
project modifies the institutional legacies of domestic IR systems. 
 
Empirical Findings 
 Taken together, the empirical findings in both chapters reveal a number of 
shared trends between Ireland and Italy, despite the very different institutional and 
economic circumstances. The first trend is that of the norm of social dialogue 
growing in importance, reinforced by the Commission and social partners at the EU 
level, and particularly as a means of responding to adverse economic 
circumstances. The mechanisms for social dialogue at the EU-level are celebrated 
(through publications issued by EU official agencies) as being a big 
accomplishment with regard to a more inclusive and representative civil society. 
This, in turn, is reflected in the way in which domestic interest groups and 
governments alike have applauded social partnership in Ireland – at least until 2009 
– as a means of generating economic progress through formally agreed wage 
moderation schemes. While the 2009 collapse of social partnership in Ireland over 
proposed wage cuts to public employees seemed to initially suggest a lack of 
institutionalization of social partnership in the face of crisis, the most recent Irish 
government elected in May 2011 has put together a “rebranding” of “social 
partnership” into “social dialogue” (EIRO 2011). Comments made by Prime 
Minister Enda Kenny (below) indicate that Irish industrial relations are heading 




proscribed formality – in response to the financial crisis. The comment below 
contextualizes the shift from partnership to dialogue as one that is less formal, more 
autonomous, and more consultative than binding:  
“Mr Kenny told the Dáil (parliament) in late March [2012] that his 
government: ‘values dialogue with the social partners, whether 
within the framework of a formal agreement or otherwise, and 
recognises the contribution that social dialogue can make to 
maximising common understanding across all sectors of society as 
we respond to the many challenges facing the country,’…Mr Kenny 
agreed that social partnership arrangements had been key to 
stabilising industrial relations in Ireland, but said they had extended 
into a range of areas ‘which was probably never intended in the 
beginning’. In that sense, he said, ‘a one size fitting everything 
approach did not work as effectively as it should have’.” (Ibid).   
 
Similarly, Italy has in the past two decades relied upon social ‘concertation’ 
– the method of shaping public policy in which the government and social partners 
together determine fundamental economic and social goals and where the 
government then delegates a portion of its authority and accountability to the social 
partners for their implementation – during times of key socio-economic challenges, 
to include the tumultuous build-up to EMU entry in the late 1990s as well as the 
present-day economic crisis. Concertation (and the Irish corollary of ‘partnership’) 
is based on the concept of policy coordination and control and the involvement of 
public authorities, and is therefore distinct from the concept of social ‘dialogue’, 
which relies on more autonomous dialogue and decision-making by consensus 
between unions and employers (EU Commission 2011b). Italy’s use of concertation 
has been in the form of tripartite pacts targeted toward combining social policies 




improved training, etc.), but such pacts have been inconsistently utilized over the 
past 20 years. 
While the politicization of Italian trade unions has frequently led to rifts 
between the more moderate CSIL and UIL and the less moderate CGIL, the 
relatively weak role of government (relative to that of Italian organized interests) 
has still allowed social partners to fulfill a very active role in shaping the direction 
of policy Ibid). Many areas of employment law and reform have been left to the 
social partners to negotiate autonomously, such as with the 2002 Directive on the 
Information and Consultation of Employees. With the recent financial crisis still 
unfolding in Italy, accompanied by the sudden replacement of Prime Minister 
Silvio Berlusconi with the technocrat Mario Monti in late 2011, concertation is 
continuing through government direction of labour reform. An important 
difference, however, between prior Italian examples of concertation and the current 
Monti ‘crisis’ administration is that discussion on the 2012 reform is beginning 
with government delegating specific topic for the social partners to negotiate in a 
more autonomous manner, thereby initiating debate in a manner more akin to EU 
style social dialogue than tripartite concertation. The Monti administration has to 
date spent several months  negotiating with employers, unions and political parties 
over a package of proposed labour reforms that include measures to make it easier 
for companies to fire employees. While CGIL has voiced strong opposition to the 
content of the reforms, arguing that the measures would lead to an “avalanche of 




from all parties, but has been closely watched by EU officials. In a statement from 
Brussels, Laszlo Andor, the European Commissioner responsible for employment, 
social affairs and inclusion, said it was a positive thing that the Italian government 
has "invested much time" in the dialogue with the trade unions over labour reform, 
"otherwise it would not be good practice." Andor added, "it is too early to pass 
judgment [on the contents of reform]…The general direction is worthy of support," 
(Agenzia Giornalistica Italia, 21 March 2012).  
Taken together, the experience of each country suggests that the recent debt 
crisis has opened up a window of opportunity for change in the style and method of 
industrial relations. The pressure exerted by the EU on Ireland and Italy – both 
members of the Euro-zone – to contain their respective debts, have encouraged the 
new government administrations in each country to shift to a style of policy-
making that adopts the formality and consultative aspects of EU social dialogue 
and loosens the obligation to bind legislation to the opinions of the social partners. 
If debt crisis era responses can be seen as a test of the strength of social partnership 
(Ireland) or social concertation (Italy), then each country is responding to the test 
by moving away from previous incarnations of bargaining toward a more EU-
friendly model of social dialogue. 
A second shared trend between the two countries is that of gradual 
decentralization of collective bargaining away from national and/or sectoral levels 
to the company or plant level. This trend, according to all interview and academic 




than with the interests of workers and unions. While employers argue that 
collective bargaining and negotiation in general ought to be dealt with at a localized 
level that serves the contextual needs of the company or industry in question, 
unions argue that maintaining collective bargaining at the national or sectoral 
interests is necessary in order for employees to have the bargaining strength to 
demand fair working conditions without fear of direct employer retribution. 
This argument was contained in the Irish implementation of DICE, where 
IBEC lobbied for worker consultation representatives to be able to come from the 
company level, thereby removing the necessity for union representation at plant-
level. As well, the very recent debates over how social pacts ought to move forward 
in Ireland following the 2009 collapse of social partnership have included 
government statements on the decreasing value of national pacts concerning wages 
and inflation: “[Minister for Foreign Affairs Eamon Gilmore said that] while social 
partnership was a very formal structure dealing with pay and wider economic 
issues, the new discussions would deal with industrial relations and allow for the 
various social partners to put forward their own ideas on improving the economic 
situation... The Tánaiste said that while a return to social partnership structures of 
the past was unlikely, there were ‘real benefits for a country like Ireland from 
effective social dialogue in terms of greater certainty for investors, maintaining 
industrial peace and strengthening social solidarity’,” (Irish Times, 6 October 2011, 
italics mine). Government statements on the reinvigoration of social partnership 




recreating a formal system of national-level wage negotiation, preferring instead to 
“jointly respond to common problems” on an ad-hoc basis (Ibid). The central 
implication of reinstating dialogue between social partners without the formal 
framework of social partnership is that unions would lose a certain degree of 
bargaining power without the national-level rules of social partnership to protect 
their bargaining rights. In support of this implication, an ETUI report on collective 
bargaining in EU Member States holds that the company level has become the new 
key level for collective bargaining following the collapse of social partnership 
(ETUI 2011). Given the pressures of the financial crisis and the need to attract 
foreign direct investment, it is reasonable to assume that Irish social dialogue in the 
near future will maintain the course of decentralization and avoid a return to 
national pacts for the collective bargaining of wages. 
All of which raises an important question: why does labour continue to 
participate? The “business unionism” explanation has a few variants (see third 
trend, below). One argues that since socialism as an ideology has fallen 
increasingly out of favour with the end of the Cold War, the underlying philosophy 
supporting the creation of worker unions has changed from a platform for worker 
protection in the face of exploitation by management to a more pragmatic platform 
for a channel of worker communication with employers. Another variant argues 
that unions themselves have begun to run themselves like businesses, with less 
internal democracy and more authoritative structures, and as such have become 




represent (Frege and Kelly 2004). Both arguments are helpful for understanding 
what is likely the case for the EU and many of its Member States – labour 
continues to participate in the EU’s legal conception of social dialogue, 
autonomous bipartite negotiation, and the overall context of the Single Market 
simply because it is a way of staying in the game and maintaining a presence. This 
trend is not exclusive to European labour, either at the domestic or supranational 
level; the heightened pace and intensity of economic globalization and capital flows 
have placed similar pressures on labour groups and organizations around the world 
(Ibid). Simplistically speaking, present-day market forces – either globally or 
within the EU – constrain labour’s choices to adopting an extreme (and likely 
marginalized) stance, dropping out of negotiations entirely, or gradually 
recontextualizing and reshaping the position of labour interests to work with the 
forces of economic integration rather than against it. At least for the specific cases 
given in this dissertation, the last choice appears to be that of major domestic trade 
union confederations. 
In Italy, a central example of the trend of decentralized industrial relations 
comes from Fiat. In 2010, the automotive giant began allowing its Italian plants to 
not join employer associations and instead negotiate agreements on working 
conditions at plant-level rather than at the sectoral level: 
“The move to abandon the traditional framework of employer 
associations and industry-wide bargaining was seen by many 
commentators as a potential disruption in the Italian bargaining 
system. Should the example of Fiat be followed by a significant 
share of Italian firms, the present two-tier bargaining system would 




associations would certainly need to be redefined. Moreover, the 
division among trade unions revitalised the debate on how to 
measure representativeness, and whether legal extension measures 
should be introduced, with a view to avoid disputes around the 
applicability of certain contracts. Some regulatory initiatives, 
especially in the field of representativeness, may be expected in the 
near future. However, despite the importance of the debate and the 
interest shown in the Fiat case within the business community, there 
have not yet been any significant repercussions, or attempts at 
imitation.” (Eurofound 2011d) 
 
As of November 2011, Fiat continued the course of defining its own autonomous 
track and announced its unilateral withdrawal from all existing collective 
agreements (EIRO 2012). According to The Economist, this decision was explicitly 
undertaken so that Fiat could negotiate directly with workers at factory level. 
Italian laws governing collective bargaining at sectoral level have, according to 
Fiat, inhibited decisions regarding productivity and flexibility, and have also 
contributed to Fiat being 15-20% less efficient than its competitors elsewhere in 
Europe (The Economist, 5 November 2011). In doing so, Fiat has renounced 
industry-wide, national labour standards, and has instigated an important challenge 
to the Italian norm of industrial relations taking place most frequently at the 
national or sectoral levels (Ibid). While it remains to be seen whether the Fiat 
exemption remains an anomaly in Italian industrial relations or whether other 
Italian firms opt for a similar route in the near future, the example of Fiat is 
significant because of the size and stature of the company and because of 
statements made by Fiat explicitly linking decentralized bargaining to 




A third trend is that the unions in each country display either passivity 
(Ireland) or incoherence (Italy) in cultivating a labour-oriented response to business 
interests. In Ireland, ICTU’s expanding membership – to include smaller, regional 
union bodies – has helped interject more divergent interests into the national-level 
union federation. As well, the reliance of the Irish economy on foreign investment 
and U.S. multinational companies was a big factor in shaping the context of social 
partnership between 1987-2009. Agreements at the national level during this time 
were heavily shaped by the overarching goal of productivity, and this goal 
influenced the compromises made by trade unions: “social partnership has helped 
to restructure the labour movement so that ‘business unionism’ has become the new 
dominant perspective of labour leadership. The boom has also strengthened the 
bargaining power of the rank and file and has laid the basis for new conflicts about 
the future direction of the labour movement,” (Allen 2000, p.7). In Italy, despite 
CGIL being the trade union federation with the largest membership, its objection to 
many proposed adjustment schemes (to do with either wages, pensions, or the 
ability for companies to fire employees) has not consistently resulted in a stalling or 
modification of concertative talks; rather, as evidenced with the breakdown of 
negotiation in 2002 and 2009, CGIL has instead been marginalized outside of the 
social partner framework, leaving CSIL and UIL to conclude negotiations on 
significant national-level pacts. In either country, the dual rising pressures of EU 
single market integration and globalization at large have shaped the context for 




ideological stance of unions – that of promoting the need for improvements in 
working conditions and increases in wages. 
Where the two countries diverge is in the amount of reliance upon the EU 
model for example and justification. Interestingly, on this point the evidence is 
somewhat counter-intuitive. Although Ireland’s economy is heavily dependent on 
outside investment, that investment comes in large part from outside the EU. The 
social partners within Ireland do not look toward Brussels or the EU-level for 
validation of procedural style or legislative substance for the Irish framework of 
social partnership as much as the Italian social partners do. Irish social partnership 
and the related national economic and/or recovery programs began very much as a 
localized phenomenon, in response to economic circumstances and as a way of 
avoiding repeats of large-scale industrial action. While the EU level mirrored the 
example of Irish social partnership in terms of timing, as the Commission deepened 
and institutionalized the roles of the social partners and of social dialogue in 
general from 1985 onwards, interviewees were quick to assert that Irish social 
partnership developed organically in response to local conditions. The EU level has 
had import by offering a parallel example of industrial relations that Irish social 
partners could use for reinforcement and validation. When asked about the 
influence of the EU level on Irish social partners, IBEC stated that Irish ministers 
often cite domestic social partner agreements as a big source of stability for the 
Irish economy, and that the “European project has fed well into this [validating 




stated that “No one is about to let politicians get away with ‘Europe is making me 
do this’ anymore,” and that the Commission “used to be workers’ friend, now it’s 
more on the employers’ side, but also offered that the influence of the EU is 
embedded in all areas and is very much a presence in the issues up for discussion 
and in the economic health of the country (Interview E1). 
In Italy, the fallout from the 1992 Mani Pulite corruption crises and the 
resulting reorganization of the Italian electoral system and political parties left 
Italian officials very much attuned to the need to undertake large-scale economic 
reforms in a direction that would maintain Italy’s role as an important economy 
within the EU.27 A straightforward differentiating economic factor between the two 
countries is that although Ireland is heavily reliant upon foreign investment, a great 
deal of that investment comes from outside of the EU. By contrast, Italy’s reliance 
upon Italian SMEs for production and exports28 makes the Italian economy much 
more entwined and dependent upon the European single market for revenue. This 
dependence, combined with the widespread norm of viewing the EU level as a 
modernizing and validating force (see Chapter 4, Italian sub-heading), has 
cultivated stronger ties – or at least a stronger perception of ties – between Italian 














UEAPME for Italian social partners on either side of labour and management. 
Given the higher than average reliance of the Italian economy on local SMEs, Italy 
has cultivated very strong representation in UEAPME, with an individual Italian 
SME presence in Brussels (Interview B7). Similarly to Italian employers 
representing public administrators using CEEP to boost the capacity of public 
employers in Italy, and to help argue for particular reforms needed nationally 
(Interview B6), SMEs have used Italian membership in UEAPME to reinforce the 
interests of small enterprises at home, and to validate arguments by referring to the 
EU-level (Interview B7).  
 
Model of Europeanization 
 In Caporaso’s (2008) model of Europeanization, the idea of 
Europeanization is endogenous to the evolution of integration theory; meaning, that 
the ‘big push’ which Europe needed and received from the member states to begin 
the initial process of integration has given way to self-sustained growth. This 
growth is what creates the basic concept of the EU being able to exert influence in 
varying ways on the member states it comprises. Technically, Caporaso’s model 
below – derived from Rissse et al (2001, 6-12) – is close-looped, since the domestic 
outcomes feed back into the process of Europeanization, but for research purposes 








Figure 6.1: Europeanization and domestic change 
 











 For the purposes of this dissertation, the beginning of the model is the EU’s 
evolving governmental system in the area of industrial relations. As outlined in 
previous chapters, successive EC/EU treaties have assigned various competencies 
to the European social partners in areas relating to social policies, and these 
competencies have helped elevate the decision-making power of the European 
social partners and their autonomy from the Commission in negotiating with each 
other. This form of European integration manifests itself in the polity of social 
dialogue, which contextualizes how actors interact and what boundaries they assign 
to their interactions; this speaks to the “goodness of fit” in the second part of the 
model. The ‘style’ of EU social dialogue – where European social partners have the 
right to be consulted by the Commission as a result of their representativeness; 
where both bipartite and tripartite dialogue is used; and where social partners have 
the ability to either reach autonomous agreements which they implement 
themselves or to transform joint actions into legislation – embodies a particular 




certain degree of technicality. This ‘technicality’ could also be contextualized as 
technocracy, or a more functional and less political approach to negotiation, in that 
the formality surrounding the process of EU social dialogue and the emphasis on 
bipartite autonomy serves to separate political actors from interest groups. The 
European model is also notable for the financial support given to social dialogue 
initiatives, in particular the key area of capacity-building for social partners 
organizations. 
 The degree of fit between the European model of social dialogue and the 
respective Irish and Italian models differs a fair amount. In the Irish case, social 
partnership was firmly tripartite in nature with regular contact between government 
departments and representative social partners. As well, social partnership 
agreements went beyond single-issue social policies relevant to employment and 
dealt with long-term strategic national economic plans that covered wages, 
industrial action, housing, transport, education, and varying other services. The 
partnership agreements (seven in total between 1987 and 2009) bound all actors to 
the negotiations agreed upon for a specific length of time. The ultimate goal driving 
each partnership agreement had been the overall economic and social health of the 
country – with productivity in the workforce comprising an explicit part of this 
goal. While the fit between the Irish system and the EU system is visible in the 
formality of dialogue and the framework of developing advance consensus on 
action, the ‘misfit’ is visible in the degree of involvement of the Irish government 




deliberation did take place with regard to specific areas within each national social 
pact, the style of social dialogue remained firmly tripartite. The content of each 
social pact dealt with a range of issues relevant to the Irish economy and working 
conditions and grouped these issues together in successive pacts – the product of 
which resulted in larger binding frameworks for negotiation rather than the issue-
by-issue dialogue utilized at the European level. 
 In Italy, there is arguably more misfit than fit visible in comparing the 
Italian case with European social dialogue. Italy is technically more of a voluntarist 
system, in that legal institutions governing the conduct of industrial relations are 
few – similarly to Ireland, this is a notable difference with the treaty-based 
procedure of the EU. However, the central tripartite agreement of 1993 was an 
important event in creating a systematic framework for collective bargaining and 
workplace representation. The timing of this agreement came right after the Mani 
Pulite corruption scandal and the signing of the EU Maastricht Treaty (where the 
EMU convergence criteria was agreed upon); the significance of this timing is that 
the weak, technocratic government at the time needed the support of employers and 
unions in order to legitimate reforms in the midst of political crisis (Ebbinghaus 
and Hassel 1999, 20). As in Ireland, this agreement sought to systematize 
bargaining procedures in general and incomes policy more specifically; but unlike 
Irish social partnership, the Italian 1993 agreement did not introduce tripartism as 
an institutionalized feature of industrial relations. Instead, Italy has frequently used 




of income policy, welfare, pensions, and labour market reform, but tripartism has 
remained an ad-hoc solution and has declined in use during the 2000s. The use of 
formalized concertation mechanisms has varied according to government 
administrations throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and the break in the trade union 
front with CGIL refusing to sign national pacts in 2002 and 2009 has contributed to 
less of a systematic framework of tripartite negotiation. In this sense, the central 
differences between Italy and the EU level are the comparative lack of formality 
with Italian industrial relations, and the higher degree of politicization and 
fragmentation among the social partners. 
 At the same time, Italian social partners have also been able to exercise a 
certain degree of autonomy in developing frameworks and joint actions for 
domestic labour-related issues and in implementing EU Directives to a greater 
degree than what Irish social partners have been able to do. In terms of social 
partners building up their own capacity to participate in social and economic 
agreements at various levels, autonomous action by the social partners is an 
important exercise; at the EU level, the Commission has called upon and 
encouraged EU social partners to develop autonomous work programmes and 
frameworks of joint action. At the Italian level, the lack of formal institutional 
structures outlining social concertation has not inhibited the autonomous 
capabilities of the social partners: “The social partners in Italy have always been 
sufficiently strong and self reliant enough to engage in bipartite social dialogue, 




pacts (or social dialogue) at the national level was only deemed necessary by the 
government – which always took the initiative – when the national political and 
economic situation was too critical to be dealt with by the government alone,” (EU 
Commission 2011b). 
 Consequently, the adaptational pressure owing to “misfit” in each country is 
visible in the following: for Ireland, the EU exhibits pressure on social partners to 
negotiate more in the direction of a regular bipartite framework; for Italy, the EU 
exhibits pressure on social partners to negotiate according to a more formal process 
and with more attention to consensus and avoiding industrial action. Arguably, this 
‘pressure’ from the EU level varies in intensity and in form according to economic 
circumstances, such as pressure to open privatize certain sectors in Member States 
or pressure to reduce deficit and debt loads in order to maintain EMU. Each 
country is notable for using national social pacts to attend to critical economic 
situations (such as high debt, high unemployment) and/or to cope with pressures 
arising from European integration (such as economic pressures arising from EMU 
or the need to implement European employment guidelines). During times of 
adverse economic circumstances, the potential for each country to take action to 
ease the pressures of ‘misfit’ is greater, as a direct means of coping with 
competition in the Single Market. The recent economic crises provide examples of 
this: Irish government statements on needing to reinvigorate negotiation in a looser 




government efforts to enact large-scale labour market reforms in consensus with 
the major social partners. 
 Substantively, other important areas of fit/misfit are in the amount of 
complementarity between the notion of worker information and consultation, and in 
the degree of decentralization for collective bargaining. The EU Directive on the 
Information and Consultation of Workers was significantly more work for Ireland 
to transpose and implement than it was for Italy. Ireland had no prior mandates for 
either worker information or consultation, whereas Italy had existing provisions for 
worker information to some degree in RSU bodies. In both countries, however, a 
visible amount of institutional and cultural maneuvering was undertaken in order to 
create or adjust the mechanisms for worker information and consultation bodies 
enough to fit with the stipulations of the EU Directive.  
In terms of what level collective bargaining takes place at in each country, 
the adaptational pressure exerted here arises from the consequences of the Single 
Market rather than from direct official EU provisos. During the build-up to EMU, 
and in the immediate aftermath of adopting the shared currency, economic 
integration created new pressures to improve competitiveness that produced the 
somewhat paradoxical development of a renationalization of collective bargaining. 
This was seen through the rising use of national social pacts in Ireland and Italy and 
elsewhere in the EU (see Chapter 2) – pacts which included commitments for 
collective bargaining to follow a policy of wage restraint on the grounds of 




particular the recent years of the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis, 
the use of national social pacts has given way to rising employer preference for 
coordination at the enterprise level. The preference itself is nothing new, but the 
ability of employers to be able to translate this preference into greater probability of 
action has increased: 
“Employer preference for coordination at the enterprise level might 
be seen as part of wider employer pressure towards more 
decentralized bargaining arrangements. Increasingly, management 
has been looking to develop organization-based employment 
systems, in which remuneration, working hours and working and 
employment practices are determined according to the business and 
production requirements of the organization…Employer preference 
for avoiding any sector-level coordination of the bargaining agenda 
and outcomes might stem from a desire on the part of MNCs to be 
able to continue to secure the advantage that mobility of capital 
across the EEA provides in terms of ‘regime shopping’.” (EIRO 
1999, p.17) 
 
The example of Fiat in Italy is one important instance of the 
decentralization of collective bargaining to enterprise / plant level as a response to 
international competitiveness. As well, the discussions surrounding the 
implementation of DICE in Ireland relate in that the potential consequences of 
allowing for company-level representation of worker information and consultation 
systems are such that mechanisms of collective bargaining would rely less and less 
on existing trade union structures at the sectoral and cross-sectoral levels. 
The third part of Caporaso’s model identifies institutional mediating factors 
at the domestic level: “Domestic cultural factors that are cooperative vs those that 
are oppositional would, almost by definition, have a facilitating (obstructive) 




informal institutions; for industrial relations, this is a question of whether domestic 
institutions, political culture, and interest groups are poised to take advantage of the 
change in Brussels or not. In terms of the style and content of EU social dialogue – 
admittedly, a very broad and loose source of pressure that exists as example more 
than direct criteria – Italian mediating factors are slightly more facilitating than 
those of Ireland. This is visible in the general bipartite framework of Italian social 
concertation, the perception of the EU level as a modernizing and legitimizing 
force, and in the explicit willingness of the Italian social partners to utilize the EU 
level as a force to boost their own capacity (as evidenced by some of the 
interviewee statements). The Irish case is not exactly a contrasting example of 
obstructive mediating factors, but in comparison to Italy the factors  are relatively 
less facilitating. The (prior) institutional element of social partnership relied on 
tripartite rather than bipartite negotiation (a notable factor that could arguably 
inhibit the capacity of the Irish social partners); Ireland is generally well-regarding 
of the EU level (as evidenced by prior Eurobarometer polls) but is less reliant on 
the single market for foreign direct investment than Italy is, due to Irish 
dependence on American MNCs; and interest groups did not rely on the EU level 
or the EU social partners as a referent to the extent that the Italian interviewees did. 
In terms of DICE, Italy was in a position of definitely lower adaptational 
pressure than was Ireland. Institutionally, Italy already had mechanisms in place for 
worker information (if not consultation) with RSU bodies across different sectors – 




perception towards DICE on the part of all actors. As Ireland was without any prior 
institutional mechanisms for worker information and consultation, the 
implementation of DICE was again a situation of high adaptational pressure to ‘fit’ 
EU legislation. The political culture within the government appeared to be one of 
straightforward acceptance, accepting the need to transpose and implement DICE 
and indeed meeting this need well ahead of deadline. Interest group responses to 
DICE were split and as such brought into focus the major debates surrounding the 
directive. Unions welcomed the content of the legislation but protested the 
qualification of non-union actors being allowed to represent workers at plant level; 
employers did not welcome the directive, but immediately sought ways to adapt the 
directive so that worker protections would not inhibit the potential capacity for 
management to enact decisions geared toward the overall productivity of the 
enterprise. 
The second set of mediating factors is veto power, which can be exercised 
through the capacity to obstruct, slow down, and amend legislation as well as the 
power to simply reject legislation (Ibid, 31). A key example of veto power is with a 
coalition government, which can have more potential veto players than 
governments with a single dominant party. Another relevant example is the 
presence of multiple large (or at least powerful) union federations or employer 
associations, as in Italy. While numerous examples exist of Italian actors subverting 
or ignoring pressures from the European level (see Héritier 2001, p.45 on the 




permissive consensus on the value of “Europe” that has overcome the interests of 
powerful groups and political parties (see Sbragia 2001, p.80). The relative 
weakness of government administration against the strength of interest groups is 
subject to this consensus. As well, the fragmentation of interests into multiple (and 
sometimes conflicting) federations instead of into a single peak organization – 
specifically, that of CGIL frequently dissenting from the shared front of trade union 
opinion – has helped modify the balance of power that might otherwise have 
furthered a climate of trade union resistance to EU initiatives related to the single 
market. A very salient example is that of CGIL frequently dissenting from the 
shared front of trade union opinion during concertative efforts to create new 
economic social pacts. 
In Ireland, veto power is immediately visible with the examples of social 
partner efforts to amend the transposition of DICE. IBEC sought to reduce the 
power of unions to act as the sole representative bodies for worker information and 
consultation, and successfully lobbied for the ability for management to undertake 
certain decisions central to competitiveness without having to respect the 
provisions of DICE. This example also supports Caporaso’s contention that 
“mediating institutions are endogenous with respect to Europeanization”, as key 
institutions or actors can be “empowered to act by the very challenge that they were 
supposed to meet,” (Caporaso 2008, 32-33). IBEC’s lack of enthusiasm over the 
EU Directive was perhaps mediated by the overarching general direction of single 




observers, has helped shaped the evolution of social partnership in a generally more 
business-friendly direction. 
The last part of the model deals with the outcomes of Europeanizing forces, 
either through institutional adaptation or larger-scale domestic structural change. 
Outcomes should be assessed according to the domestic context: “Outcomes are not 
expected to be identical, except in the improbable case where adaptive pressures 
and mediating institutions are identical. Convergence is neither theoretically 
predicted nor empirically likely. The process of Europeanization involved a 
continual arbitrage between national differences, different adaptational pressures, 
difference mediating institutions, and outcomes,” (Ibid, 31). Despite the above 
qualifier, however, the evidence in this dissertation provides an argument that some 
convergence in the industrial relations systems of Ireland and Italy is taking place 
as a result of Europeanizing forces stemming from EU social dialogue. This is 
visible in the similar strategies each country has used to respond to the external 
pressures (external to the domestic level) of EMU, financial crisis, DICE, and the 
increased institutionalization of social dialogue at the EU level. The build-up to 
EMU stimulated the use of national social pacts in each country to attend to the 
economic reforms necessary to enter the euro-zone; the recent financial crisis 
provoked the collapse of government and ushered in a change of administration in 
each country; DICE introduced the concept and institutionalization of consultation 
of workers – a novel idea for the treatment of workers in each country; and as a 




seeking to implement large-scale labour market reforms that utilize a method of 
negotiation markedly closer to the model of EU social dialogue than what was 
previously used in each country. This is evidenced by Irish governmental 
statements on the need to “re-brand” social partnership into a less restrictive form 
of “social dialogue”, and by the current Italian technocratic administration’s efforts 
to delegate a certain portion of reform efforts to the social partners during the euro-
debt crisis. 
Notably, this is convergence in very broad form – the exact context of 
responses and detail of implementation still varies in detail according to domestic 
context. Taken together however, and with acknowledgement of the very different 
political and economic circumstances in each country, the responses undertaken in 
Italy and Ireland offer insight into what could collectively be termed as empirical 
evidence of some Europeanization of industrial relations systems. 
 
A ‘Hybridized’ Capitalism 
 That the EU seeks to become a stronger and more internationally 
competitive economic actor is not a new revelation; nor is it a new idea that most 
European countries in and out of the EU have more robust welfare states and strong 
social protections than other industrialized countries around the world. The manner 
in which EU policy seeks to reconcile these two characteristics, however, goes 




of more social protections from the state. In efforts to implement this 
reconciliation, a ‘hybrid’ form of capitalism is emerging at the supranational level. 
 The ‘hybrid’ comes from intertwining of some of the more neo-liberal 
elements underlying the logic of the single market (privatization, deregulation, 
competition) with a set of labour laws and regulations at the supranational level that 
attend to the rights of workers (the right to paid and unpaid leave, the right to 
worker consultation, the right to request more flexible working arrangements). The 
‘hybrid’ does not come from a combination of liberal capitalism and social welfare, 
as the term “social capitalism” has been often used to connote (see Chapter 2) – 
simply because it can’t. The European Union is not a state and is also not a 
conventional federative entity with a single executive holding some source of 
authority over its constitutive parts. This fact alone immediately limits the power of 
the EU institutions over its population; in particular, there is no supranational 
ability to tax. As such, the traditional political conception of creating a welfare state 
to manage social protections is not directly applicable to the EU Social Model. 
Consequently, the EU has developed “Social Europe” in the areas in which it does 
have authority – economic policies relating to competition and productivity, in 
particular those areas to do with employment. Social Europe is primarily found in 
legislation relating to labour laws and the protections available through 
employment. The ‘hybrid’ of capitalism that emerges with European integration is 





 The European Employment Strategy (EES – see Chapter 2) and the EU 
concept of “flexicurity” are both emblematic of this. The EES encourages Member 
States to align their labour market goals toward the objective of increasing 
employment for all citizens. This is at first an obvious point, but there are important 
differences between the objective of increasing employment and the employability 
of the workforce, and other objectives of either reducing unemployment or of 
creating more full-time employment opportunities. The first objective prioritizes 
increasing participation in the workforce, whether it be on a part-time, temporary, 
or contractual basis, and thus necessarily de-prioritizes other elements such as 
unemployment support or long-term job security. Similarly, “flexicurity” – the 
balance between flexibility and security for employees against labour market risks 
– emphasizes the security dimension through elements such as training 
opportunities for all and smooth transitions between different labour market 
situations (i.e., from school to work, from one job to another, from unemployment 
to work and from work to retirement) (Eurofound 2008b, 1), rather than the more 
traditional Western European welfare state notion of achieving security through 
restrictions on redundancies, high pensions, and thorough unemployment benefits. 
All taken together, the term “hybridization” captures a shift in the European social 
model away from social welfare and toward active labour market policies. 
 An important component of ‘hybrid capitalism’ is the flexibility and 
security of industrial relations. Numerous EU efforts and statements have 




approach highlights the “flexibility and security of labour relations within 
companies,” (Ibid, italics mine) – significant because of the identification of the 
company level as the place where effective social dialogue ought to take place. In 
line with the hybrid model of assigning the responsibility of security to the realm of 
employment instead of to the government, EU flexicurity policies implicitly and 
explicitly highlight the company level rather than the sectoral level or cross-
sectoral level as the appropriate place for productive industrial relations. In doing 
so, the supranational level fosters a climate of decentralized industrial relations that 
generally favours employer interests. According to the EU Commission, 
“adaptation requires a more flexible labour market combined with levels of security 
that address simultaneously the new needs of employers and employees. This 
entails a shift from job security to employment security for workers and the 
possibility for companies to adapt their workforce to changes in economic 
conditions. In the latter case, companies should be able to recruit staff with a better 
skills match, who will be more productive and adaptable leading to greater 
innovation and competitiveness,” (EU Commission 2007). 
 Achieving a more flexible labour market requires negotiation itself to be 
more adaptive to the current competitive climate. But whereas straightforward neo-
liberal logic might likely recommend a slow degradation of industrial relations 
systems altogether towards pure voluntarism, the EU prescribes by example a 
formal process of autonomous bipartite social dialogue that produces “soft law” 




of EU directives. Both of these mechanisms cultivate a trajectory of enhancing the 
flexibility of business through regulatory structures designed to generate advance 
consensus on economic policy and avoid industrial action. DICE is a prime 
example of this strategy; formal legislation requires businesses to create 
information and consultation bodies for workers in order to (ideally) allow 
management to increase its ability to respond to market forces more quickly. 
Simply put, the EU Social Model is slowly moving toward a new form of 
capitalism that uses social policies (in the form of labour laws) to help make 
business more competitive, rather than using social policies to attend to the 
negative effects of heightened competition. 
 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
The three questions posed at the outset of the dissertation were: (1) how 
European-level trade unions and employers’ organizations as new political actors 
have influenced domestic interest configurations; (2) how negotiation at the 
supranational level affects the strategies of central actors in domestic industrial 
relations systems; and (3) if and how pressure from the European integration 
project modifies the institutional legacies of domestic IR systems.  
In terms of configurations, European-level social partners as new political 
actors have not had any visible affect on the actual number, type, or compositions 
of social partners and major relevant interest groups in Ireland and Italy. The 




remained the same over time, and have not gone through any fundamental changes 
or internal alterations as a result of EU-level influence or access. One exception to 
this finding is the presence of UEAPME at the EU level. UEAPME offers an 
important source of information, assistance, and legitimacy for individual SMEs 
and for the existing domestic associations that represent SMEs. ISME in Ireland 
stressed that the specific role of SMEs in the European labour market needs to take 
higher priority in European discussions on recovery, growth and job creation, and 
that the inclusion of UEAPME in the constellation of employers organizations at 
the EU level has been one of the most important developments of EU social 
dialogue (ISME in Voss 2011, 18). In the aftermath of the financial crisis in 
Ireland, ISME states that SMEs have to double their efforts to become more visible 
and influence policy-makers, as small enterprises lack the resources of big 
businesses, and that the EU level is a critical area of opportunity for getting SME 
interests on the agenda in general (Ibid 18-22). As ISME is not accorded social 
partner status at national level in Ireland, UEAPME at the European level has 
become the primary recipient of ISME lobbying. In Italy, where SMEs comprise 
such a significant amount of the general workforce, UEAPME offers an important 
source of legitimacy and capacity-building for Italian employer associations 
representing SMEs. 
Negotiation at the supranational level affects the strategies of central actors 
in domestic industrial relations systems in two ways. First, the large trade union 




accommodate the overarching EU goal of competitiveness. This is generally visible 
in the acknowledgement that wage restraint is necessary for businesses to remain 
competitive within the EU and in the larger global economy and in the use of 
national social pacts to try to negotiate consensus on difficult labour market 
reforms. This is specifically visible in the evolving “business unionism” of ICTU in 
Ireland and in the pressure currently being put on Irish social partners to redefine 
their negotiation procedures outside of the realm of social partnership. This is also 
specifically visible in the actions of the Italian UIL and CSIL to conclude 
concertative talks on various labour market issues and reforms with employers and 
government even after the (very large) CGIL dissented from concluding the talks. 
The repeated fragmentation of union responses in Italy is, arguably, giving rise for 
employers to have more room to press their interests. Second, the strategies of the 
social partners in each domestic industrial relations system have slowly adapted 
toward negotiations centering on how to deal with collective bargaining at the level 
of enterprise. This is a development that has been ushered in through competitive 
pressures stemming from economic integration, and has been championed by 
employers associations and business interests. While trade unions ostensibly 
oppose the shift toward levels of bargaining that are decentralized from the national 
or sectoral levels, unions have concentrated on arguing for their involvement at 





Pressure from the European integration project has modified the 
institutional legacies of Irish and Italian industrial relations systems by the example 
of bipartite, autonomous social dialogue. This example is not one that has been 
wholeheartedly swallowed by each country, by any means. Instead, where this 
pressure is visible is in the response to the financial crises in each country. The 
pressure on all actors – government, social partners, interest groups, banks – to 
respond with substantive and coherent reform packages has led each country to 
break away from previous patterns of negotiation. This is much more visible in 
Ireland, where the celebrated framework of social partnership was abandoned in 
2009 and current discussions are focusing on what discussions between 
management and labour ought to look like in the future. In Italy, the current 
technocratic administration is attempting another round of tripartite concertation to 
enact large-scale labour market reforms. While this form of concertation is one that 
Italian governments have utilized in the past, with varying degrees of success, the 
central difference is that this set of reforms is in direct response to the European 
debt crisis and the style of negotiations is under close scrutiny by the European 
Commission.  
Another important institutional legacy that each country has internalized is 
the formalization of worker consultation. This legacy speaks to the hybridization of 
free-market capitalism with social policies visible in the conception of 
“flexicurity”. As businesses demand the ability to respond to market forces more 




instituted the policy of informing and consulting workers in efforts to soften the 
potential for insecurity that generally accompanies heightened flexibility. The 
implementation of worker consultation systems speaks to a re-shaping of security 
away from job security toward a more general employment security – meaning, that 
if workers are consulted on significant decisions ahead of time, workers have more 
time and opportunity to react, accommodate, or approve company policies. 
In answering the above research questions, the dissertation’s two research 
hypotheses are supported to varying degrees. The first hypothesis – that the 
development of EU-level, supranational interest confederations generate pressure 
over time in member states toward a form of social dialogue that is increasingly 
less political and binding than previous models – is supported through evidence on 
the Irish shift away from social partnership and toward social dialogue, and through 
the reliance of Italian social partners on the EU level for ideas, affirmation, and 
reinforcement of style and substance. The second hypothesis – that EU legislation 
related to worker-employer relations generates pressure over time on domestic 
systems of industrial relations to decentralize collective bargaining to the individual 
company level – is visible with the transposition and implementation of the EU 
Directive on the Information and Consultation of Workers. The content of DICE 
did not attend to decentralization explicitly, but its provisions at the very least have 




CHAPTER 7: Conclusion 
 The purpose of this dissertation was to analyze the impact of the EU on the 
industrial relations on two of its member states – Ireland and Italy. The broad 
purpose speaks to the potential effects of the EU’s sui generis, supranational 
governance on the domestic political and economic systems of the countries that 
comprise it; the specific purpose examines what effects EU social dialogue and EU 
legislation pertaining to labour and employment issues have had on Irish and Italian 
systems of bargaining and negotiation between management and labour.  
 The academic context for this dissertation is the area of ‘Europeanization’. 
Europeanization has largely been considered as a conceptual process that speaks to 
the complex effects of European integration on the behavior of EU member states. 
It considers the direct effects of EU regulations on domestic political systems as 
well as the indirect effects of the unintended consequences of such regulations. 
This dissertation utilizes the concept of Europeanization being a process of 
domestic adaptation in response to pressure from the European level, rather than 
any strict form of political integration – what Radaelli (2003) calls a change in the 
logic of behavior of EU member states. Using Caporaso’s (2008) model of the 
Europeanization process, the argument of this dissertation is that the pressures of 
European integration on member states are visible in the industrial relations 
systems of domestic economies. Specifically, the European-level social partners’ 
implementation of the EU model of “Social Dialogue” motivates a gradual shift 




The first research question driving the dissertation was asking how 
European-level social partners (ETUC and the major employers’ associations, 
specifically) have, as new political actors, influenced domestic interest 
configurations. Strictly speaking, the actual configurations of social partners in 
Ireland and Italy, respectively, have not noticeably changed, and have only been 
slightly altered as a result of EU-level policies or general pressures stemming from 
European integration. In the Irish case, the central social partners – ICTU 
representing workers and trade unions, and IBEC representing employers and 
employer associations – have remained the chief actors within Irish negotiations 
and collective bargaining. Local and sector-specific unions and employer 
associations have also remained organized in the same configurations consistently 
over time. One central change to the configuration of Irish domestic interests is that 
ICTU and IBEC each maintain a representative in Brussels that acts as an important 
point of communication and information transfer of EU activities. Another change 
is that many smaller, local Irish unions that were not affiliated with ICTU in the 
early 1990s have become ICTU affiliates in recent years, as the benefits of being 
involved in centralized negotiation became more tangible with regard to domestic 
economics and with regard to ICTU’s interaction with ETUC at the European level. 
In the Italian case, the central social partners have also remained the same – 
Confindustria as the main employers association, and CGIL, UIL and CISL 
remaining the chief federative trade union organizations – and there has been little 




within the Italian bargaining context. One change to the Italian situation is the 
repeated marginalization of CGIL, the largest and most politically left-leaning trade 
union federation of the three, out of discussions to do with important social and 
economic policies. Research based on news articles and interviewees with trade 
union representatives showed that this marginalization is largely self-selected by 
CGIL and is somewhat related to questions of power and authority between the 
unions themselves. However, it is also arguable that as the economic pressures of 
deepening European integration are felt throughout different social and political 
realms, CGIL’s resistance to the evolving “business unionism” practices (see 
Chapter 6) increasingly employed by the other two large union confederations – a 
resistance than derives from the central ideological underpinnings of why CGIL 
exists – is in part an overarching response to the economic pressures of the EU. The 
Single Market, EMU and the adoption of the euro, and the recent debt crisis have 
all shaped the topics of industrial relations toward employment, flexibility, and 
adaptation and away from protection, benefits, and security. These topics help 
create a climate that is difficult for CGIL to remain a full participant within. 
 The second research question driving this dissertation asked how 
negotiation at the supranational level affects the strategies of central actors in 
domestic industrial relations systems. The most visible shift in strategy as a result 
of European-level influence comes from the EU Social Partners’ emphasis on 
“flexicurity”, a term which reflects the overarching aim of the EU’s Single Market 




competitive while creating and/or maintaining a reasonable degree of security in 
employment opportunities and related social protections. The significance of 
flexicurity policies is that it reflects the limitations of what EU authority holds over 
the economies of Member States, thus shaping political discussions related to 
flexicurity around employment goals and targets rather than some of the more 
traditional areas of discussions between domestic social partners, such as around 
wages, pensions, or  job security. Put another way, as the EU is a regulatory 
supranational body that derives its authority from member states, and as such has 
limited or no direct jurisdiction in domestic matters of taxation and public 
spending, the realm of EU authority is concentrated in areas to do with labour laws 
and employment creation. Policy-making at the supranational level has 
consequently been directed at creating employment targets with the EES and 
related employment-generation strategies, and at establishing a floor of regulations 
amongst member states dealing with worker rights and protections. The 
significance of this focus is that the EU does not, because it cannot, involve itself in 
the more specific policy areas to do with collective bargaining, wage adjustment, 
taxation, and welfare state entitlements. The main EU Social Partners (ETUC, BE, 
CEEP and UEAPME) as a result have logically aimed their efforts at dialogue and 
negotiation dealing with the specific instruments that arise out of the EES and 
directives and framework agreements that target employment practices. 
Taken together, this form of negotiation affects the strategies of domestic 




the presence of EU social partners and the avenues of support they can potentially 
offer domestic social partners – to include access to information, analyses of 
competing alternatives, and platform guidelines on how to approach issues relating 
to industrial relations at European and domestic levels – directly impacts the tactics 
management and labour each respectively take in their efforts to negotiate on 
domestic social and economic policies. This is seen through domestic social 
partners using the language of EU social dialogue to create their own platforms or 
reinforce their existing stance, as evidenced with Italian SMEs relying on 
UEAPME to help bolster their own negotiation platforms in Italy. Using the 
resources of ETUC for domestic trade unions or BE, CEEP and UEAPME for 
domestic employers and business shapes and re-shapes the language of debate in 
member states to necessarily complement the resources being used. Over time, 
social partners in EU member states are likely to internalize the emphasis on 
employment goals over unemployment protections or on employment security over 
job security, for the sake of being able to continually rely on EU Social Dialogue 
and EU social partners as a source of tools and support.  
Second, negotiation at the supranational level indirectly affects the 
strategies of central actors in domestic industrial relations systems through the 
mechanism of EMU. This is visible with entry into EMU in the late 1990s and 
through the recent debt crisis, ongoing since 2009. The factors of monetary union, a 
shared currency and a single independent central bank contribute enormously 




through the limitation of policy instruments available to domestic actors and 
through the shared ideal of needing to uphold EMU. Entry into monetary union 
effectively cut off the tool of using inflation to adjust for budgetary issues, and as a 
result many EMU members began to use wages as a mechanism by which to 
compensate for other economic variables (Pérez 2002, Royo 2002). Both Ireland 
and Italy are on the whole (slightly more) enthusiastic EU members (as compared 
to the EU member state average; see the Eurobarometer levels in Chapter 4), and 
were so during the run-up to EMU in the mid- to late- 90s. The strategies of 
domestic social partners were thus readjusted to using collective bargaining as one 
important means of upholding (or at least attempting to) EMU convergence criteria. 
In Ireland wages were negotiated with respect to growth, rather than inflation. In 
Italy, social partners turned their attention to reductions in public spending in order 
to uphold Italian membership in EMU. The recent debt crisis highlights these 
processes, as Irish social partners and Italian social partners respectively focus their 
strategies on growth, competitiveness, and austerity by way of increased 
decentralized bargaining. The decentralization of negotiation in many ways reflects 
a growing trend in ‘business unionism’ as a response to debt crises, and could also 
be considered a reflection of ETUC’s limitations as a full worker representative 
body at the EU level.  
The combination of the tools of the EU social partners at the European level 
and the circumscribed room for economic negotiation at the domestic level due to 




redirecting efforts at policies in line with the EU language of “flexicurity”. 
Employment growth, particularly growth in forms of temporary, contract, and part-
time employment, is now emphasized over unemployment protections; employer 
adaptability is prioritized over worker compensation; and the security of 
employment over a worker’s lifetime is stressed over what is now a traditional idea 
of job security and protection from dismissals. To the point of ‘business unionism’ 
(Frege and Kelly 2004), it must be noted that this shift in strategy is one that has 
affected labour and labour organizations at all levels much more so than business 
and management.  
The third research question of this dissertation asked if and how pressure 
from the European integration project modifies the institutional legacies of 
domestic systems of industrial relations. Legacies, in this sense, refer to the 
qualitative ‘type’ of industrial relations system, from the categorizations associated 
with the pluralist-corporatist spectrum. Guiding this question was the logic of 
Europeanization, and the notion of gradual adaptation of policy and political 
processes and incremental institutional change. Featherstone argued that evidence 
for Europeanization could be found in “the emergence of a European political 
agenda…[and] the forms of interest representation (for example, corporatism 
threatened by more open and competitive modes of representation),” (Featherstone 
2003, 11). The answer to this question comes from the evolution of European 
Social Dialogue and its influence on the structure and substance of industrial 




informal in its application. The formality stems from the treaty laws governing the 
right of the social partners to be consulted and for them to request the initiation of a 
framework agreement into a potential Council directive. The procedure for 
consultation is also legally supported, with specific timelines provided for the 
duration of dialogue as well as resources provided by the Commission to enable the 
infrastructure for social dialogue to take place. The informality is found in the 
autonomous, bipartite style of social dialogue, which allows the social partners to 
negotiate between themselves without interference or restriction from the 
Commission or EP. The informality also extends to the duties of the social partners; 
while successive EU treaties have stipulated that the social partners have the right 
to be included in discussions on social policies, there is no legal obligation for the 
social partners to participate thoroughly (meaning, to employ a nine month period 
with a set expectation for a resulting opinion) on every single social policy, nor is 
there the stipulation that social partners have the right to be consulted on economic 
policies related to the Single Market.  
The effects of the structure and substance of EU social dialogue on the 
institutional legacies of Irish and Italian industrial relations are visible during the 
recent financial crises in each country. In both cases there was some form of 
dismantling of the negotiation procedure used previously to the financial crisis and 
some form of reorganizing dialogue between management and labour along more 
autonomous, bipartite lines. In Ireland, the structure of what had been 22 years of 




ICTU’s lack of compromise on public sector wages. The social partners began to 
cautiously undertake negotiations once again in 2012, but public statements by 
government and social partners alike indicated that there would be no return to the 
prior model of Irish social partnership. Instead, negotiation on matters relevant to 
the social partners would be undertaken in an increasingly independent manner 
(i.e., independent from government), and in a less comprehensive framework (i.e., 
not in the context of undertaking three-year programs for wage setting and welfare 
provisions, but on a more ad hoc basis). Prime Minister Enda Kenney specifically 
stated in late 2011 that social partnership had been too formal and ambitious, and 
that industrial relations in the future would be organized – and “re-branded” – more 
along the model of “social dialogue” (EIRO 2011). In Italy, the escalating debt 
crisis led to Prime Minister Berlusconi’s resignation in late 2011 and ushered in the 
technocratic government of Mario Monti. The social partners have been included in 
discussions surrounding key economic and social policies, but while the 
discussions themselves remain predominantly bipartite the actual content of 
dialogue is circumscribed. In relation to “business unionism”, the Monti 
administration has set the course for discussion and asked the social partners for 
their contribution regarding austerity measures, but not for their input on the 
validity of the measures themselves. Both events illustrate the potential power of 
the model of EU social dialogue on EU member states. When existing models of 
industrial relations are upended, the EU model serves as a powerful example for 




Also related to the possible modification of the institutional legacies of 
domestic industrial relations systems are EU labour laws, in particular the 2002 
Directive on the Information and Consultation of Workers. Generally speaking, the 
requirement that member states need to transpose EU directives relating to 
employment into national law either introduces or reinforces a baseline of labour 
law legislation domestically. This has been the case with directives on parental 
leave and part-time work. More specifically, the need to transpose legislation 
pertaining to the actual modes of discussion between labour and management, as 
was the case with DICE, creates a basic legal framework of social dialogue that 
definitively moves Ireland away from the categorization of ‘voluntarist’. DICE 
effectively mandated worker consultation systems in undertakings and enterprises 
over a certain size; the Irish transposition of this requirement created a law that is in 
direct contradiction to the institutional legacy of Ireland being a ‘voluntarist’ state 
of industrial relations. While Italy occupied a less concrete designation, with many 
legal attributes in public sector industrial relations and many voluntarist attributes 
in the public sector, the transposition of DICE has nudged Italy in a similar 
direction of becoming more formal in its approach to industrial relations.  
Interestingly, although DICE and other related directives (European Works 
Councils being the central example) have introduced important qualifications for 
any member state that relies on voluntary (meaning non-legal) approaches to 
labour-management discussion strategies, it would not be accurate to say that a 




combination of EU legislation and the example of EU social dialogue are together 
shaping the industrial relations of member states in a manner that is increasingly 
formal but is targeted towards an increasingly limited area of policy. Evidence 
toward this point, coming from multiple sources found in Chapters 4 and 5, offers 
support for the first hypothesis presented in the beginning of this dissertation: that 
the development of EU-level, supranational interest confederations generates 
pressure over time in member states toward a form of social dialogue that is 
increasingly less political and less binding than what already existed in certain 
member states, and yet this form is more structurally formal than what already 
existed. 
The second hypothesis introduced at the beginning of this dissertation 
proposed that EU legislation related to worker-employer relations generates 
pressure over time on domestic systems of industrial relations to decentralize 
collective bargaining to the individual company level. Using DICE as evidence, it 
would appear that this hypothesis has a significant amount of support. In Ireland, 
the transposition of DICE triggered debate between social partners concerning the 
role of trade unions at company-level worker consultation forums. IBEC, 
representing employer associations and businesses, won this debate, thereby setting 
the stage for non-union company employees to act as worker representatives in 
consultation bodies. In Ireland, the automotive company Fiat in late 2011 chose to 
abandon its participation in sector-level collective bargaining and opt toward 




DICE helped make Fiat’s transition to decentralized bargaining seamless, as the 
provision for independent worker consultation bodies removed the necessity of 
having to rely on union representatives at either the sectoral or national level. 
Another source of support for this hypothesis has been the combination of EU 
‘flexicurity’ policies with the recent financial crisis. Flexicurity emphasizes the 
importance of employer flexibility and adaptability toward helping European 
businesses stay competitive, and the timing of the financial crisis has provided a 
huge source of momentum to this rationale. Decentralization to the company level 
offers employers the maximum amount of flexibility in dealing with workers while 
still maintaining the rubric of collective bargaining and social dialogue, thereby 
marrying the economic bottom line of needing to enhance competitiveness and 
profitability with the European social model of valuing representativeness and 
responsiveness. 
The argument of this dissertation is that the EU has had significant impact 
on the domestic industrial relations systems of Ireland and Italy due to the 
mechanisms of the Single Market and EU social policies, as well as through the 
logic and consequences of EMU and the recent debt crisis. This impact is visible in 
shared trends toward decentralized bargaining, bipartite social dialogue, and a more 
circumscribed bargaining realm. It should be noted that this impact is inadvertent, 
or at least unintended – none of the relevant policies pertaining to economic 
integration or Social Europe were directly intended to have any substantial effects 




Europeanization being more a process of a conceptual change in the logic of 
behavior of member states, rather than a direct and intentional imposition of EU 
regulations upon domestic societies. The main actors involved in industrial 
relations in Ireland and Italy – government, trade union federations, and centralized 
employer associations – have seen fit to set agendas and organize interactions 
amongst themselves in a manner that best serves their own interests; their own 
interests now being symbiotically intertwined with the central features of European 
economic integration.  
One important qualification to the notion of the inadvertent and unintended 
Europeanizing effect of the EU level on domestic industrial relations is DICE. This 
directive explicitly and intentionally set out to standardize relations between 
workers and employers in companies over a certain size across the EU. In doing so, 
critical issues were brought to the forefront in Ireland and Italy: the role of trade 
unions in an increasingly competitive and austere business environment, and the 
introduction of the concept of worker consultation being an important part of 
business adaptability. Simplistically, DICE leveled the playing field for the 
voluntarist-corporatist categorizations that have previously been applied to 
European countries, by establishing a legal precedent for how workers and 
employers ought to communicate in the more voluntarist countries and by 
minimizing the amount of formality applied to the use of worker representatives in 




The argument of this dissertation highlights the flexibility of paths in path-
dependent institutional analyses. None of the research findings suggest that 
industrial relations in EU member states are undergoing fundamental structural 
convergences that would make labour-management dynamics across the union 
resemble each other. But nor do the research findings indicate that each case study 
continues to diverge from other models because it is committed to its own politico-
economic institutional path. What the evidence does suggest is that each member 
state is entrenched in its own politics and power struggles amongst established 
domestic groups but is also simultaneously entrenched and engaged with the 
dynamics of policy-making and articulation at the supranational level. The result is 
that countries’ paths continue to diverge along independent courses but the EU 
itself has created an additional institutional path, or layer, that all member states 
share as a complement. The degree to which the EU path and the domestic path 
merge is what provided the impetus for a fundamental jump in domestic politics. 
Entry into EMU and the experience of the recent financial crisis have provided two 
such ‘jumps’, manifested as critical junctures for the re-shaping of industrial 
relations in member states. 
On a broader scale, this dissertation speaks to the varieties of capitalism 
literature that addresses the politico-economic distinctions between different ‘types’ 
of capitalism in large, industrialized democracies around the world. Rather than 
address the specific characteristics that draw distinctions between particular 




form of capitalism that interweaves the more competitive open-market aspects of 
what is usually known as Anglo-American capitalism with some of the more 
socially-minded regulations familiar to continental, ‘Rhineland’ capitalism. This 
model is worthy of becoming a type of its own in its ability to use certain social 
protections to help promote and achieve competitiveness and adaptability among 
businesses and countries alike. The advent of legal requirements for worker 
consultation within DICE is one key component of this model; the concept of 
‘flexicurity’ as a prescriptive business strategy is another. The central emphasis is 
that certain social protections pertaining to workers and employers is considered 
necessary for enhancing competitiveness, rather than considered as a salve to the 
negative fallout arising from enhancing competition, and that EU institutions are 
undertaking initiatives related to this emphasis rather than simply encompassing a 
variety of types of capitalisms within a shared treaty regime. A defining 
characteristic of this ‘hybrid’ capitalism stems from the sui generis nature of the 
EU itself; as the EU is not a political state and as such does not carry out the 
functions of taxation and welfare that a political state would normally do, the EU’s 
idea of “Social Europe” is limited to the areas of regulation wherein it has 
authority. The central area – indeed, almost the only area – is that of labour law and 
employment generation guidelines. Social policies are therefore restricted to 
employment policies, and industrial relations are the domestic institutions that are 
ripe for internalizing the pressures of Social Europe efforts. The Irish and Italian 




The importance of this research lies in its contribution to literature on 
Europeanization and the potential arc of governance in European integration. 
Europeanization, as a change in the logic of domestic behavior, is a tangible 
phenomenon that is most visible during times of crisis or opportunity, as witnessed 
with the various developments related to EMU. Studying this phenomenon in the 
field of industrial relations offers insight into a process that is neither strictly 
intergovernmental nor neo-functional, but appears to be much more social and 
sectoral according to the politics at hand. The strongest parts of the data come from 
direct interviews with social partners and analyses done by industrial relations 
observatories, and consequently the strongest parts of the argument are grounded in 
the observations on worker consultation and social dialogue. Future directions 
relating to this research lie in the extension of the research argument to other EU 
member states and comparisons with European countries that are not EU members 
(i.e., Norway, Switzerland). As well, expansion into the process of Europeanization 
and its contribution to theories of European integration offers another potential 
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APPENDIX A: Table of Acronyms 
 
BE:  BusinessEurope (EU-level Employers’ Association) 
CEEP:  European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation 
CGIL: Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (Communist 
legacy) 
CISL: Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori (Christian 
Democratic legacy) 
Confindustria:  Italian Business and Employers Confederation 
DETE: Department for Enterprise, Trade and Employment (Irish) 
DG: Directorate-General 
DICE: 2002 EU Directive on General Framework for the 
Information and Consultation of Workers 
ECB:   European Central Bank 
ECJ:   European Court of Justice 
EES:   European Employment Strategy 
EIRO:   European Industrial Relations Observatory 
EMU:   Economic and Monetary Union 
EP:   European Parliament 
ETUC:   European Trade Union Confederation 
EU:   European Union 
EWC:   European Works Council 
IBEC:   Irish Business and Employers Confederation 
ICTU:   Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
IMF:   International Monetary Fund 
NAP:   National Action Plan 
OMC:   Open Method of Coordination 
SEA:   Single European Act 
SME:   Small and Medium Enterprise 
UEAPME: European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises 
UIL:   Unione Italiana Lavoratori (Socialist legacy) 
UK:   United Kingdom 
US:   United States 








APPENDIX B: Interview Codes 
 
Brussels (October-December 2008, with follow-up emails in 2009) 
• B1: ETUC Representative on Social Dialogue 
• B2: ETUC Representative on Collective Bargaining 
• B3: ETUC Representative on Social Dialogue and Regional Union 
Federations 
• B4: ETUI-REHS Representative on EWCs and Worker Representation 
• B5: BE Advisor on Social Affairs 
• B6: CEEP Advisor on Social Dialogue 
• B7: UEAPME Representative on Social Affairs and Vocational Training 
• B8: European Parliament, Advisor on Employment and Social Affairs 
Committee 
• B9: European Parliament, Head of the Economic and Social Affairs (ECO-
SOC) Committee 
 
Ireland (February 2008, with follow-up emails in 2009) 
• E1: ICTU, Policy Analyst 
• E2: IBEC, Policy Analyst 
• E3: Irish Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment; Assistant 
Principal of Industrial Relations Unit 
 
Italy (December 2008 in-person and November 2009 by phone calls) 
• I1: Confindustria, Public Relations 
• I2: UIL, Advisor on Social Affairs 
• I3: CISL, Public Relations 
• I4: Labour Market Analyst 
• I5: Former policy analyst in the Italian Ministry of Labour 
 
 
